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THE DOCTRINE OF PRUDENCE IN THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT THE GREAT

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THESIS

THE DOCTRINE OF PRUDENCE IN THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT THE GREAT

(Summary)

Albert the Great deals with the virtue of prudence principally in two works--the De bono, and an as yet unedited commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. According to available evidence, this commentary is preserved for us in the notes which Thomas Aquinas copied while attending Albert's lectures on the Ethics. Because of the presence of 'questions' in the commentary, it is felt that this Unedited Course does present the personal views of Albert. When he wrote the De bono, Albert did not possess the translation of Aristotle's Ethics, Book VI. In this thesis we wanted to study the virtue of prudence in the writings of Albert the Great and also to see whether the new Aristotelian material influenced Albert's views concerning prudence. Our method has consisted largely in an analysis of the De bono treatment of prudence and an analysis of the treatment of prudence which is to be found in the Unedited Course apropos the Aristotelian Ethics, VI, 5.

William of Auxerre and Philip the Chancellor were two immediate predecessors of Albert and the first authors to give serious consideration to the virtue of prudence. Albert's treatment in the De bono is particularly influenced by the discussion of Philip. In addition to this immediate influence Albert benefited from the classical speculation on the virtues and from the medieval tradition concerning discretio.

I

There are two major concerns in the De bono discussion of prudence. The first is the sciential nature of prudence; the second is the act of prudence. In the preferred definition of prudence, prudence is placed in the genus of knowledge (scientia). If prudence is knowledge, how can prudence be a virtue? Albert's reply uses the Aristotelian distinction between speculative and practical knowledge. Prudence is practical knowledge--knowledge totally ordered to the end of moral action. Following Aristotle, Albert also insists on the volitional character of prudence. It is the will which desires the end and under the thrust of the will the moral agent is moved to adopt means to the end under the guidance of prudence. The knowledge of prudence is consequent to the antecedent movement of the will.

The act of prudence is the second important aspect of the discussion of the De bono. From a psychological standpoint, the act of prudence is identical with the acts of practical reason and in his analysis Albert is indebted to John Damascene. This psychological dimension is essentially: examination of means to the end, judgment of the best means, choice of these means and the command to act. There is another dimension to the act of prudence for the moral agent is interested in choosing the most effective from among the morally good means to his end. Consequently, he must know how to judge the moral character of the action contemplated. Albert says that prudence informs the act with notions of the good, the useful, the expedient. These notions are expressed in

principles which Albert calls universalia iuris. If we view the process of deliberation after the model of a syllogism, then it is these principles that provide the major premise of the syllogism. They are the first axiomatic principles of the natural law. However, since actions are singular, a minor premise is essential in which the particularities of the situation are judged. The conclusion is the command to act or to refrain from acting. This expressed command of the conclusion is what is called conscientia.

Since prudence is an intellectual virtue, its matter is determined differently than is the matter of the moral virtues. The matter of prudence is essentially the object of choice in view of a good act. When the element of choice is present, there prudence ought to be present as guide in this choice. In view of Albert's remarks about the matter of prudence, and although Albert does not explicitly say this, we feel justified in counting the proper act of prudence as the act of choice.

The discussion of the matter of prudence raises the question of the relation of prudence to the other virtues. This relation had been expressed traditionally through the image of auriga (charioteer) virtutum. Prudence is the directive agent in the moral life. It is prudence that guides the other virtues through the contingencies of the moral life. Albert says that it is prudence that makes the acts of the other virtues human acts, and it does this by bringing them under the direction and guidance of reason. In this context, however, Albert has no positive doctrine of the connection of the virtues.

The second question on prudence in the De bono discusses the 'parts' of prudence. Cicero and Macrobius are the two main sources for these 'parts'. As found in Cicero, these parts go together to constitute the whole which is prudence. These parts are memory, understanding, and foresight. The parts found in Macrobius are rather conditions which facilitate the act of prudence. They defend the agent against rashness or blindness in the face of dangers.

The De bono treatment of prudence has three characteristics: (1) prudence is in the genus of knowledge; (2) prudence is closely associated with natural law which provides the principles for moral reasoning; (3) because of these two aspects, prudence is relatively free from any need for the moral virtues.

II

In the Unedited Course Albert finds a definition of prudence that places prudence in the genus of habit. In addition, he finds Aristotle several times sharply distinguishing prudence from scientia. Albert accepts this and provides no further discussion of the prudentia-scientia problem.

When Albert comes to describe the structure of prudential reasoning he uses the syllogism model of the De bono and he also uses the notion of natural law. The major of the syllogism enunciates the general principles of natural law. It is in this enunciation that the habit of prudence is substantially to be found. In another place Albert says the whole force (tota virtus) of prudence is in the major of the syllogism. In its principles prudence cannot err because the principles are part of man's nature. At this point Albert is under the influence of his earlier analysis.

In the Unedited Course Albert says that the 'parts' of prudence are the three auxiliary virtues of eubulia, synesis and gnome. These virtues are adjuncts of prudence and they aid in the execution of a prudent act. On the relation of prudence to the moral virtues, we first briefly outlined the teaching of Aristotle in this regard. Aristotle's position can best be summed up in the two maxims: "No prudence without moral virtue"; "No moral virtue without prudence." For Aristotle this means that prudence guarantees the perception of the goal in the moral life and that it guides human actions accordingly; moral virtue assures the stability of this perception of the goal and does not let the perception become blurred by passion or by immoderate pleasures. Albert agrees that there can be no moral virtue without prudence. Prudence rules and guides the moral virtues and provides them with their end. However, once he has placed prudence substantially in the enunciation of the principles of the natural law, he cannot see the need of moral virtue in the Aristotelian sense of "No prudence without moral virtue."

III

From this analysis it is evident that Albert has a consistent doctrine of prudence. This doctrine was shaped in its essential features in the De bono and the Aristotelian material did not seriously change that picture. Surely there are differences, but in its main outlines it seems not to have changed under the influence of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. However, we must not let this blind us to the historical value of Albert's doctrine of prudence. Albert systematised a vast array of traditional material. He was able to draw the lines of a treatment of prudence which was to be valuable in the future. He was able to put an end to the interminable discussions of the cognitive nature of prudence. Perhaps more importantly for his time, he was able to lay the groundwork for a natural human ethic based on principles accessible to man and flowering in virtues that remain natural virtues. In Albert we see historically demonstrated the central role of reason in moral thought. If man is defined by his rationality, then his moral reflection must disclose the role of reason in his moral life. In his doctrine of prudence, Albert has demonstrated the central role of reason in moral thought.

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THE DOCTRINE OF PRUDENCE IN THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT THE GREAT

P. Payer C. Ss.R.

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THE DOCTRINE OF PRUDENCE IN THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT THE GREAT

INTRODUCTION

1. Statement of problem

"In the twelfth century the tract on prudence is, one could say, as yet non-existent."[1] With this sentence Dom Lottin begins his article on the beginnings of the treatise on prudence in the Middle Ages. However, by the middle of the thirteenth century, in his Commentary on the Sentences, Thomas Aquinas outlines a general treatment of the virtue of prudence as one of the cardinal virtues.[2] By the time he wrote the second part of his Summa Theologiae Aquinas had developed an original and systematic treatment of prudence.[3] This means that within a space of seventy years the Middle Ages moved from a point of a complete lack of systematic treatment of prudence to a very highly developed treatment of the virtue. We can assume some development over this period and it is one aspect of this development which we want to investigate in our thesis.

Albert the Great was the teacher of Thomas Aquinas. From Albert, Thomas received his first instruction in the study of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. In fact, it is thanks to Thomas Aquinas that we possess the first full commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle which, as far as we know, was made in the Christian Latin West.[4] Albert, then, would appear to be an important operative force in the transmission of Aristotelian ethical learning in the Latin West. He might also be an important element in bridging the gap between a time when there was no tract on prudence and the magistral treatment to be found in the Summa of Aquinas. It is this hypothesis that we want to investigate in our study of prudence in the writings of Albert the Great. Our concern will not be to inquire into any direct literary relationship between Albert and Thomas. To demonstrate this would be to write another separate and lengthy study. We are interested solely in the study of the writings of Albert the Great. It is hoped that from this study we can show Albert to be a principal agent in filling the lacuna of which Lottin speaks in regard to the treatment of prudence.

Albert's discussions of prudence divide naturally into two phases. The first phase is the period prior to the possession of the sixth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics. The second phase is the period after the possession of the complete text of the Ethics. In terms of actual works in which Albert discusses the virtue of prudence and related questions, to the first period belong the De homine, De bono,[5] Commentary on the Sentences, II-IV; to the second period belong the so-called Unedited Course on the Ethics, Paraphrasis on the Ethics and the Summa Theologiae.[6] The three works of the second period are the principal works in which discussions of prudence are to be found among the many works of Albert during this period.[7]

2. Sources for doctrine of prudence

The statement of Lottin concerning the non-existence of the tract on prudence in the twelfth century although not untrue, does not adequately describe the situation prior to the thirteenth century, nor do the two brief paragraphs introducing his article adequately describe the situation. The treatment of the virtue of prudence evolved over many centuries out of discussions concerning *discretio*. Dingjan has demonstrated that the treatment of prudence by the Scholastics of the thirteenth century incorporates the essential elements of the earlier treatment of *discretio*.[8] John Cassian began the treatment of *discretio* and drew its main outlines for posterity. He spoke of *discretio* in a monastic milieu and for very practical purposes. Consequently, a systematic speculative treatment cannot be expected. However, he did attribute to *discretio* many characteristics which would be inherited by future writers. Some of the more important we shall note here.[9] The function of *discretio* is to discern between good and evil (p. 16). It finds the mean between excess and defect (p. 28) and directs our thoughts and actions (p. 21). There can be no virtue without *discretio* since it is the font and root of all the virtues (pp. 33-35). There is a close alliance between *discretio* and temperance since the moderation of discretio is temperance (p. 74). When prudence is mentioned, it takes on the aspect of knowledge or of rational process (p. 76).

After Cassian the tradition kept repeating what he had said. Gradually, however, prudentia begins to emerge. With this emergence, emphasis is placed on the definition of prudence provided by Cicero. At the same time, much of what had been said about discretio came to be applied to prudence. Where in Cassian prudence was an act of discretio, discretio now becomes an act of prudence, although sometimes there is confusion here (pp. 173-4).

After studying the work of Dingjan one can see the evolution of ideas concerning prudence. One can see that, while it is true that no systematic account of prudence is to be found in the twelfth century, the elements for such an account were present. The men of the thirteenth century had much to draw upon when they came to write about prudence. There was first the whole tradition concerning discretio. There was also the wealth of the classics. Philippe Delhaye has shown that Ethics was a recognised science in the twelfth century.[10] He has also shown how many of the texts of the classical authors were used as points of departure for moral commentary.[11] Cicero in particular will be one of the most important classical authors on whom the medievals draw for their discussions of virtue in general and prudence in particular. This is not too surprising when one realises that Cicero was one of the authors studied in the Faculty of Arts at Paris in the first part of the thirteenth century. The works of Cicero which were used were precisely those which we find Albert using so frequently in his De bono.[12] Macrobius too will be of importance in providing a definition of prudence which will receive particular treatment; in addition he will provide a description of the 'parts' of prudence.

Saint Bernard provides a text regarding discretio which will be used often by authors discussing prudence. Bernard says that discretio is not so much a virtue as the auriga virtutum.[13] Bernard's text seems to provide Peter Abelard with the background he needs for his contribution to the discussion of prudence. Abelard reports that some say that prudence is not a virtue but rather the mother and source of the other virtues.[14] This statement of Abelard is perhaps the reason why both Albert and Thomas discuss the question whether prudence is a virtue.[15]

As is well known, the Sentences of Peter Lombard was the standard text for the study of theology throughout the period of the Middle Ages after its publication.[16] In the Sentences there is no discussion of the moral virtues as such. However, there is a brief mention of the cardinal virtues (Book III, D. 33, chaps. 1, 2, 3). The first chapter lists the cardinal virtues; the second asks whether they were in Christ; the third discusses their operations (usus). The definition of prudence is taken from Augustine, "Prudentia in praecavendis insidiis."[17] The list of the virtues from Proverbs 8, 7 is also mentioned in the first chapter.

3. William of Auxerre

The foregoing is a very brief outline of the various sources which were available to thirteenth century authors who desired to write about the virtue of prudence. In the thirteenth century we see an attempt made to organise these sources into a systematic account of the virtue. Apparently the first man who did this was William of Auxerre in his Summa aurea.[18] It is a work of theology written in four books and it follows the general plan of the Sentences of Peter Lombard. In this work William has a very long treatment of the virtues.[19] The discussion of the cardinal virtues begins at fol. 155va. With regard to these virtues which are called virtutes politicae, William proposes this order of treatment: definition of each one of the virtues; their differences one from the other; separate consideration of each.[20]

Prudence is the first virtue to receive separate treatment. William's plan is as follows:[21]

> Et primo de prudentia de qua primo querendum est utrum sit idem quod scientia; secundo utrum scientia(a) sit species specialissima an genus subalternum; tertio utrum prudentia sit

> prima cardinalium virtutum et an sint
> tantum quattuor cardinales virtutes.

In the section treating of prudence and in other places William provides certain data and viewpoints which will contribute to the formation of the future approach to the study of the virtue. On the question of whether prudence is _scientia_, he answers that it is not. The reason is provided in the first solution. It is given in the form of a distinction with regard to the judgment of reason. The first judgment is discretionary judgment (_iudicium discretivum_). This is the _discretio_ by which reason judges that something must be done or not be done, but it remains a judgment. It is the _discretio_ of which St. Bernard speaks when he says that _discretio_ is not so much a virtue as the _auriga_ of the virtues. This judgment is concerned with knowledge and it is not a virtue. The second judgment is defining judgment (_iudicium diffinitivum_) by which reason orders (_imperat_) something to be done or not to be done, and virtue comes into play here. Prudence is the virtue which commands that something be done or not be done.[22] From this it would seem that the act of prudence is to order or to command. However, as Lottin points out, William is not too rigid in defining this act. In another place where he shows the relation between the two judgments, we find that choice (_eligere_) is also mentioned as the act of prudence:[23]

> Alterum est iudicium quo quis sciens per
> deliberationem et collationem aliquorum

> quid faciendum quid non, et diffinit et sententiat et imperat ut hoc fiat, illud non. Et hoc est primum opus virtutis post opus naturae et tale iudicium est meritorium vel demeritorium, et tale iudicium est actus potentiae eligendi quae est liberum arbitrium.

In this way the autonomy of prudence is safeguarded and does not become confused with moral philosophy (*scientia moralis*) on the one hand nor with the moral virtues on the other hand.[24]

For William, reason in its commanding, follows a certain norm and it is up to prudence to direct everything *ad normam rationis*. At this point we see William the theologian come to the fore. The norm in question is nothing other than conformity to the will of God.[25] The theologian is also speaking when William says apropos the cardinal virtues:[26]

> Iste enim quattuor virtutes habilitant hominem ad habendum theologicas virtutes et faciunt per exteriora opera hominem similem deo.

There are two further elements in William which will find a place in subsequent discussions. The first has reference to the parts of prudence. In the *Summa aurea* we find at least three divisions of prudence into its parts. Two of these divisions are important for future developments. One is taken from Cicero who divides prudence into: *memoria*, *intelligentia* and *providentia*.[27] The other is from Macrobius who divides prudence into: *ratio*, *intellectus*, *circumspectio*, providentia, cautela.[28] There is a third division which William gives which is rather curious. William simply says: "Again the philosophers divide prudence into monastic, economic, political."[29]

Another notion which will be discussed by later authors is prudentia spiritus.[30]

In the Summa aurea of William of Auxerre we find a very rudimentary discussion of the virtue of prudence.[31] However, the issues are beginning to surface and the main lines of a comprehensive doctrine are beginning to emerge. Many elements which will engage subsequent authors and particularly Albert the Great are contained at least by way of mention in William. It will be for other men to gather the main issues together and to advance a step farther in organisation and insight. This will not always be easy without the tutoring of Book VI of the Ethics of Aristotle.

4. Philip the Chancellor

After William it is to Philip the Chancellor that we must turn. The work in which Philip considers the virtue of prudence is Summa de bono.[32] Of Philip Lottin says: "Chez le chancelier Philippe les développements prennent une ampleur inaccoutumée qui en font le premier traité systématique sur la matière."[33]

Lottin deals with Philip's doctrine of prudence under two rubrics, viz. the proper act of the virtue and the influence of this virtue in the general economy of the moral life.[34] Consequently, the texts he chooses are determined by this view of the matter.

Philip has a very systematic approach to the cardinal virtues. After dealing with them in general he treats of each in particular. He begins with prudence as did William of Auxerre. His plan is as follows:[35]

> Quarto de singulis et primo de prudentia, circa quam queretur in hunc modum: primo quid sit secundum essentiam, cum diverse eius ponantur diffinitiones; secundo qualiter se habeat ad alias virtutes; tertio quis eius actus proprius (a) et quis essentialis et quis ordo actuum; quarto utrum habeat species et que sint ille, iuxta quod queretur utrum prudentia spiritus sit eadem cum prudentia virtute; quinto de eius opposito.

After outlining his plan Philip proceeds to give several definitions of prudence. The first is from Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae; the second is from the Glossa ordinaria on Matt. XV which in turn is from Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII; the third is from what was thought to be Augustine's De spiritu et anima; and then there are three from the De requie mentis of a certain Harialdus.[36]

We now turn to the material which Lottin provides. Lottin says that Philip is preoccupied with linking prudence with reason and will. It must be linked with reason since its act is essentially judgment and decision. It must be linked with the will since prudence is a virtue and virtue consists in the will--this is what is called prudentia virtus.

The prudence which is antecedent to virtue is called prudentia scientia.[37] The problem is to see how these two aspects of prudence can be related and what is the proper and essential resultant act of prudence.

There is some knowledge which has nothing to do with virtue or with prudence. Such is the pure knowledge of the speculative intellect. There is other knowledge which is an aid to virtue in general and to prudence in particular. This aid is given in various ways. There is scientia que dirigit ad virtutem and scientia que tantum disponit. Furthermore, the knowledge which disposes, disposes either remotely (a remotiori) or proximately (a propinquiori). The knowledge which directs (dirigit) is knowledge of good and evil in an incomplex manner according to which we are said to know how to act.[38] This knowledge is called prudence but it is not prudentia virtus. Its function is to direct the act of prudentia virtus. We shall not go into the other distinctions with regard to the disposing functions of certain knowledge except to say that we shall have reason to return to the distinction when we study how Albert deals with the same problem.[39] We have seen the act of prudentia scientia (knowledge of good and evil) to be that of directing with regard to prudentia virtus. What then is the act of prudentia virtus?

In order to answer this last question Philip has recourse to the psychological process of the human act. The act of prudence is going to be associated with this process in some way. As we have seen, prudence as knowledge is prior to and directs the virtue of prudence. This knowledge is a material disposition towards the virtue of prudence. After we know good and evil we choose (electio). It is with choice that the moral quality of virtue emerges (et prima ratio virtutum est in electione).[40] Philip also approaches the problem in another way. It is in consent to the good that he places the act of prudence:[41]

> Prudentia autem habet duplicem cognitionem: primam que est materialis, et secundum hanc non est virtus, de qua intelligitur quod "scire parum vel nichil facit ad virtutem"; habet aliam que est ordinata affectio super bonum sive consensus super bonum, et secundum hanc est virtus.

As Lottin points out, Philip fluctuates between electio and consensus as candidates for the act of prudence. However, Philip is clear on one point; whatever the name, it is an act of the will, the last decision of free choice.[42]

However, the problem is not yet solved. This act of choice or consent is common to every virtuous act. Now, if each of the virtues has its own area of interest, what is left for prudence? This problem is really asking what is the proper matter of the virtue of prudence and the relation of prudence to the other virtues. Philip answers this question by distinguishing between a general order and a particular or proper order. Each virtue has its own proper good, e.g., bonum delectabile is the matter of temperance, bonum arduum is the matter of fortitude. Prudence, however, looks to the good in general which is a formal disposition for any virtue. For this reason Philip says he agrees with the proof that prudence is the form of the other virtues. 'Form' here means forma ad bene esse. What Philip means is that for the good and smooth prosecution of the works of the virtues prudence as form is necessary; he does not mean this in the sense that prudence is to be taken as the internal formal cause of the other virtues.

Prudence is called the inspectrix medii.[43] Each virtue is the examiner of its own mean between excess and defect with regard to its own matter. There is another area, however, the area of the carrying out of the actions of the virtues, in which many obstacles can arise. This is the area of prudence--a general inspection with regard to the good in general or with regard to that in which counsel must be taken. From the aspect of the carrying out of the action and its continuation prudence is the perfection and form of the other virtues--the auriga virtutum.

Strictly speaking prudence does not have a proper matter in the sense that the other virtues are said to have proper matter. However, by appropriation prudence is said to have proper matter in the sense that the operation of reason is proximate to prudence. Prudence then is said to have a proper matter quantum ad rationem but not quantum ad rem. Philip ends this section:[44]

> Secundum predicta ostensum est quomodo prudentia se habeat ad alias virtutes ut principalior eis, utpote que non est tam virtus quam auriga virtutum, sicut dicit beatus Bernardus; quod ita est intelligendum quod et virtus est et auriga virtutum et inspectrix medii . . .

From what we have seen, it is clear that Philip has a very systematic plan in his approach to prudence. He develops this plan and in the development he touches upon several main themes. His solutions, while not always in verbal agreement with each other, are in substance consistent. As he proceeds, certain ambiguities are revealed. Prudence is concerned with electio and consensus, but because it is concerned with reason it also functions in a role of command and direction; because it looks to the other virtues in a general way it is the auriga virtutum. Philip has given us many elements but he does not succeed totally in integrating these elements. We shall see Albert take up these same elements and attempt to organise them around more basic and fundamental principles.

Before we directly approach the De bono of Albert a word must be said about the situation with regard to Aristotle at the time of the writing of the De bono. At this time the complete text of the Nicomachean Ethics was not available to Albert. All he had were the Ethica vetus (Books II-III) and the Ethica nova (Book I).[45] There were also commentaries on these first three books.[46] The sixth Book in which Aristotle treats of prudence ex professo was not translated at the time.[47] We should remember, however, that, while Albert only had the first three books of the *Ethics*, with these books he had a fairly complete treatise on the virtues in general. He uses this matter in elaborating his own treatment of the virtues in general.

From the foregoing we can see that when Albert wrote his *De bono* he was not writing in an intellectual vacuum. There was considerable material for a discussion about prudence--material which demanded assimilation, organisation and interpretation. While Albert did not have the complete text of the *Ethics* he did have a substantial number of the Aristotelian works. These works will aid him in solving some of the problems connected with the traditional discussion of prudence.

CHAPTER ONE

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF PRUDENCE

1. Tract on prudence in *De bono*

Saint Albert the Great continues the development of the analysis of the virtue of prudence in his *De bono* which was written shortly after the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor.[1] In the *De bono*, the first work in which Albert focuses in a particular manner on prudence, he gives a separate and lengthy treatment of the virtue of prudence.[2] However, besides being the first work of Albert to deal with prudence, there are other values in beginning our study with the *De bono*.

First, it is not a commentary. The study of a commentary for the doctrine of anyone is particularly difficult. An independent control is necessary if we are to be assured that the author is recording his own thoughts or at least manifesting agreement with the author who is being commented upon. The *De bono* is an independent work of Albert and in this work we find an independent treatment of the virtue of prudence. The second advantage of the *De bono* is its highly systematic format. Each part is articulated with what precedes and with what follows. Such a systematic presentation lends itself to a systematic study.

The tract on the virtue of prudence is in the section in which Albert treats the virtues singly. After fortitude and temperance it is the third of the virtues to be discussed. This order is a departure from the order of both William of Auxerre and Philip the Chancellor who begin their treatment of the individual virtues with prudence.[3] It does not correspond to the order of the cardinal virtues as enumerated by Peter Lombard taken from St. Augustine.[4] It does not correspond to the order Albert thinks Aristotle follows in the _Ethics_, viz. fortitude, temperance, justice, prudence.[5] The order Albert adopts does not seem to be based on any imagined priority among the virtues. He says he will first deal with the virtues which reside in the passions of the soul and then with the virtues which reside in reason.[6] He gives no explicit justification for this particular approach.[7]

When studying the tract on prudence it is important to remember its position in the whole _De bono_ of Albert. It has already been preceded by a general treatment of the virtues, the causes of virtue, the definition of virtue, the division of the virtues, the names of these virtues (_cardinales_, _principales_, _politicae_). In addition to this direct focusing on the virtues, other points have been discussed which are presupposed in the discussion of prudence. Of these perhaps the most important are the treatment of circumstances, the voluntary and involuntary, choice (_prohaeresis_) and _consilium_. These notions will be introduced when the occasions arise. It would take us too far afield to study them prior to our discussion of prudence itself.

The treatise on prudence immediately follows the treatment of the passions. The virtue of prudence is dealt with in two questions, viz., prudence in itself, and prudence in its parts. Each of the two questions is composed of six articles. With regard to the first question Albert says:[8]

> Circa prudentiam autem quaeremus duo, scilicet de ipsa in se et de ipsa in partibus eius. De ipsa autem in se quaeruntur sex. Quorum primum est, an sit virtus; secundum, quid sit per diffinitionem et substantiam; tertium, quid sit materia eius; quartum, quis sit actus eius proprius; quintum, utrum sit simpliciter vel multipliciter dicta; sextum qualiter non tam est virtus quam auriga virtutum.

If we compare this division with the division of Philip the Chancellor we shall see a marked resemblance. And if we examine their respective discussions of these points we see that the resemblance in at least what is treated is even closer although not identical in every respect. Although Philip does not discuss whether prudence is a virtue, both authors discuss several definitions of prudence. Philip then discusses the relation of prudence to the other virtues. This turns out to be a discussion of the matter of prudence which is what Albert deals with after the definition. There follows in both a treatment of the proper act of prudence. Philip then asks whether prudence has species; Albert in the same place discusses the various ways prudence is spoken of. He leaves a discussion of the species of prudence to the second question, on the parts of prudence.

In connection with this latter point Philip discusses *prudentia spiritus* and it is in this same context that Albert discusses *prudentia spiritus*. Albert then devotes a separate article to how prudence is called the *auriga virtutum*. This point is covered by Philip when he deals with the relation of prudence to the other virtues.[9] Faced with these similarities one would have to say that at least it seems that Albert was using the *Summa de bono* of Philip for his own purposes.

The second question in Albert's discussion of prudence deals with the parts of prudence as enumerated by Cicero and Macrobius. The sixth article of this question deals briefly with the three intellectual virtues which Aristotle gives in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Our own discussion of the virtue of prudence will not correspond exactly with the order of Albert's text. Our general plan will be to first treat of the definition of prudence, then prudence as a virtue, the act of prudence, the matter of prudence, prudence as *auriga virtutum*, and finally the parts of prudence. Perhaps some justification for this change of order is required. We want to build up gradually to an integral notion of prudence as Albert conceives it. The best place to start would be with the definition and substantial nature of prudence. Whether prudence is a virtue is a particular problem inherited from his predecessors and Albert feels that it calls for special treatment. However, when we see what prudence is, it will be clear that it is a virtue. Actually, many of the problems in the article on the definition of prudence are common to the article on whether prudence is a virtue. This is why we have chosen to treat the definition first. The article on the act of prudence demands a broad discussion of the whole intellectual and psychological framework within which Albert is writing. It seems to us proper to deal with the act after dealing with the definition and nature of prudence as a virtue. Why the matter of prudence is what it is becomes clear when we understand the act of prudence. Treatment of the matter of prudence suggests the relation of prudence to the other virtues and consequently we shall deal finally with prudence as the auriga virtutum. The fifth article of the first question on prudence more properly fits into the discussion of the parts of prudence.

2. Definition of prudence

At the time of Albert's writing, many definitions of prudence were current. Albert takes seven of these definitions as a core around which to construct his discussion of the definition of prudence.[10] The first definition is taken from the De inventione of Cicero: "Prudentia est bonarum et malarum utrarumque scientia."[11] The main problem here will be to show in what way prudence can be called a virtue and still be scientia. Albert inherited this problem from his predecessors. The gradual emergence of interest in prudence over the ages was accompanied by the use of this definition of Cicero. Cicero says that prudence is _scientia_. Albert will show how prudence is knowledge and at the same time a virtue. The objections center around this problem. A definition should mention what principally constitutes the thing defined, but prudence here is defined as _scientia_. _Scientia_ does not principally constitute the substance of prudence, therefore prudence is poorly defined.[12] This objection is the crucial one and on its reply will hinge other replies made to similar objections. Other arguments object either that prudence is really knowledge of the whole world,[13] or it is speculative knowledge.[14] It is in the replies to these various objections that the essential outline for a solution to the _prudentia-scientia_ problem is presented. By distinguishing the _kind_ of knowledge prudence is, Albert arrives at the definition of prudence. By showing that prudence is not merely knowledge he shows it to be a virtue.

Albert first distinguishes the type of knowledge that is involved when we say that prudence is _scientia_:

> Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod scientia per materiam coartata supponit id quod formale et substantiale est in prudentia. Scientia enim movens per hoc quod est boni vel mali, non est nisi voluntaria et quae est in ratione consequenter ad voluntatem ordinata, et de tali scientia intelligitur hoc. (_De bono_ IV, 1, 2, ad 1, p. 224.)

This is knowledge of good and evil which are objects of appetition and of flight and which motivate human choices. It is voluntary and subsequent to the initial tendency of the will to a good end. In this way the knowledge of prudence becomes part of the moral constitution of the agent. It is not knowledge which simply speculates about good or evil. Such speculation would be done under the formality of truth. Rather it is the intellectual apprehension (acceptio) of good or evil as such--either the absolute good or evil or what is good or evil in reference to the circumstances and in reference to right appetite.[15] It is in this particular kind of knowledge that we find the formal element of the virtue of prudence in as far as it is a habit associated with the will (habitus voluntarius).[16]

Further objections are raised to this first definition. Prudence directs in the use of every good; but knowledge must precede use; therefore, prudence must be knowledge of every good and consequently knowledge of every created thing.[17] From Cicero we gather that prudence is knowledge and explanation (ratio) of everything.[18] It seems, then, that prudence is "omnes scientiae simul sumptae."[19] These two objections present prudence as all knowledge or knowledge of everything. Albert demonstrates that this is not so. First, prudence is not knowledge of everything in the sense that it knows the natures of everything. Its knowledge is concerned with use and action. Consequently, the knowledge required is a knowledge which aids in desiring or doing some particular thing. This knowledge is sufficient for prudence to direct in the use of anything.[20] Secondly, prudence is not all knowledge taken together. Albert says that the text of Cicero which makes up the fourth objection is taking the term _prudentia_ in a wide sense by extending it to secondary matter. Secondary matter is related to proper matter as an aid to what is being sought. This can be in two ways. The first way is when the knowledge is concerned with the _content_ of what is known. Albert calls this the _scibile_. _Scibile_ is a term used to refer to a possible object of knowledge that has some direct relation to human action.[21] Such knowledge profits the act of prudence. However, it does not further the virtue of prudence itself by producing (_generans_) prudence. It functions in the role of teacher or persuader. Knowledge is of secondary matter in another and more remote way. The exercise of knowledge in one area is a disposition towards seeing the truth in another area. In this way even astronomy and geometry can benefit prudence. The content of the _scibile_ is not of value but only the exercise in knowing these matters.[22] This reply follows the direction already suggested by Philip the Chancellor in his distinction between the various kinds of knowledge and their relations to prudence.

The reply to the fifth objection develops the same argument. This objection, using Cicero, protests that prudence is speculative knowledge. In the text of Cicero various sciences are enumerated.[23] In reply Albert says that prudence is not speculative knowledge but practical knowledge. The introduction of the notion of practical knowledge shows how the influence of Aristotle is working in Albert. With the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge Albert found a way to solve the prudentia-scientia problem of his predecessors. Albert says that the sciences which Cicero mentions are concerned with prudence only per accidens and then not with the virtue itself but with the act. The solution then follows the same lines as the reply to the fourth objection.

Albert is gradually working his way through the various problems which arise from calling prudence scientia. Knowledge is reserved to aiding the act of prudence but so far has nothing to do with the production of the virtue as such. On the other hand, Albert has stated what is formal in the virtue of prudence, viz., the intellectual apprehension of what is good or evil simply or in relation to the agent.

The definition of Cicero says that prudence is scientia bonarum. Albert distinguishes what kind of good is involved here. Everything that is, is good by the goodness of nature because it participates in the good.[24] This is not the good that is meant here. Rather, it is the good according to the end, that is, the good which is the end of the appetite, moving the appetite through right reason.[25] The good is the end of the appetite which moves the appetite through right reason. Right reason is the directing force, the appetite the moving force, the good is the final cause which moves by being desired. Prudence is knowledge of this good.

Cicero also says that prudence is _scientia malarum_. Knowledge of evil is not a good thing and so prudence cannot be associated with knowledge of evil matters.[26] The objection will be standard and the reply will be uniform in each case. The solution will be based on two texts, one from St. Ambrose and the other from Boethius.[27] The knowledge of evil is not of itself evil, it is the attitude towards, or possible effects of, such knowledge which can be evil.

Albert gives his general judgment of this first definition. It is given from the standpoint of the genus and proper matter of prudence. The genus is _scientia_; the proper matter is good and evil, since these are the motive forces in voluntary acts.[29]

The second definition is also taken from Cicero: "Prudentia est 'indagatio atque inventio veri'."[30] As would be anticipated, the objections center around the concept of _verum_. Aristotle says that knowledge contributes almost nothing to virtue; but _inventio veri_ pertains to _scire_; therefore it does not pertain to prudence which is a virtue.[31] In the reply Albert puts in more systematic form the replies he had already given. He distinguishes three levels of knowledge related to prudence: (1) There is knowledge which contributes nothing to the virtue of prudence. Such is the knowledge of logic, physics, mathematics and metaphysics. The Aristotelian division of speculative knowledge is recognizable here with the addition of logic. However, this knowledge can contribute to the act of prudence since these sciences exercise the intellect in inquiry and investigation. (2) There is knowledge which contributes little (*parum*) to prudence. This is what Albert calls *scientia speculativa moralium* and it aids the act of prudence greatly (*multum*). (3) There is a third class of knowledge which Albert calls *pars virtutis*. He describes it in this manner: "Pars enim virtutis est acceptio eligibilium ad opus ex voluntate movente et ratione dirigente tantum."[32] The will moves not to know but to act. It is on account of action that knowledge is had and this knowledge directs action. The integration of will and knowledge gives a moral character to the whole process of prudential thought and action. What in the tradition of William of Auxerre and even Philip the Chancellor was pre-moral now is incorporated into the whole virtue of prudence.

It is objected that prudence should rather be called the *inventio boni*.[33] This objection attempts to undercut the intellectual basis of prudence. It would actually remove prudence from the intellect. Albert will not allow this and so shows the relation of the true and the good. The true in question is the true of the practical intellect, not of the speculative. When we assent to do a particular action we assent to something true. This true object is an actual, singular possible act. We want to perform a good action. We then find the true in a possible act which is good. Albert sums up the relation in this way: "Et hoc est quod dicitur communiter, quod prudentia est veri in ratione boni."[34] The assent of truth pertains to the intellect, but the truth involved is measured by the good to be done.[35]

With regard to this second definition Albert says:[36]

> Ad id quod obicitur contra secundam, dicendum, quod illa data est penes actum et finem prudentiae, qui est finis in ipsa et non in alio. Actus enim prudentiae est indagare et inquirere verum in operabilibus, et verum inventum in illis est finis, quem consequitur in seipsa.

The definition emphasizes the role of truth and reason in prudence. However, it is a particular kind of truth which is ordered to action.

The third definition is from Macrobius: "Prudentiae est mundum istum et omnia quae in mundo sunt, divinorum contemplatione despicere omnemque animae cogitationem in sola divina dirigere."[37] Since this definition pertains to the relation of prudence to the ultimate end of man (felicitas), and we are not concerned with this aspect, we shall not discuss it at any length. It should be noted, however, that Albert says that in happiness prudence has a more excellent act since happiness is the act according to the perfect virtue of the soul. Prudence directs to the first good in which happiness is to be found.[38]

The fourth definition is taken from Augustine: "Prudentia est amor ea a quibus adjuvatur, ab his quibus impeditur, sagaciter eligens."[39] The objections can be understood when we see Albert's judgment on the definition as a whole. He says that the definition takes into account four aspects of prudence. Prudence here is viewed as an infused virtue. It is infused through grace from love and so inclines to actions for the love of God. In this context Albert is speaking of prudence from a theological standpoint. As he says, this prudence does not operate _propter_ _honestum_ (as the acquired virtues do). The end of its operation is signified by the term _amor_. The second aspect this definition suggests is God. This is signified by the term _ea_ and refers to God. The third aspect is the act of prudence and this is suggested by the term _eligere_. The fourth aspect is the object: "Et hoc generale inclinans et formans ipsam quibus juvatur, sunt objecta ipsius."[40] This is signified by the words _quibus_ _adjuvatur_.

An objection is posed which would deny choice to prudence.[41] A full understanding of the reply cannot be had until we have seen the nature of the practical intellect and the relation of will and reason in the human act. Albert himself refers to a future treatment. It should be noted, however, that the objection strikes at the heart of the act of prudence by trying to remove choice from prudence. The solution to the problem would best be left to a later time when we have the conceptual tools for an adequate solution.

The fifth definition is from the *Glossa ordinaria* on Matth. XV (36). It is actually taken from St. Augustine. Prudence is said to be "cognitio rerum vitandarum et appetendarum."[42] There is one objection which gives St. Albert an opportunity to reiterate what has been said already. Both *scientia iuris* and moral philosophy are sciences which aid us in knowing what to desire and what to shun; so prudence must be moral philosophy.[43] This is false from what we have already seen. Knowledge of law and moral philosophy are concerned with actions and so are related closely to the act of prudence but do not produce the habit of prudence. The habit originates from the intellectual apprehension of possible courses of action and this apprehension is subsequent to the act of the will.[44] Albert says that this definition is given from the standpoint of the proper matter of prudence. Objects of flight and desire are within the class of objects which must be considered when action is contemplated. The knowledge and discernment of prudence is operative with regard to these matters.[45]

The sixth definition is taken from the pseudo-Augustinian work, *De spiritu et anima*: "Prudentia est virtus, qua anima scit, quid debet facere."[46] This definition is given from the standpoint of the effect of prudence in the subject (moral agent). Prudence by its own light causes the subject to know what he must do in matters of moral action.[47]

The seventh definition is one of the definitions which Albert takes from the otherwise unidentifiable Harialdus: "Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum cum alterarum dilectione et reliquarum detestatione scientia."[48] This definition, in the view of Albert, is the best definition among all the ones advanced. This is so because it gives the matter (good and evil), the genus or form (scientia) and the diversity of acts which arise because of the diversity of matter (love and hate or desire and flight).[49]

Although this last definition is the best of the seven, the others are all of some value. Albert says they all satisfactorily determine what prudence is but they do so under different aspects:[50]

> Dicendum, quod omnes istae diffinitiones satis bene determinant, quid sit prudentia, sed non determinant respiciendo ad idem.

We have pointed out the contribution each definition makes to the understanding of prudence. As a habit prudence pertains to the genus of scientia, but a very particular kind of knowledge. In order to solve the prudentia-scientia problem Albert distinguishes between the habit of prudence and the act of prudence. There is some knowledge which is a part of the virtue. This is the practical knowledge associated consequently with the will. The introduction of the will as antecedent to the knowledge allows Albert to say that prudence is scientia generically, but a knowledge which moves because of the relation of will and reason.[51] There are other types of knowledge which are related to prudence in various degrees. These are all forms of speculative knowledge, however, which facilitate the act of prudence but do not give rise to the habit. Only the intellectual apprehension of possible actions under the initial tendency of the will is involved in the production of the habit of prudence.[52]

3. Prudence as a virtue

The first article of the question on prudence asks whether prudence is a virtue. We have already seen that it was suggested by Bernard and affirmed quite straightforwardly by Abelard that prudence was not a virtue. Dingjan points out that discretio was never explicitly called a virtue:[53]

> En effet, nous l'avons déjà constaté plusieurs fois, jamais on ne s'est prononcé explicitement sur la valeur de la discretio en soi en tant que vertu; toujours il s'agissait de son rapport avec les autres vertus. Eh bien, vue comme telle, la discretio est un acte intellectuel.

It is true that both William of Auxerre and Philip the Chancellor consider prudence a virtue. They accepted this as a fact since prudence is one of the cardinal virtues in the traditional list. However, they do not explicitly handle the question. Albert does so in this first article.[54]

The solution to the article is quite clear: "Dicendum quod in veritate prudentia virtus est et est pars honestatis, ut dicunt sancti et philosophi."[55] Aristotle and Cicero are the principal authorities which Albert adduces in the sed contra to show that prudence is a virtue. These authorities are followed by what Albert calls rationes. They are arguments of Albert, not directly related to the objections, in which he proves that prudence is a virtue. These arguments are based principally on the central role reason plays in directing moral activity. Among the motive powers of the soul reason holds a central position. Consequently, the habit which perfects reason will be even more of a virtue than the habits of the other powers of the soul.[56] Another argument is given in the same vein. As a power of the soul is related to another power, so the habit will be related to another habit. The power of reason is related to the other powers as their ruler. Consequently, its habit will be ruler of the other habits.[57] In both of these arguments it is understood that the habit of reason which is spoken of is prudence.

Most of the objections in this article are based on certain views of Aristotle concerning the general theory of virtue. In sum, these objections claim that prudence cannot be a virtue since the general notions of virtue do not apply in the case of prudence. The first objection uses the apparent opposition between will and reason. If virtue is a voluntas quaedam or at least is not without will, and prudence is in reason, prudence cannot be a virtue.[58] The argument hinges on the minor of the objection, viz., "nulla virtus est in ratione." In reply Albert says it is false to say there is no virtue in reason. Every voluntary act is in reason in at least one way. The will is the antecedent mover of reason and in this way the act of reason takes on the character of being voluntary.[59] In the same way prudence as a virtue is in reason and is a habit of the will.[60] The acquisition of virtue is a voluntary and free acquisition and the virtuous person can be subject to praise and blame. In this way prudence satisfies the observation of Aristotle that only voluntary actions are praised or blamed.[61] Prudence, then, is a voluntas quaedam and does not move without will and so is a virtue.

Another objection is raised from the standpoint of Aristotle's theory of virtue. Aristotle says that intellectual virtue acquires much ex doctrina and so needs experience and time.[62] However, the principles from which virtues arise are operations and passions; therefore, prudence is not a virtue.[63] In his solution Albert makes a distinction. Prudence has two aspects, the aspect of virtue and the aspect of knowledge. What pertains to the aspect of virtue is formal in prudence. What pertains to the aspect of knowledge is material. In so far as prudence is formally a virtue it is effected through operations and passions. In these the will is the first mover in the rational part of man and this is reason. He concludes: "Et ideo in omni opere et passione relinquitur id quod est virtutis consuetudinalis, et id quod est prudentiae."[64] It is true that prudence needs experience and learning (doctrina). It finds these in the same operations in which moral virtue is to be found. Consequently, prudence does arise from operations like the other virtues.[65] However, in so far as prudence has a certain knowledge (material element), it is perfected through study and learning and can be said to be generated secundum quid ex doctrina et studio.[66]

Aristotle says that no virtue is for the sake of contemplation but is aimed at making its possessor good.[67] However, Cicero says that prudence consists in the knowledge of the true and this would seem to be the truth of the speculative intellect.[68] In reply Albert first shows the relation of prudence to the text of Aristotle. Prudence is not for the sake of contemplation but is propter opus. Even prudence which is knowledge of moral matters consists only in use aimed at making a man morally good. Its value does not lie in the learning acquired.[69] Albert then interprets the text of Cicero. Cicero says (Albert quotes this text): ". . . primus ille, qui in veri cognitione consistit, maxime naturam attingit humanam. Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem."[70] In the interpretation the text of Cicero is associated with a text of Aristotle concerning metaphysics:[71]

> Sed, sicut dicimus, homo liber, cum sui ipsius causa sit et non alterius, sic et haec sola liberalis scientia est, sola enim haec sui ipsius gratia est.

Albert then distinguishes the kinds of truth all men desire to know. There is first the knowledge of being in itself which pertains to metaphysics. This knowledge is not propter opus since it is speculative and not practical. There is also another knowledge of the truth which is naturally desired by all men. This is the knowledge of the cause of being and it pertains to the theologian. Neither of these two forms of knowledge is what Cicero means. Albert concludes the reply:[72]

> Alio modo sumit Tullius in libro De officiis scire, quod desideratur ab omnibus non gratia sui, sed gratia honesti, quod est in ipso, quod pertinet ad felicitatem, quae est bonum hominis, secundum quod est homo; et hoc scire maxime est prudentiae et non est contemplandi gratia, sed ut boni fiamus.

Cicero has a definition of virtue which was famous in the Middle Ages: "Nam virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus."[73] An objection is based on this definition. Since prudence is per modum artis et scientiae and not per modum naturae prudence cannot be a virtue.[74]

Albert's reply to this objection is a summary of his teaching regarding prudence as a virtue. Admittedly, prudence enjoys an element of knowledge, and to this degree prudence is an intellectual virtue. Reason is the subject in which prudence is to be found. However, if this were the sum total of prudence, it could hardly be called a virtue. Reason is antecedently moved by the will to a good and this characterises prudence as a virtue. The will is the source (generans) of prudence. The movement of practical reason perfected by prudence does not arise from a knowledge of the reasons for acting but from the good which is the object of the habit and through the dynamic force of the virtue: ". . . tamen non tam inclinat eum ratio quam bonum habitus et vis ipsius sicut in aliis virtutibus."[75] To illustrate this point Albert provides two arguments, the first is an example (signum), the second gives the reason (causa). (1) As an example, Albert points out that we often see simple common people who are devoid of scientific moral knowledge making good moral choices. What is it that moves them to do this? They lack the knowledge which would provide them with a kind of art of moral reasoning. It is the power of the virtue which directs and moves them. (2) The reason for Albert's view is provided if we ask a prudent man why he makes the choices or decisions he does make. His reply will not be an account of the rational arguments which convince him. Rather he will say that what he desired was a good thing and he was directed by reason in his choice.

Albert says the reply would be, "quia recta ratio virtutis vel boni."[76] (Albert obviously does not think the man in the street would reply in this way! He is putting a certain philosophical terminology on his lips.) Experience shows that many men who know the arguments or reasons for acting, act to the contrary. The movement to act arises out of a union of knowledge of the morally good with the habitual inclination to the good acquired through virtue. Consequently, the virtue-character of prudence, that by which we become good and perform good deeds, arises formally from the relation of prudence to the good. It does not arise from mere knowledge of morals. Perhaps at this point Albert was thinking of the words of Aristotle:[77]

> But the mass of mankind, instead of doing virtuous acts, have recourse to discussing virtue, and fancy that they are pursuing philosophy and that this will make them good men.

Since nature inclines through habit, Albert says that prudence moves to action per modum naturae et non artis. Now there is an element of knowledge in prudence, and art inclines to action through the conviction of reason. Consequently, Albert says that to give the total picture, we should say that prudence, "inclinat sicut natura habens artem."[78]

Prudence, then, is a virtue. The subject in which the virtue is present is reason or the practical intellect. It is essentially a virtue of the will, which, as motive power, is antecedent to the reason. Only in this way does the act of reason become voluntary. The knowledge which is involved in prudence is a knowledge which is totally ordained to action. The prudent man does not know in order to contemplate or speculate about what he knows. He knows in order to become a good man.

In the two articles we have examined, Albert develops in outline the essential notes of the virtue of prudence. He did not have Aristotle's _Nicomachean Ethics_, Book VI, but what he did have he used. The Aristotelian distinction between speculative and practical knowledge provided the key to solve the traditional _prudentia-scientia_ problem. The distinction between moral and intellectual virtue helped to situate prudence within the realm of virtue. However, Albert himself adds an important note to this development. The notion of the will's anteceding reason and being the mover of reason incorporates prudence into the full moral life. Will involves the good which is operative in prudence as the end moving to right choice.

In these articles, however, there are several questions unanswered. Albert speaks of the act of prudence at one time being the investigation of reason into the truth and at another as being choice. The concept of practical reason must be elucidated, and, as we have mentioned, the relation between will and reason calls for further explanation. These questions are treated in the context of the discussion concerning the act of prudence. We shall turn to this subject now.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ACT OF PRUDENCE

To understand the nature of prudence we must understand the act of prudence. Albert deals with the act of prudence after his consideration of the matter of prudence.[1] In this arrangement he is no doubt influenced by the plan of Philip the Chancellor. We have chosen to deal with the act of prudence before the matter since the prior question works from a broader base. The whole framework for prudence as an intellectual virtue is provided in a thorough discussion of the act of prudence. What the matter of prudence is will follow directly from a consideration of this act.

1. Practical intellect

In the solution to the article on the act of prudence Albert says: "Prudentia enim et ratio practica eosdem habent actus."[2] If this is so, then we must understand something about the nature of practical reason. Consequently, in order to facilitate our understanding of the act of prudence it would be best at this point to examine what Albert has to say about the practical intellect. He discusses this subject at De homine, q. 63, in four articles. The first article takes up the question of the definition of the practical intellect. The definition and connected discussion center around the definition given by Avicenna. Avicenna says that the powers of the human rational soul are divided into the power of knowing (virtus sciendi) and the power of acting (virtus agendi). He continues, "et unaquaeque istarum virium vocatur intellectus equivoce aut propter similitudinem."[3]

The virtus agendi which is called an intellectus by Avicenna is further understood by Albert to be the practical intellect. Whereas Avicenna defines the vis activa, Albert defines the practical intellect, including in the definition the notion of vis activa. Albert says:[4]

> Dicit Avicenna in libro sexto de naturalibus, quod intellectus practicus est vis activa quae est principium movens corpus hominis ad actiones singulas quae sunt propriae cogitationis, secundum quod intentionibus convenit quae ad placitum praeparantur ei, et habet respectum in comparatione virtutis vitalis appetitivae, et respectum in comparatione virtutis vitalis imaginabilis et aestimabilis, et respectum in comparatione ipsius ad se.

Nine objections to the definition are proposed and the solution follows. We shall look at the solution now.[5]

Albert says that the definition of Avicenna is a good one and is given from the standpoint of those things which proceed from the practical intellect, i.e., human works (opera). Now, whatever works one might consider, whether these be discovered in moral matters or in the mechanical arts, they must be performed through the body.[6] This is why the definition says the practical intellect is a principle movens corpus. Averroes, according to Albert, says that the practical intellect moves through its knowing in so far as the knowledge refers to the ordering of actions (dispositio operabilium).[7] In the light of this, Albert explains the next part of the definition, viz., that the principle is, "ad actiones singulas quae sunt propriae cogitationis, secundum quod intentionibus convenit quae praeparantur ei ad placitum." Cogitatio refers to the discursus of practical reason in its investigation into actions to be done. The principles (rationes) of these actions arise through the notions which are prepared ad placitum, that is, they are prepared with a view to the will since only voluntary acts are under consideration here.

Albert goes on to discuss the three relations of the practical intellect. Through the discursus of practical reason and the investigations into possible actions it is the office of the practical intellect to order the principles which have a view to action. Albert says these principles are, "aut in opere aut in ratione operis." This phrase is difficult to interpret. It can only be interpreted in the light of what follows. In the division which follows Albert calls attention to the faculties from which the various actions proceed. The faculties seem to be determined by the kind of act (opus) that is in question. Principles "in opere" are principles determined by an action which is itself determined by something else. This first way of conceiving action has two subdivisions. On the one hand, the principles "in opere" are principles "in ratione operis pertinentis ad consuetudinem". These are the principles of the moral life as such which is perfected through moral virtue. The principles involved are the appetitive vital powers, viz., the irascible and concupiscible appetites. The relation is a relation whereby these appetites are ordered or directed by practical intellect.[8] On the other hand there is another relation to principles "in opere". This is the case when the action or work pertains "ad naturam extra". This is the case with the mechanical arts. Here the work proceeds from practical intellect through the mediation of the imagination and estimative power. The relation is a relation of practical intellect to these powers whereby practical intellect effects an action. These two relations refer to principles "in opere".

Albert says the principles of action can also be "in ratione operis". Here it is a question not of the intellect's ordering or working through other faculties or powers. Rather, it is a question of the intellect being ruled by principles which it possesses itself. It is practical intellect in relation to its own directive principles. Following Avicenna, Albert says these principles are known of themselves, per se nota. Such principles would be, "To lie is wrong.", "We must give to each his own." In this way the practical intellect is related to itself since it is in possession of the very principles by which it is ruled.[9]

Continuing further in the text of Avicenna[10] Albert says that in the first relation certain affections (e.g. shame) and particularly the natural passions (fear, hope, joy, sadness) arise. In the second relation the mechanical arts arise. In the third relation the principles of activity which he calls dignitates (axioms) arise.[11]

The fourth article discusses the difference between the practical and speculative intellects. The difference is shown from the nature of the practical intellect. This difference is described by Aristotle whom Albert quotes:[12]

> Et consuevit dici, quod speculativus per extensionem fit practicus, propter illud verbum Aristotelis in tertio De anima ubi dicit: "Amplius extendente se intellectu et dicente intelligentia fugere aut imitari, non movetur, sed secundum desiderium agit, ut inabstinens."

As the clarifications in the preceding note show, Albert had an incorrect text of Aristotle and he used it to explain the difference between the speculative and practical intellect. After quoting the text of the De anima, Albert poses the question: "Sed tunc quaeritur, quae sit ista extensio?"[13] Some say that it is an extension from the notion of the 'true' to the notion of 'good' or 'evil', in accordance with what Aristotle seems to say in the Ethics, viz., that the work of ethics is not for the sake of contemplation, but that we might become good.[14]

In the solution Albert answers his own question. The speculative and practical intellects are the same in substance, but are differentiated by reason. This means that there are not two distinct intellects in question. There is one intellect which can be differentiated by the mind and the basis or ground for this distinction is what Albert calls, "extensio a vero in bonum". There are three principal extensions which so characterise the practical intellect and differentiate it from the speculative. There is the extension to the good (*ad bonum*), to an action (*ad actuale sive operabile*) and to the appetite (*ad appetitum*).

The good is the first mover and the first thing moved is that to which the good reveals itself.[15] This is the practical intellect. In this way the practical intellect extends itself to the good. The good in question is the good in an actual state of singularity characterised and thoroughly determined by its circumstances. It is within this structure of the actual that an action takes place.[16] This is the basis for a human action being called a *voluntarium*. The principle of the act is in the one knowing the circumstances in which the act is to be posited.[17] Further, the good does not, as it were, announce itself except as being appetible. It is the appetibility of the good which draws the perceiver. In this way the practical intellect is extended by moving the appetite to the acquisition of the good.[18]

Albert continues by showing that the characteristics of the practical intellect are lacking in the speculative intellect. He sums it all up tersely when he says: "In speculativis enim status est."[19] By this expression Albert means that the speculative intellect is not further concerned with action. Matters of speculation are static. He then goes on to point out how the three extensions are lacking in the speculative intellect. It knows the true but as truth and not as its own good. If it does apprehend the good, it does so as true since the notion (*ratio*) of anything is the principle of its truth. Consequently, the *ratio boni* is apprehended by the speculative intellect as furnishing the truth about the good. It is not apprehended as a good to be realised or executed. The speculative intellect does not extend to particulars, nor to the appetite since the speculative intellect does not consider an act to be performed.[20] While Albert speaks of three extensions of the practical intellect, it should be noted that it is a question of three aspects of the one object of the practical intellect. The *bonum* to be realised is the *actuale* with the quality of being appetible. It is a single object with three dimensions.

In his reply to the sixth objection Albert gives four differences which exist between the speculative and practical intellects. He says these are gathered from Aristotle and

Avicenna.[21]

The first difference is given in a text in which Aristotle says that the end of speculative science is truth while the end of operative (practical) science is action.[22]

The second difference is that the practical intellect has the operative form of the thing and in this way is composed with the action done. The health which is induced in a sick person is from the health in the soul of the doctor. (This does not mean that a sick doctor cannot cure. The health involved here is the health in the art of medicine which the doctor possesses.)[23] However, the form in the speculative intellect is not referred to a thing but is abstracted from a thing. These forms are called respectively, *forma compositionis* and *forma abstractionis*.

The third difference is that the practical intellect knows the particulars in which the action is to take place. The speculative intellect is concerned with universals and does not know the matter or the material conditions in which alone the universal form is diversified by the matter.

The fourth difference is that the practical intellect, since it has an aspect of the appetitive, accommodates itself to the body and infuses it with motive power so that motion might take place.[24] The speculative intellect does not do this but withdraws itself from the body in order to rest in the universal.

One aspect of the practical intellect will enable us later on to understand certain aspects of natural law and synderesis. The third article asks: "Utrum intellectus practicus semper sit rectus."[25] The practical intellect can be understood in three ways:

1. "A certain nature and part of the rational soul."[26]

2. "In so far as it is potentially intelligibles and operables."[27]

3. "In so far as it is the seat of the principles of actions."[28]

If the practical intellect be understood in the first way then it can be drawn towards evil. This is shown in the case of the angels who were drawn to evil even without the use of the phantasm.[29] In this sense then it is not semper rectus.

If the practical intellect be understood in the second way, again it can be drawn to evil. The principles of actions are in particular circumstances and so the practical intellect must attend to the particular contingencies of actions. However, in this case the practical intellect can turn to evil through error or ignorance. Consequently, in this second sense it is not semper rectus.

If the practical intellect be understood in the third sense then it is concerned with the universal principles of natural law (universalia iuris).[30] In these matters there is no error and so, in this third sense only the practical intellect is semper rectus. In support of this position Albert says:[31]

> Et quia sic proprie accipitur, eo quod sit de ratione intellectus, ut dicit Avicenna, quod sit circa universalia remota a materia et appendiciis materiae, dicit Philosophus, quod semper est rectus.

This outline is a sufficient background to understand the nature of the practical intellect. It is an aspect of intellect distinct from the speculative intellect. It is basically a dynamic (movens) principle which looks to the field of operation and not to the static contemplation of truth. It is the vital principle in human activity and, as we shall see, the nature of prudence is largely determined from the close connection between the practical intellect and its full development which is nothing other than the virtue of prudence.

2. Damascene and the human act

We have already seen Albert speak of the identity of the acts of prudence and the acts of practical intellect. This is the complete text of Albert:[32]

> Per omnem enim eundem modum, quo in tractatu De anima, quaestione De ratione dictum est de actibus prudentiae, ita hic dicendum videtur de actibus prudentiae. Prudentia enim et ratio practica eosdem habent actus, eo quod ratio actum dat, prudentia autem informat eum per rationes iuris et expedientis et honesti.

We have already looked at the nature of the practical intellect. Albert says that reason gives rise to the act;

prudence informs the act through certain notions (*rationes*). Before we can deal directly with the act of prudence we must first look at the human act as a psychological process proceeding from practical intellect. Albert's analysis of the psychology of the human act is determined more or less by the analysis of John Damascene. Consequently, we shall first examine the analysis of Damascene, then we shall see how Albert uses the material of Damascene and finally we shall study the role of prudence in the human act. In this way we shall arrive at the act of prudence as Albert understands it.

After stating the two powers of the soul (cognitive and appetitive) and their respective parts (appetitive parts are *βούλησις* and *προαίρεσις*),[33] John Damascene discusses the appetitive parts of the soul and in so doing treats of the dynamics of the human act.[34] To understand the later developments and the problems which will arise through the Latin translation of Damascene, it will be well to consider the analysis of Damascene in some detail.[35]

I. 1. *θέλησις* : a natural power implanted in the soul which tends to what is in conformity with nature and conserves everything essentially in nature.

2. *θέλημα* : is *ὄρεξις* : both rational and vital drawn only by goods which pertain to nature.

3. *θέλησις* : is a simple power *ἡ ἁπλῆ δύναμις*).

4. *βούλησις* : is *ποιὰ φυσικὴ θέλησις* with regard

to a particular undertaking.

5. βούλησις: is the rational tendency to move naturally towards some object.

6. βούλησις: is a term used with regard to both objects which are within our power, and those which are not.

7. βούλησις: seeks the end (τὸ τέλος) and not what leads to the end.

8. βουλητόν: is the end.

9. βουλευτόν: is in view of the end; that of which we deliberate.

II. (After βούλησις)

10. ζήτησις καὶ σκέψις.

After these, if what is desired is within our power:

11. βούλη, i.e. βούλευσις.

12. κρίσις.

13. διατίθεται (passive of διατίθημι which would seem to mean here to be favorably disposed towards what we judged. Lottin translates it: "l'on est attiré.")

14. γνώμη: one loves what has been so appreciated after deliberation--sentence.

15. προαίρεσις, or, ἐπιλογή.

16. ὁρμή: impulse towards action.

17. χρήσις: use (the act).

18. παύεται: desire or appetite ends after use.

The De fide orthodoxa of John Damascene was translated into Latin about 1148-50 by Burgundio of Pisa.[36] The Latin translation in the Greek Patrology is not the same as the one known to the men of the Middle Ages. Lottin provides an edition of the section of the De fide orthodoxa we have been concerned with in its Latin translation.[37] The following outline will be an attempt to show how the relevant terms in Damascene's work were translated by Burgundio. We shall follow the previous Greek outline (nos. 1-18).

I. 1. Voluntas: naturaliter est inserta animae virtus appetitiva eius quod secundum naturam est, et omnium quae substantialiter naturae assunt contentiva.

2. Thelima: id est voluntas, est appetitus rationalis vitalis ex solis dependens naturalibus.

3. Thelesis: id est voluntas . . . simplex virtus.

4. Voluntas: autem est qualiscumque naturalis thelesis, id est voluntas.

5. Bulisis: (ipse rationalis appetitus ad aliquam rem), id est voluntas (above bulisis in a second hand in one ms.: vel consiliatio).

6. Bulisis: id est voluntas, et in his quae sunt in nobis et in his que non in nobis sunt.

7. Bulisis: id est voluntas (second hand: vel consiliatio) finis, non eorum que ad finem sunt.

8. Voluntabile: igitur finis.

9. *Consiliabile*: ad finem.

II. (Post consiliationem, bulisim, id est voluntatem).

10. *Inquisitio* et scrutare.

Post hec, si ex his que in nobis sunt:

11. *Consilium*: scil. consiliatio.
12. *Judicium*.
13. *Disponit*.[38]
14. *Sententia*.
15. *Electio*.
16. *Impetus*.
17. *Usus*.
18. Deinde cessat ab appetitu post usus.

Lottin indicates two points in the translation which are going to hinder the West from benefiting fully from the analysis of Damascene.[39] The first is the absence of distinct terms to render *θέλησις* and *βούλησις*. Notice that the one word *voluntas* is used to render these two different Greek terms. It is true that the two words are also transliterated but the one Latin word only makes for confusion and misunderstanding. The second point is the incorrect translation of *διατίθεται* by *disponit*. The medievals will not know what to make of this word.[40]

3. Albert and the human act

We shall now turn to Albert's treatment of the human act. We have already seen his views concerning the practical intellect.[41] We should point out that practical intellect is ranked along with phantasm and appetite among the motive powers.[42] Practical intellect and phantasm command action, appetite executes the command. Practical intellect is of the rational order directing action according to the abstract formality of the good as such.[43] Rational appetite is called 'will' if it is a question of the good as such. It is called 'irascible' or 'concupiscible appetite' if it is question of a concrete good.[44] The difference between will and intellect is clear. Practical reason moves by commanding or ordering and directing. In this sense a person issuing an order to someone can be said to move him. However, the will is a *motor* in the sense of a real efficient mover of the powers of the soul. In the *De homine* Albert speaks of the will being the general mover of all the powers to action.[45] In the *De bono* he says the will is the *motor universalis virium*, and the *motor motorum in anima*.[46] With these distinctions made we are in a position to look at how Albert views the *processus* of the human act.

Albert is commenting on the text of Damascene in the Burgundio translation.[47] The first act is the apprehension of the good in itself, or in other words, the end. This is an intellectual act. There follows immediately a movement of the will towards it before any act of reason. These acts are not as such in John Damascene but Albert says Damascene presupposes them. The first is of the practical intellect, the other of that will which only has regard to the end. The acts which follow look to the means. The first act is to investigate the ways of achieving the end. Since reason inquires into many possible ways, the second act is to examine by seeking counsel what is the better way to achieve the end. When reason is persuaded of one way it passes judgment on it as being the best way. Since there are many others opposed to this one, it prefers it through counsel and chooses it before the others. After choice there is the command of reason to do it since by means of it the thing is obtained. We have then the fruit of the thing desired which is use with joy. Since the end intended is arrived at, appetition or desire ceases.[48]

4. Act of prudence paralleling human act

This is a rather clear outline of the psychological _processus_ of the human act, but it remains psychological. Now, Albert has said that the acts of prudence parallel this schema. _De bono_ IV, 1, 4, asks what is the proper act of prudence. The solution to the article says that the act of prudence is multiple. Albert does not say there are many acts. In some way prudence covers a whole dynamic process. As the solution says, prudence informs the act _per rationes iuris et expedientis et honesti_. In the solution Albert analyses this complex act of prudence.[49]

There is the act of prudence in itself and the act in so far as it commands motion and action. The act in itself is twofold, viz., antecedent and consequent. The antecedent act is the disposition and potency for the acts of the virtues. The consequent is as the perfection, in so far as it is the role of the ruler to perfect. The antecedent act is multiple. First, reason grasps a possible act (operabile) and then examines it in the light of the notions of law, the expedient and the absolute good. It then takes counsel with itself on how the object is to be achieved or shunned. Then reason ordains. The consequent act is choice. The act according to which reason commands an action to be done is the sentence to do something.[50]

This text of the De bono does not reproduce the analysis of John Damascene in all its detail. It simply gives the broad outlines and refers back to the previous treatment of the De homine.[51] Realising this and taking seriously the remarks of Albert about the acts of prudence being the same as the acts of reason, we must now analyse this text and try to see what it is which prudence does.

It is to be remembered that Albert does not say what the proper act of prudence is. In fact he says the act is a multiple or complex act. We are speaking about a human action which is dynamic in its operation. In reply to the first objection Albert says that the first act of prudence is "acceptio et examinatio operabilis."[52] There are two terms here which must be understood, viz., acceptio and *examinatio*.

The source for the term *acceptio* is Aristotle. The Greek term is ὑπόληψις and is found in the *De anima* III 3,427b16.17.25.28. In these places J. A. Smith translates the term as 'judgment'.[53] A clarification of how Albert understands the term is given in the *De bono*. In the article on the matter of prudence, an objection is raised based on Aristotle:[54]

> Item, videtur hoc per rationem, quia dicit Aristoteles in III *De anima*: "Sunt autem et ipsius acceptionis differentiae scientia et opinio et prudentia." Ergo prudentia est species acceptionis per rationem et intellectum; hoc enim vocat ibi Aristoteles acceptionem. Omnis autem acceptio per rationem et intellectum est de vero cognoscibili. Ergo prudentia est de vero cognoscibili, et sic materia prudentiae erit verum cognoscibile.

We are not directly concerned now with the reply of Albert as such. We are only interested in the light the reply throws on the notion of *acceptio*. Albert says:[55]

> Ad aliud dicendum, quod accipit ibi acceptionem communiter pro apprehensione intellectus speculativi et practici tam in necessariis quam in probabilibus.

He continues by showing that prudence is not the whole of *acceptio* since *acceptio* is divided into three levels. The type of *acceptio* pertaining to prudence is that of the "verum actuale ordinatum ad opus per rationes boni utilis vel honesti."[56] This phrase would seem to telescope into one the first four phases: apprehension, examination, counsel and ordering.[57] After the apprehension of the possible action we have the examinatio operabilis. This examination or inspection consists in a confrontation of the thing apprehended with certain canons of the good. These are said to be notions of law, the expedient and the absolute good (honestum). Through these notions prudence informs the human act. In this way we are apprised of the goodness or badness of the contemplated action.

These notions are clarified for us in the article on the matter of prudence. They are considered as principles of the good for practical reason by which prudence comes to the knowledge of the good and desirable act to be done. It is in view of these notions that prudence chooses.[58] Commenting on a text of St. Paul: "Omnia mihi licent, sed non omnia expediunt; omnia mihi licent, sed non omnia aedificant." (I Cor. 10, 23), Albert clarifies further what these notions are. Albert says:[59]

> Innuit enim Apostolus, quod omne opus electum debet esse ratione liciti vel ratione expedientis vel ratione aedificantis.

This is the basis for saying that prudence chooses in view of these notions. The notion of the licit is the notion of law. Our choices must be in accord with what is allowed by law. Albert is thinking primarily here of natural law. The two other notions refer to the type of good which can form the basis for judging the goodness or badness of a proposed act.[60] Paul's expediunt refers to the useful (utile). The useful or the expedient is the good chosen not for itself or its own value but because of its value in contributing to the attaining of a good end. The notion of *aedificare* is close to the notion of *honestum*.[61] With the *honestum* we are dealing with a good which is chosen for its own worth because of its own goodness. It is an end as such.[62] It is through these notions of law and the useful and the absolute good that the truth apprehended provides a knowledge which can be focused on a particular action (*contractum ad opus*).[63]

After the *acceptio* and *examinatio* there follows counsel. The agent takes counsel with himself on how the particular act is to be either done or avoided. In the reply to the third and fourth objections this is called *consiliatio de operabili*.[64] In the previous text from the *De homine* counsel follows *inquisitio*.[65] Albert writes: "Since it investigates many matters, its second act will be counsel which seeks to find out which of these matters would be better for the obtaining of the end."[66] Counsel is similarly described in the *De bono*: "For through discernment, counsel pronounces what would be right (*rectum*) and what not right."[67]

Counsel discerns. Albert specifies more clearly how this discernment is made. There is a certain discernment through the habit of speculative knowledge. This is done through such sciences as law, moral philosophy and theology. As we have seen already, they benefit the act of prudence through their own matter. But people discerning with such knowledge sometimes make poor choices. There is another discernment which is the knowledge of prudence and which is related consequently to the will:[68]

> Et huius signum est, quod illa discretio semper est propter electionem et opus et praecedit electionem et opus sicut necessitas ad illa. Et illa discretione discernens numquam male eligit vel operatur . . .

This is a very strong statement. Such infallibility demands some rectitude of reason in the prior examination of which Albert speaks. It is this rectitude which we must study later.

A problem arises in regard to counsel. In both texts we have looked at, counsel is viewed by Albert as an act of practical reason. However, Damascene calls it an appetite. In the Burgundio translation we read: "Consilium est appetitus inquisitivus de his quae in nobis sunt, rebus fiens."[69] This difference is raised as an objection to the definition of John Damascene.[70] In reply Albert makes a distinction. If we take appetite strictly in so far as it is divided into desire and will, then reason is not appetite or any part of it and in this sense the first objection is valid. However, Albert says that *in veritate* counsel is *appetitus inquisitivus*. This is so through a reduction of reason to appetite:[71]

> Appetitus enim est generale movens, in cuius forma omnia moventia uniuntur ,

> sicut notatum est in quaestione De potentiis motivis. Et sic ratio practica reducitur ad appetitum, et illius appetitus inquisitivus est de faciendo vel non faciendo.

This distinction of Albert is very important. All the steps of the human act in Damascene are acts of appetitive powers. All the acts in Albert's analysis are acts of practical reason. Only in a reduction of this sort can there be any parallel between what Albert is saying and what Damascene is saying.

After counsel there follows *ordinatio* (*deinde ordinat*.)[72] What does this act refer to? In the schema of Damascene (in the Burgundio translation), after counsel there follows judgment. This is a judgment regarding what is the best means to use here and now. After judgment there follows (because of the faulty translation of διατίθεται) *sententia* and after this, choice (*electio*) and after choice the impetus to action. In the text of the *De homine* that we have seen, the sequence is as follows:[73]

> consilium
> judicium de uno tamquam melius
> electio
> imperium rationis.

It is the judgment of Lottin that because of the faulty translation of διατίθεται, the phrase connected with this term is made to describe the act corresponding to *sententia*. *Sententia*, then, would seem to serve as a reduplication for *imperium rationis*.[74] The confusion lies here since in Damascene *sententia* precedes choice and the imperium rationis which Albert identifies with Damascene's impetus. In Albert sententia is subsequent to choice.[75]

In the text of the De bono under investigation, sententia follows choice and is identified with the imperium rationis (Actus autem quo imperat opus, est sententia de faciendo.). Sententia is the last act of prudence for Albert:[76]

> Ad aliud dicendum, quod Tullius tangit actum ultimum prudentiae, qui est sententia de opere per rationes iuris sive liciti, quod idem est, et expedientis et honesti; per hanc enim sententiam actio discrete et prudenter fit.

The notions of law and the expedient are present once again to inform the act. The act is commanded because it is in conformity with these principles. Such conformity has been initially sought in the examination of which Albert speaks when giving the antecedent act of prudence ("Deinde examinat ipsum per rationes juris et expedientis et honesti.") In our view, without further evidence, it would seem that the "deinde ordinat" refers to the judgment which follows counsel and is prior to choice.

Choice follows upon this judgment. In the text of the De homine Albert says:[77]

> Post consilium vero suasum de uno dat judicium de ipso tamquam melius. Et hoc cum aliis multis sit ei oppositum, praeoptat illud per consilium et praeeligit.

Choice is, you might say, the natural completion and fulfillment of counsel. Counsel is performed in view of choice.

Counsel, judgment and choice make up one whole which leads to the settling on the specific means to the specific end.

In the De bono Albert analyses the concept of choice.[78] In Aristotle he finds a definition of choice:[79]

> Dicit Aristoteles in III Ethicorum, quod "eligentia est consiliabile desiderium eorum quae in nobis sunt." Eligentia autem et prohaeresis sunt idem.

Albert analyses this definition after the manner of a literal commentary.[80] Aristotle's definition makes three points which are of the essence of choice. The term consiliabile suggests the object of choice. We do not take counsel about any object whatever. In general we take counsel about means to an end. More specifically, we take counsel about those means which, while doubtful, at least provide the possibility of aiding in the attainment of the end. The examination of reason results in a judgment as to which means are useful and which are not. The term desiderium, if understood in a wide sense, suggests a certain will. This is a will which follows upon the judgment of reason. Reason judges the means from the standpoint of the usefulness in arriving at the end. From this judgment there is a preference (praeoptat) for one means over all of those proposed. This is a preference of will which is an aspect of choice. The terms "eorum quae in nobis sunt" suggest the act of choice. Possible actions are said to be within our power. These are the actions which Aristotle describes when he says: " . . . actus, quorum nos domini sumus." (EN III 8, 1114b31-32) This is the choice (electio) of which Albert is speaking when discussing the act of prudence. Through counsel and judgment we make our way through the doubtful but possible means to a desired end. We choose the means we have judged most suitable to the end we set for ourselves.

Even a cursory glance at this analysis should convince one of the central role that reason plays in the dynamics of the moral act. We have tried to understand what Albert means when he says, "Prudentia enim et ratio practica eosdem habent actus, eo quod ratio actum dat."[81] We must go further in an attempt to understand what he means by the rest of the sentence, " . . . prudentia autem informat eum per rationes iuris et expedientis et honesti."[82]

5. Act of prudence and principles of natural law

The act to be chosen must be seen in its moral nature. This is the only way we discover whether it is a good and desirable action. We find this out by examining the act in the light of the above notions of law, the expedient and the absolute good. These notions give rise to principles:[83]

> . . . ita habet prudentia et intellectus
> practicus penes se quaedam principia boni,
> quibus venit in rationem boni operabilis
> et appetibilis, et hae rationes omnes
> sumuntur ex parte iuris sive debiti propter
> honestum et decens vel propter expediens.

From the comparison with the first principles of the speculative intellect, we gather that there are first principles of the practical intellect. If this is so, then the practical intellect in some way has these principles of the good and can know them. In Albert's discussion of the nature of the practical intellect he spoke of *principia per se nota* whereby practical intellect was itself ruled.[84] He called them principles of activity or *dignitates*. In the article on whether the practical intellect is always *rectus* we saw Albert call these principles the *universalia iuris*.[85]

What are these *universalia iuris* and do they have any relation with the *rationes iuris* we have seen already? In the *De homine* Albert speaks of the first principles which constitute the natural law aiding practical reason to discern between good and bad. These principles are the *universalia iuris*. They are in man by nature:[86]

> Sicut enim in speculativis sunt principia et dignitates, quae non addiscit homo, sed sunt in ipso naturaliter, et iuvatur ipsis in speculationem veri, ita ex parte operabilium quaedam sunt universalia dirigentia in opere per quae intellectus practicus iuvatur ad discretionem turpis et honesti in moribus, quae non discit homo, sed secundum Hieronymum est lex naturalis scripta in spiritu humano. Et dicuntur ab Augustino universalia iuris. . . .

The natural law is nothing else than these first principles of the practical intellect: "Ius naturale non est nisi in principiis ultimis iuris humani et est ipsa principia."[87] Natural law is common to all rational creatures and without it moral action could not be performed. It is the initial light of the practical intellect whereby man is put in possession of the general lineaments of good and evil.[88] With these principles he is endowed with the means by which he can discern between good and evil. They furnish him with principles from which reason can judge whether the concrete act is good and to be done or evil and to be avoided. However, there is a significant gap between abstract principles of morals and concrete good actions placed in the existential situation. This gap must be bridged if action is to be performed. Consequently, we must investigate further the implications of natural law.

6. Synderesis

If it is through natural law that the first principles of practical reason are furnished, the further question arises as to man's possession and use of these principles. How is man in possession of these principles and how does he use them? According to Albert these universal principles of practical reason are possessed through the habit of synderesis and are brought to bear on action through synderesis.[89] Synderesis functions both as a habit and as a power of the soul. When speaking of the universal principles of natural law, Albert says:[90]

> Sine praejudicio dico quod synderesis est specialis vis animae, in qua secundum Augustinum universalia iuris

> descripta sunt. . . . et subiectum
> illorum synderesis est.

In the same place he gives a comprehensive definition of synderesis: "Synderesis est vis cum habitu principiorum iuris naturalis."[91]

F. M. Henquinet has discovered a manuscript with questions which he feels are the work of Albert.[92] One of the questions deals with synderesis. Several phrases in this question help to highlight the nature of synderesis.[93] These phrases are as follows:[94]

1. "Dicimus quod synderesis est potentia rationalis animae."
2. "Sed discernere motum est dupliciter: aut secundum rationem boni non consideratum in particulari, sed penitus separatam ab appendiciis materiae et sic est movens intellectus practicus."
3. "Aut enim regulatur aliquis ad finem universalibus quibusdam principiis, et sic est sinderesis que habet apud se universalia iuris circa que non est error, sicut est intellectus principiorum in speculativus."
4. "Sic igitur dicimus quod synderesis est quedam potentia motiva per habitum universalium iuris et habet aliquid de cognitione et aliquid de appetitu, sed plus se tenet ex parte cognitivarum."
5. " . . . sed sinderesis accipit universales rationes operandorum."

All of these statements confirm in some way the aspects of synderesis and practical intellect which we have seen Albert point out.

7. Conscientia

It is in the doctrine of natural law and synderesis that we find a proper understanding of the rationes iuris expedientis et honesti. It is in this same background that we must look for an understanding of what Albert calls the last act of prudence. Albert says: "Actus quo imperat opus, est sententia de faciendo."[95] In the reply to the second objection of the article on the act of prudence he says:[96]

> Ad aliud dicendum, quod Tullius tangit actum ultimum prudentiae, qui est sententia de opere per rationes iuris sive liciti, quod idem est, et expedientis et honesti; per hanc enim sententiam actio discrete et prudenter fit.

We must investigate further into Albert's understanding of this expression of the command to act (sententia). It is that by which prudence commands the act to be performed. The act is performed because it is in conformity with the universal principles of natural law. However, these principles are universal and remote from the material circumstances of the act. Consequently, there is a gap between the universal principles and the actual act here and now. How is this gap to be filled? It is filled by what Albert calls conscientia.

In the text which ultimately lies behind the whole speculation concerning synderesis in the Middle Ages, St Jerome says:[97]

> Quartamque ponunt quae super haec et
> extra haec tria est, quam Graeci vocant

> *συντήρησιν* quae scintilla conscientiae
> in Cain quoque pectore, postquam ejectus
> est de paradiso, non extinguitur . . .

Here synderesis (the spelling which was used through the Middle Ages) is called the *scintilla conscientiae*. Further in the text it is even called conscience. Albert justifies this by saying that conscience follows from synderesis through reason.[98] He relates synderesis and conscience as major and conclusion of a syllogism:[99]

> Major autem istius syllogismi est synderesis, cuius est inclinare in bonum per universales rationes boni. Minor vero est rationis, cuius est conferre particulare ad universale. Conclusio autem est conscientiae.

Albert continues in this same text to explain what he means. The first act (synderesis) is not meritorious or non-meritorious since it does not concern a particular act.[100] The second act (of reason) is not concerned with an action's imperativeness, but the formality (*ratio*) of the act. Reason says whether the act envisaged is good or not but it does not yet command it to be done or avoided. Albert then continues:[101]

> Sed quando infert per modum sententiae hoc esse faciendum vel non faciendum tunc, excusat si sequitur in illo opere, vel accusat si non sequitur.

The *sententia*, then, is the expression of the judgment which is arrived at through inference. Conscience is an act of reason, but not a reasoning process.[102] Reason commands through conscience. It is like the conclusion of a syllogism. The _sententia_ is the expression or enunciation of this command to act or to refrain from acting in a particular matter.

We have already seen that synderesis is without error. We know, however, from experience, that we can err in our judgments and can do wrong. This erring must be attributed to reason in drawing a wrong conclusion. Reason can be mistaken in its application of the universal principles to particular cases (_licet ex parte rationis quandoque decipiatur_).[103]

8. Prudence and relation of will and intellect

Our discussion to this point has focused almost exclusively on the role of reason in the human act and in the acts of prudence. However, prudence is very much related to the will as any virtue must be. It is to safeguard the fundamentally voluntary character of prudence that Albert is careful to delineate the order that obtains between intellect and will. The question of this order does not only have regard to the area of prudence but extends to any moral act. There is a right order and there is a wrong order:[104]

> Potest tamen dici, sicut quidam dixerunt, quod intellectus ordinatur antecedenter ad voluntatem et consequenter: et quando antecedenter, tunc movet voluntatem, et non errat, et ille est ordo proprius: quando vero consequenter,

> tunc quandoque errat, et est ordo indebitus et innaturalis, per quem egrediuntur mores perversi, ut dicit Avicenna.

In order to have a true morality the intellect must antecede the will and so move the will.

If this is so then the converse must also be true, viz., the will is ordered to the intellect consequenter. Elsewhere this is not what Albert says, however. In discussing the meaning of the term voluntarius in Aristotle's definition of virtue in relation to intellectual virtue, Albert says:[105]

> Ad id quod obicitur de li voluntarius, dicendum, quod licet quaedam virtus sit intellectualis quantum ad obiectum, tamen est voluntaria, secundum quod voluntas antecedenter ad intellectum practicum ordinatur . . .

Before attempting a reconciliation between these two views concerning the order of will to reason or intellect we must try to understand the underlined phrase in the above text. In the generation or causality of virtue the will plays a principal role. We have seen this emphasized in the previous chapter. Albert is in agreement with Aristotle that the moral virtues are caused in us by the corresponding moral actions.[106] We become just by doing just acts.[107] Moreover, the acts performed must be voluntary acts. The will, then, is also an efficient cause of virtue for Albert:[108]

> Ad aliud dicendum, quod licet plura sint

> efficientia virtutem, unum tamen est principale, quod est voluntas. Hoc enim est efficiens operationis, quae immediate causat virtutem consuetudinalem.

We have seen Albert juxtapose the relation of moral philosophy to the act of prudence and the generation of prudence. Moral philosophy does not contribute to the generation of prudence. After speaking of the proximate relation of moral philosophy to the act of prudence Albert continues:[109]

> . . . sed tamen non generant habitum ipsius, quia ille, eo quod voluntarius est, sicut omnis virtutis habitus generatur ex acceptione operabilium consequenter ad voluntatem ordinata.

Here again the will is antecedently ordered to intellectual apprehension. The reason given is because the habit is voluntary and so its initial move must be voluntary. The will is the mover of reason in this case as in any voluntary rational act. In another text we have already seen, Albert speaks in the same way. It was objected that no virtue is in reason; but prudence is in reason and therefore prudence is not a virtue. In reply Albert says that it is false to say that no virtue is in reason. When the will is the mover of reason and is antecedently ordered to reason, the act of reason is made voluntary. Consequently, the virtue of reason which in this case is prudence, will be a virtue and in reason.[110] Again Albert says:[111]

> . . . operatio, ex qua relinquitur virtus, et similiter passio est illa in qua voluntas est motor primus.

It is clear from these texts that the will is antecedently ordered to reason in order to ensure the basic moral or virtuous character to human action.

Saint Albert discusses this question ex professo. He asks what it means to say that, "prudentia sit in ratione, secundum quod consequenter se habet ad voluntatem."[112] He had used this expression in the previous article.[113] Now he wants to determine the precise meaning of the expression. Albert begins his explanation with a text from Aristotle:[114]

> Dicit autem Philosophus in III De anima, et nos supra explanavimus in quaestione De movente, quod "appetitus movet et propter hoc intelligentia movet, quia principium ipsius appetitivum est, phantasia autem cum moveat, non movet sine appetitu."

Using this text, Albert defines the meaning of the above expression. He says that in this text Aristotle wants to show how all the moving powers are united in the appetite. In knowledge, however, which pertains to the moving intelligence, there is first the appetite inclining to the intellectual apprehension of the possible action. The appetite here is rational appetite which is called will.[115] From this initial inclination of rational appetite to the intellectual apprehension of a possible action, there follow the human acts we have already seen. Albert says:[116]

> Igitur in scientia, quae est intelligentiae moventis, primus est appetitus inclinans ad acceptionem operabilis et

> consequenter intellectus accipiens
> scientiam operabilis vel inquirens et
> disponens et consilians et etiam sen-
> tentians de operabili recto et non
> recto. Ergo scientia est hic conse-
> quenter ad appetitum.

Albert then anticipates a possible objection. Someone might say that this same process obtains in every knowledge because there can be no inclination unless from the will and so this knowledge too is consequently ordered to the will. Albert says this objection is not true. In other knowledge the intellectual apprehension is not made with a view to action or desire but solely in order to know. In the case we have been discussing, the knowledge is because of subsequent operation and desire. In this case the knowledge is consequently ordered to the will and is in what is willed or in the object of the will. In the case of pure speculative knowledge, the acts which have regard to the act of study or consideration are simply after (posterius) the will act. This is the case when it is not the object of the will but rather the end of the speculative intelligence.[117]

Albert is distinguishing here between scientia consequenter ad voluntatem ordinata and actum studendi posterius voluntate. In the first case the knowledge subsequent to the will is a practical knowledge totally ordered to an action to be performed. This knowledge is intimately connected with the object of the will, the appetibile, the bonum. The will and its object are present throughout the whole process of the moral act. The knowledge concerned is a knowledge of this object. In the second case we have simply a question of before and after. The knowledge, for example, of the speculative sciences is a knowledge which is an end in itself. It is not further ordered to any practical activity. It is true that the will must move the intellect to know; but 'to know' is the end in view. We are no longer striving to create a human act in the reality of our lives. Knowing is the end in view and when we have been moved to know then the will as such has, you might say, done its job. In speculative knowledge you have a simple case of an act of knowledge following upon the inclination of the will. In moral action the will and the knowledge are intimately connected as movers towards operation. Through this analysis Albert has shown that prudence is in reason. However, it is in a reason which is antecedently moved by the will and so is voluntary and can be called a _quaedam_ _voluntas_.[118]

Three objections are brought up against this view. The will has regard to the execution of the act, while prudence directs the act. In any such situation what rules and directs is prior to what is ruled and directed; therefore prudence is related antecedently to the will.[119] In reply, Albert points out that the will is not said to be antecedent in the execution of the act (_in_ _actu_ _operis_) but in the intellectual apprehension of the object in so far as it is object of desire. By such knowledge and through choice, reason and likewise prudence direct so that the act will be done with discretion. In this way reason and prudence can be said to antecede the will in the action. However, neither reason nor prudence takes precedence in the acceptio operabilium.[120]

There is a similar objection. Prudence should be related to the concupiscible and irascible appetites. But reason is antecedently related to the concupiscible and irascible when a morally good (rectum) act is performed. Therefore prudence also will be antecedently related to the other virtues in every action and never consequently.[121] In reply Albert says that the concupiscible and irascible appetites are more principal when considered from the standpoint of the object and its investigation. The proof of this is that if we ask why reason accepts some knowledge or a possible act to be done, the answer will be, not in order to reason or to know, but to desire or to hate. Consequently, the concupiscible and irascible are as the efficient and final causes in the acceptance of any knowledge. Reason is the leader and auriga. This would make reason, as regards the acceptio, consequently ordered to the concupiscible and irascible. A similar answer is given as regards the relation of prudence to fortitude, temperance and justice.[122]

In Avicenna Albert finds another objection. Albert refers to him as saying that when reason rules (dominatur) good action is produced. However, when will rules, then evil action arises. The conclusion follows: "Ergo voluntas numquam antecedenter se habet ad rationem in opere virtutis, sed semper consequenter."[123] Albert's reply is clear enough:[124]

> Ad aliud dicendum, quod dictum Avicennae intelligitur de dominio ducis et aurigae in actu, non in inclinatione prima vel in ratione finis in opere, quia sic verum est, quod dicit.

This text brings us back to the original text from the De homine.[125] There the same reference to Avicenna is made to authorise the statement regarding the intellect, " . . . et quando antecedenter, tunc movet voluntatem et non errat, et ille est ordo proprius." We pointed out that this statement is in apparent contradiction to others in the De Bono which say that the intellect is ordered consequenter to the will. The solution to the apparent contradiction is in this reply to the eighth objection. If we are speaking about the order of ends and the initial inclination towards the apprehension of means to the end then the statement is not true. In this case the intellect is related consequenter to the will. However, when speaking about the order of means to the end then the statement is true and reason is related antecedenter to will.

We have already mentioned the difficulty medieval masters had with Damascene's analysis of the human act in regard to the will. They were not able adequately to assimilate the teaching of Damascene with regard to θέλησις and βούλησις. Albert too was not altogether clear on the meaning of Damascene. However, there is one thing on which he was clear, viz., that βούλησις has regard to the end and not the means in human action.[126] θέλησις is natural will which inclines to what is constitutive of nature within us. This is the initial inclination to the good of nature. The βούλησις of Damascene is the *voluntas* of Albert which is directed towards the end. This is the will which is antecedent to reason. Will inclines towards the end. It is the function of reason to find ways to achieve the end. This particular will has no relation to means to the end. Albert gives his reason for saying this about βούλησις.[127] βούλησις is placed among the purely appetitive acts--acts ordered in no way to apprehension. Consequently, it can have no part in distinguishing or ordering since these acts pertain to the rational dimension. In matters concerned with finding right means to an end inquiry and distinction and ordering are necessary. This is so since there is doubt and indecision concerning means to the end. There is no simple will (*voluntas*, βούλησις) of these things. However, since it is presumed that the end is certain for one who is desiring means to the end, this will or βούλησις looks to the end. Here it is a question of appetition only.

However, Albert is not denying that in regard to means there is will. He is simply saying that where we have pure will then this will has regard to the end. There is a will which Albert calls *voluntas deliberativa*. He defines it thus: "Deliberativa vero est de his quae secundum prohaeresim eliguntur."[128] Now, both deliberation and choice have regard to means and not ends. Consequently, this *voluntas* has regard to the means and not the end. If deliberative will has regard to the means then it must share in the work of distinction and ordination, which, Albert says, is from preceding knowledge. In this case the will is consequent to the intellect or reason. The will is as it were mixed with reason to perform the two-fold task of moving and apprehending and ordering. It seems that this *voluntas deliberativa* is described by Albert when he describes a second way the will can be viewed:[129]

> Alio modo accipitur voluntas, secundum quod est in ratione imperans aliis potentiis et rectificans eas per habitum rationis.

The virtue by which this deliberation and choice are done is prudence; prudence which is a habit of the will as Albert insists but which is *in ratione* and so acts according to the ordering and ruling role of reason.[130]

We are in a position now to look at a previous objection which denied choice to prudence.[131] Choice (*electio*) pertains to freedom of choice (*liberum arbitrium*) and this freedom of choice is a combination of reason and will. Prudence does not arise out of such a combination and so choice does not pertain to prudence. In reply to this objection Albert points out what we have just seen, viz., will is related both antecedently and consequently to reason. This means that this two-fold relation also holds for prudence:[132]

> Et ita dicimus hic, quod prudentia est in ratione consequenter ad voluntatem ordinata et etiam antecedenter, sicut posterius erit manifestum.

When we say that eligere is an act of freedom of choice the emphasis is on the aspect of practical reason. When practical reason is viewed as mover then it is consequent to the initial movement of the will. Here reason is moved to adopt the means under the impetus of the will towards an end. There is a fusion of reason and appetite. In the choice (electio) of means to the end we have knowledge and reason investigating and will choosing what has been decided on:[133]

> . . . et ita ratio per appetitum, qui est in ea, habet optare alterum et disponere habet per cognitionem, quae est in ea.

In this way prudence does participate in a certain combination of reason and appetite and so choice cannot be denied to reason nor to prudence.

9. Summary

We have ranged widely over the field of psychology and morality in this chapter. An attempt will be made now to bring together briefly the various elements. In the context of the discussion of the human act in general and of the acts of prudence in particular, Albert is not explicit on the distinction between the order of ends and the order of means. As we have seen, this distinction clears up the problem of the relation of will and reason. With regard to the end, after a simple intellectual apprehension of the end there is a simple inclination of the will towards it without deliberation. The material we have examined which bears on the act of prudence refers to the order of means to achieve the end. This is the area of practical reason in search of the best possible means. The acts of prudence are the acts of the practical intellect. Here we have the basic structure of the human act. However, in our investigation and deliberation about means to an end, we are deliberating not merely about actions which would be effective to achieve a particular end. We are looking for actions which are morally good and effective. Prudence deliberates and judges, chooses and commands such acts. It does this in the light of the first principles of the natural law which are common to all men. Through synderesis we are in possession of these principles. The choice which prudence makes is a choice made in accord with these principles after considering the relevant circumstances. The result of this confrontation between contemplated actions and the principles of law or the useful or the absolute good is pronounced by conscience. Conscience is expressed in the form of a command either to act or not to act. Intimately connected with this expression of the command to act (sententia) is the action which follows. Perfect prudence implies the performance of action unless otherwise hindered.

Albert uses the notion of the syllogism to explain the reasoning processes involved in the act of prudence. This use of the syllogism must be understood properly. It is the use of a model very familiar to his scholastically trained readers. This is not to say that Albert did not think that the deliberative processes of human action were not like the reasoning process signified by the syllogism. However, we do not think that he understands the complexities of human deliberation to fit into a neat syllogistic form. Nor would he say that every moral action is decided upon after long and laborious deliberation. This should be clear from ordinary human experience. Albert sees in syllogistic reasoning a certain analogous relation to human deliberation. He structures his analysis of deliberation around this syllogism-model.

Albert nowhere answers the question he set out asking, viz., what is the actus proprius of prudence. The act of prudence is a complexity of acts issuing in the command

and ultimately issuing in action itself. In our next chapter we shall suggest what seems to be the proper act, bearing in mind that this is an inference on our part. The prudent man is the man who can perform the at times complex process of deliberation and ultimately find the morally good and effective means to achieve the end towards which he moves.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MATTER OF PRUDENCE

Albert has already mentioned the matter of prudence. He said that the _scibile_ is identical (_vel fere idem_) with the matter of prudence.[1] He has already distinguished between proper and secondary matter. The proper matter of prudence is _bona et mala_.[2] Secondary matter is knowledge either of the sciences directly related to human activity or, in a more remote way, any knowledge.[3] However, these distinctions were made while discussing whether prudence is a virtue. Consequently, they lack a certain precision which the definition of the matter of prudence demands. Albert devotes a separate article to the clarification of the matter of prudence. He deals with this question at _De Bono_, IV, 1, 3.[4] In this chapter we shall also take up a question from the fourth article, viz., whether the act of prudence seeks a determined mean for itself as does any other virtue.[5]

1. Matter of virtue in general

In the first tract of the _De Bono_ Albert provides a general background in which to fit our discussion of the matter of prudence. In the fourth question of that tract he begins his treatment of the political virtues in general.

The first article of this question is: De materia virtutis.[6] The solution to the article begins with the general principle that all the powers of the soul are differentiated according to their objects. This is so because the object of these powers functions as end and mover for them (finis et movens). In moral matters as in nature there is a twofold end. There is the end of nature which nature intends in one act, and this is the form.[7] By this Albert means that in each individual act which takes place in nature, there is an end for that act. The end is the form in the sense that the end is the fulfillment and accomplishment in nature of the virtualities and tendencies of the form. There is another end which nature intends in all her acts taken together, viz., the very perpetuity of nature since in this way nature is assimilated to the divine being.[8]

A similar situation obtains in moral matters. An end corresponds to the motive power involved in each individual act and there is another end which is not intended in each individual act or in one virtue alone. The latter is beatitude or happiness. The former is described by Albert:[9]

> Et sic est in moribus. Finis enim motivae potentiae in actu uno est circa materiam, quae movens est specificando et distinguendo voluntatem in actu existentem, et secundum hunc finem distinguuntur virtutes et vitia in suis speciebus.

This is in accord with what was said at the beginning of the solution. All the powers of the soul are differentiated by their objects. This differentiation with regard to the virtues is the specification of the virtues. The objects of the motive powers are the matter of these powers. The powers move on account of or for the sake of this matter. In this sense the matter is the end of the power or capacity. The objects of the will which specify the will in its act as far as praise and blame are concerned are in the passions. This is why Aristotle says that the virtues are concerning passions and pains.[10]

The matter of virtue for Albert is matter *circa quam*.[11] This is the matter which can serve as a principle which can lead to a knowledge of the thing.[12] Since virtue is a perfection of a faculty of the soul, the matter of virtue will be the object of that faculty or power. The object, however, is the end and mover of the faculty. Albert does not mean that the object of the power is the *efficient* mover. It is not a mover in the way in which the will is a mover. He means that it is the end and because it is an end, it moves by drawing the soul to itself.

In several texts Albert is quite insistent on the nature of the matter of virtue as end. He does this in order to distinguish this matter of virtue from a purely material or gross concept of the matter of virtue. In human acts the matter is not taken simply as matter but as end.[13] He says that virtues and vices are differentiated through matter, "quae est finis intentionis."[14] The intention mentioned here refers to the end towards which the act tends or is ordered. It does not necessarily mean the subjective intention of the agent in acting. In the realm of morals the end is included in the matter; it is an essential dimension of the matter.[15] As Albert says:[16]

> . . . materia per se nihil specificat. Sed hic non est differentia a materia tantum, quae est tangibile vel gustabile, sed est differentia finium, qui fines appetitus in moribus sunt formae specificae.

We can see then that the concept of the matter of virtue for Albert is not really a question of something material. The matter of virtue rather refers to the whole area of goods which move the agent. The matter of virtue is actually a coalescence of the end, the good and the form of virtue. The matter specifies the virtue to be such and such a virtue.

In a general way the matter of any virtue will be the object of the power of which the virtue is the perfection. In this sense the concupiscible appetite is a power of the soul. The object of the concupiscible appetite is the sensually pleasurable in general. The virtue of the concupiscible appetite is temperance. Consequently, the matter of the virtue of temperance is the pleasurable and temperance is said to be circa delectationes. However, again we cannot insist too strongly on the role of the end. The end is the good of the appetite and moves it. The virtue is specified through this end and not by any particular pleasure. This must be borne in mind if we are to avoid a material notion of the matter of virtue. Let us now examine the matter of prudence in particular.

2. Matter of prudence in general

There are two questions which Albert discusses separately with regard to the matter of prudence. The first deals with the matter of prudence in a general way and is treated in the responses to the first five objections. The second, which investigates whether prudence has matter _per se_, is treated in the replies to the ninth to fourteenth objections.

The solution to this article simply states what the matter of prudence is. Only in the replies to the various objections do we receive an explanation of this bare formulation. The solution reads:[17]

> Dicendum, quod materia prudentiae est eligibile ad opus rectum et gratia illius etiam considerat fugibile propter privationem eligibilitatis ad opus rectum in ipso inventum.

The first four objections claim that the matter of prudence is the _verum_. The first three are taken from Cicero's _De officiis_, the fourth from Aristotle. Again we see the preoccupation with the sciential or intellectual dimension of the virtue of prudence.

Cicero says that prudence deals with truth. The other three virtues have to deal with the necessity of promoting and maintaining the practical affairs of life so that the society of men might be conserved.[18] Albert continues this objection: "Ex hoc accipitur, quod materia prudentiae est veritas, quam tractet . . ."[19] In reply to this objection Albert does not deny that prudence is concerned with veritas, but it is a particular kind of veritas:[20]

> . . . veritas, quam tractat prudentia, est illa quae determinat veram rationem boni appetibilis vel operabilis.

The appetible or the operable are presented to the agent. The agent must in some way determine whether these are good (moral) or not. Consequently, he must not only have the reason or notion of the appetible or operable before him. He must have the true notion of the appetible good. Albert continues: "Vera autem ratio illius determinari habet per rationes iuris et honesti et expedientis."[21] The veritas which determines the true reason is seen basically to be the first principles of practical intellect. In this case the truth is, as it were, already possessed. The agent does not acquire the truth from a simple examination of projected action. In other words, it is not here a question of speculative truth. It is rather truth which determines whether the operabile is good or not. This is done through a confrontation of the contemplated action with true practical reason. Practical reason is true since it is in possession of the principles of natural law and the good through nature itself. Albert goes on to explain this and in so doing he draws the parallel between first principles of speculative intellect and first principles of practical intellect which we have seen.[22]

The second objection is also from Cicero.[23] Its main point is that all the arts deal with the investigation of truth. Consequently, Albert concludes that it is the function of prudence to investigate the matter of truth in all the arts. This makes the matter of prudence to be the verum. Actually, this objection has been used before by Albert in discussing the definition of prudence.[24] In his reply he refers to his previous answer. The principal matter of prudence is in matters of action. However, in a wider sense, in order to facilitate the act, prudence can extend to other matters besides actions as such. This is what, earlier, Albert called materia secundaria. This is in opposition to what he had called materia propria and what he calls in this context materia principalis.[25]

Using another text from Cicero, Albert again argues that prudentia est cognitionis. Since all knowledge is concerned with the verum, prudence must be concerned with the verum as with its matter.[26] In reply Albert again does not deny that prudence is concerned with the true. In fact he says that among the political virtues prudence alone with its parts consists in knowledge. However, he hurries to add:[27]

> . . . sed haec cognitio est ordinata ad opus, et si ipsa respicit verum, hoc erit contractum ad opus et bonum expediens vel honestum quod movet appetitum, ut dictum est.

The fourth objection is taken from Aristotle.[28] We have already seen this objection when clarifying the notion of acceptio.[29] Since prudence is a species of acceptio and every acceptio is through reason and intellect with regard to some knowable truth, prudence must be of a knowable truth (de vero cognoscibili). Therefore the matter of prudence is knowable truth.[30] The reply, as we have seen, simply uses the threefold division of Aristotle.[31] Prudence is not the whole of acceptio but one of its divisions. It is precisely this verum we have been speaking about which is ordered to action through the notions of the useful or the absolute good.

The fifth objection is actually a counter argument based on reasons from Aristotle (3) and Cicero (3) to show that prudence is really propter opus.[32] Albert is enlisting these men as authorities for his own position. He calls these reasons and authorities bonae et notabiles.[33] The texts of Aristotle are interesting since they are the classic texts used to show the distinction between the speculative and practical intellect. The last argument is taken from the De anima of Aristotle. In this text Aristotle says:[34]

> Both of these then are capable of originating local movement, mind and appetite: (1) mind, that is, which

> calculates means to an end, i.e. mind practical (it differs from mind speculative in the character of its end.)

Albert quotes this text in the translation of the *versio antiqua*:[35]

> Intellectus, qui propter aliquid ratiocinatur, practicus est. Differt autem a speculativo fine.

What in Aristotle was a parenthetical expression becomes for Albert a *locus* to prove that the practical and speculative intellects are different and that they differ because they have different ends. Albert continues after this citation to explain that the practical intellect reasons about something other than its own knowledge. This 'something' is an *opus*. Since prudence is in the practical intellect it must be *circa opus*.

In two previous arguments of this section Albert uses Aristotle to back up his statement that prudence is *propter opus*. In neither place is a work of Aristotle cited. First, Albert says that according to Aristotle practical sciences are all *propter opus*. Prudence is a practical science, therefore it is *propter opus*.[36] In the second text Albert quotes Aristotle as saying: "Finis intelligentiae est opus." Since prudence is in man through intellect, the end of prudence is an action. The end is not attained except by acting in some matter. Therefore, the matter of prudence is *circa aliquod opus inventum*.[37] It would seem that the two texts from Aristotle refer to the *Metaphysics*.

There the Philosopher says, "Nam theoricae finis est veritas, et practicae opus."[38]

In these texts Albert insists on the close parallel between the practical intellect and prudence. It is because the practical intellect is of such a nature that prudence is of a corresponding nature. We would have to say that prudence, in moral matters, is the virtue of the practical intellect. In reply to the arguments raised in his own defense Albert says:[39]

> Rationes autem et auctoritates, quae sunt in contrarium, bonae sunt et notabiles, quia in illis determinatur vera materia prudentiae, quae est eligibile ad opus per rationes iuris et honesti et utilis, ut dictum est. Penes illas enim rationes prudentia eligit, quidquid eligit . . .

Albert continues this reply by way of an exposition of St Paul, I Cor. 10, 23. We have already seen this text and how in it further elucidation of the terms _ius_, _expediens_ and _honestum_ is given.[40]

In the solution to this article Albert says that the matter of prudence is the _eligibile ad opus rectum_.[41] In the text above he says that the true matter of prudence is the _eligibile ad opus per rationes iuris et honesti et utilis_. The moral agent wants to perform morally good actions. Deliberation, as we have seen, culminates in choice--the choice of the right action in the particular circumstances. It is the function of prudence to guide actions by guiding choice. The matter of prudence will be the object of choice. In regard to actions in general, the object of choice can be said to be the eligibile ad opus. In this case choice is the natural culmination of any deliberative process of the practical intellect. However, we are not speaking here about actions in general. We are speaking about morally good actions. Consequently, the matter of prudence will be the eligibile ad opus rectum. It is a question here of a moral agent's choosing an object which is in conformity with true moral principles. Prudence guides him in this choice. The matter of prudence is the end and mover of choice. It is the end in the sense that choice is made for the sake of this matter. It is the mover since the goodness of the matter moves the will and intellect by its own appetibility.

Through these five objections Albert has shown that prudence is not concerned with the verum as such. If one can say it is concerned with the verum it is correct only to the extent that the truth is truth ordered and oriented to some action. From one standpoint it can be said that in prudence truth as such is secondary, it is the action which is primary. It is the action which is the object and end of prudence. The full flowering of prudence as a virtue means that action follows upon the knowledge of prudence. It is this action which crowns the notion of prudence as a complete virtue. This thought is present in the remarks which Albert makes regarding the texts of Cicero already referred to. To show this we shall quote Albert in this regard (disregarding the texts of Cicero on which these texts are actually comments).[42]

> Ex hoc accipitur, quod cognitio contemplativa est imperfecta ad rationem virtutis, eo quod non sequitur ad ipsam actio. Ergo cum prudentia habeat completam rationem virtutis, ipsa non erit manca vel inchoata ut imperfecta ad actionem; ergo consequitur ipsam actio necessario . . .

Again Albert says:[43]

> Ex hoc accipitur, quod prudentiae cognitio est circa operabilia. Et non est perfecta prudentia secundum rationem virtutis in cogitando tantum de vero operabili, sed perficitur per hoc quod agit. Ergo prudentia perfecta consistit circa actualia.

3. Per se matter of prudence

In these replies certain aspects of the matter of prudence have been cleared up. However, we have not yet ascertained just what precisely is the matter of prudence. Albert moves on to this problem in the ninth objection. He asks: "Ulterius iterum oportet inquiri, si prudentia habeat aliquam materiam per se."[44] Before replying to the various objections, Albert answers this question. From the reply we see that when he asks whether prudence has some matter *per se*, he is asking whether prudence has a *determined* matter.[45] The reply centers around a distinction. Determined matter can be understood in three ways.

1. Matter is said to be determined through the power in question.[46] In this case the matter is determined since the power has a determined object. If we understand determined matter in this sense, neither prudence nor justice nor any power of the rational soul nor any habit which is in a power of the rational soul has determined matter. Albert says the reason for this is given in the *De homine*.[47] He summarises his reasoning in the *De bono*:[48]

> . . . potentiae animae rationalis non sunt virtutes affixae organis et ideo non coartantur ad objectum unius materiae tantum, sed accipiunt suum objectum in materia qualibet.

The powers of the rational soul are not determined to one matter alone. Their object is determined by whatever matter they are focusing on and these can range across all boundaries.

2. Matter is said to be determined in a second way. It is determined not from the standpoint of the notion of matter but from the standpoint of the agent in an action.[49] We say the art of house building has determined matter. However, the determination does not arise through reference to a particular matter which we call "the matter of house building". The determination arises through reference to the art and the builder in which we find the one formality (*ratio*) determining the matter of house building. Rather than say that wood or stones are the matter of this art, we should rather say the matter is, "in omnibus quae addomum

exiguntur secundum artem domificandi."[50]

Prudence has a determined matter in the second sense of matter. Its matter is not in any one matter of the passions or operations. It is rather in any matter proportionate to the appetite. Since the appetite is first in the order of efficiency in actions, prudence posits its act with regard to the act and matter of each of the virtues.[51]

Albert provides clarification for this notion in his treatment of the matter of virtue in general. An objection is raised to saying that virtue is *circa delectationes et tristitias.* Passions are either generated from within (*innatae*) or stirred up from without (*illatae*). Since there is one matter of one passion, there would be only two moral virtues. This is false since there are four. Further, justice is a moral virtue which does not determine any passions. A similar objection can be raised regarding prudence.[52]

In replying to this objection Albert clarifies what is meant by speaking about the matter of prudence. There is a certain parallel between the relation of powers and the relations of their perfecting habits.[53] Reason is related to the irascible and concupiscible appetites as ruler and orderer. It is also in a way universal in their regard. It is universal in the sense that it is not restricted to the matter of either of these powers nor to the matter of both of them together. Consequently, the habit of reason will be similarly related. In the domain of morals prudence is the habit of reason. For example, prudence will be related to chastity and fortitude as ruling and directing them. It will do this in a quasi-universal way, in the sense that it is not restricted to them. The matter of prudence will not be matter over and above the matter of these virtues. However, its matter will not be formally identical with their matter either. The matter of the virtues is called the materialia of prudence. Materially, one might say, the matter of prudence coincides with the matter of the other virtues. Formally, they differ. As Albert says:[54]

> Et sic patet, qualiter omnes cardinales virtutes sunt circa delectationes et tristitias, licet differenter. Quaedam enim particulariter, sicut castitas circa delectationes et fortitudo circa tristitias, quaedam autem universaliter et per rationes universales, sicut prudentia circa delectationes et tristitias, non inquantum delectationes et tristitiae sunt, sed inquantum invenitur in ipsis eligibile ad opus laude dignum.

It is clear from this text that prudence does have a matter. It is a determined matter but it is not determined in the same way as the matter of the other virtues. This is what Albert means when he speaks about the art of building a house. There are many scattered 'matters' which go into the building of a house. However, it is the one formality (una ratio) of the exigencies of house building which determines the matter of building a house.[55] In the same way that we might say the matter of the art of building a house is quae ad domum aedificandam exiguntur, so we say the matter of prudence is the eligibile ad opus rectum. Albert himself says:[56]

> Similiter una est ratio, licet non materiae, efficientis tamen in omnibus eligibilibus ad opus, et haec est ratio communis boni utilis vel honesti.

In the replies to the remaining objections Albert demonstrates the universal influence of prudence in the moral life. In reply to the same ninth objection he continues:[57]

> Si enim consideretur operabile privatum vel commune, semper est ordinatum per rationem rectam prudentiae. Unde secundum rationem ducis et aurigae prudentiae est ponere rationem suae materiae circa quamlibet virtutem, secundum quod est in opere, et etiam circa opera quaedam voluntaria, quae non proprie sunt alicuius virtutis.

There is in this regard the question of specification. Prudence is a virtue specifically distinct from the other moral virtues. However, if these other virtues find their own specification in their own matter and the matter of prudence is not found outside this matter then either prudence must have its own proper matter or not be a specific virtue. This problem is raised in two objections, the solution of which rests on the initial distinction of the ways matter can be said to be determined. In the tenth objection we meet the problem:[58]

> Item, virtutes speciales sunt a materia determinata specificae, sicut fortitudo

> a passionibus illatis, temperantia a delectabilibus innatis. Ergo similiter prudentia habebit materiam determinatam.

The reply reiterates the distinction mentioned above. Prudence is specified by that notion of matter which is determined from the viewpoint of the proper efficient agent and not from the standpoint of the subject matter. Albert continues:[59]

> Efficientem autem proprium voco efficientem motum a fine determinato, sicut faber lignorum structura domus movetur, et appetitus operans motus est intentione honesti vel boni ordinati ad vitam.

There is another objection in the same vein. The habit of practical reason will not have as object an object other than that of the just, the chaste or the brave. Therefore, prudence, since it is a habit of practical reason ruling in action, will not have matter over and beyond the matter of the other virtues.[60] The reply distinguishes between specification and ordination. Reason does not give to the inferior powers nor to their habits their specification. If this were so then the irascible and concupiscible would be reduced to one which is false. Rather the case is as follows:[61]

> Ergo ratio non dat eis speciem appetibilis, sed tantum ordinat ad electionem appetibilium quorumcumque secundum rationem rectam boni utilis vel honesti. Et hoc facit etiam prudentia in virtutibus, et ideo non constringitur ad materiam virtutum tantum, sed etiam extendit se ad alia pertinentia ad vitam virtuosam generaliter.

4. Mean of prudence

Before concluding this section on the matter of prudence we must look at a closely allied topic, viz., whether prudence has a determined mean as does any other virtue. This question is raised at De bono, IV, i, 4.[62] This is an important question, both from the standpoint of clarifying the nature of prudence as a virtue on the one hand, and from that of clarifying the intellectual character of prudence on the other. The question lies between two poles which seem to offer a dilemma. One pole is that we have the Aristotelian definition of virtue which says that virtue consists in a mean determined by reason. This is the mean between excess and defect. We shall see how Albert handles this definition when he advances it as an objection to the assertion that prudence has no mean. Albert himself said earlier in the work: "Omne enim bonum consuetudinis substantialiter existit in medietate."[63] This is one pole which would seem to argue for the necessity that prudence have a mean, or for the alternative that prudence is not a virtue. The other pole is that we have just heard Albert saying that prudence has no per se matter of its own. Now the proper mean of a virtue is determined within its proper matter. Consequently, if this is the case, prudence cannot be lacking a proper matter and at the same time have a proper mean.

The solution to the problem lies in an answer to the problems posed by the first pole of the dilemma. In fact we are not faced with a dilemma at all but rather with an apparent one. Albert is ready to grant what is advanced by the second pole, viz., that prudence has no per se matter. His task is to give a satisfactory reply to the problem posed by the first pole. He does so by replying to the problem as formulated in two objections. The first objection is simply a restatement of Aristotle's definition of virtue. Aristotle says that virtue is a habit of the will consisting in a mean determined by reason. If some habit did not consist in a mean it would not be a virtue. If prudence does not consist in a mean it is not a virtue. We know it is a virtue so it must consist in a mean.[64] In reply, Albert agrees that every political virtue is defined as Aristotle defines it. However, it does not follow that each virtue consists in the mean in the same way. In fact this is not the case since the mean of virtue follows the matter of virtue. As Albert says: " . ... secundum quod habent materiam, ita etiam determinant sibi medium."[65] The reply continues:[66]

> Unde cum logicae virtutes non sint determinati negotii vel materiae, non habent medium proprium, sed potius sicut materiam suam, quae est secundum rationem solum determinata, ponunt circa aliud, quod est in dictis vel factis vel passionibus, ita etiam habent medium in illis, et hoc est eis per accidens et non proprium.

We have seen that the influence of prudence must spread throughout the whole moral life.[67] Its matter is eligibile ad opus. Every moral action involves an element of choice and it is prudence which determines choice. But what to choose is to be found in the nature of the virtue or action to be performed. Consequently, prudence finds the eligibile ad opus in these other elements and determines a mean in and for them. This mean cannot be called its proper mean, but since it is a mean regarding choice it can be said to be the mean of prudence in a secondary and non-proper sense. Albert says: "Et cum prudentia regat in opere, ipsa accipiet in materia castitatis et fortitudinis eligibile ad opus."[68]

There is another similar objection:[69]

> Item, supra habitum est, quod virtus substantialiter est medium ipsum. Cum igitur prudentia sit virtus, ipsa erit medium secundum sui substantiam.

Albert again agrees that the substance of virtue is the mean since the definition and being of virtue is the mean. However, prudence is not related to the mean in the same way as are the other virtues. The knowledge which is proper to prudence is a knowledge of things (scibilia) which themselves have a mean. Knowledge as such, however, has no mean. In the case of chastity or fortitude, prudence has a knowledge of the matters attendant upon these virtues. The elements which are known in regard to these virtues have a mean whereas the knowledge as such does not have a mean. The mean which prudence has is not from the side of its knowledge which pertains to prudence, but from the side of the scibile. The scibile, however, is not for the sake of what is known and so is not directed to prudence but is directed towards an action to be done (opus).[70] In the case of the relation of prudence to the other virtues, the mean of prudence will be found in the matter of these virtues. It cannot be said properly to pertain to prudence.

In the solution to these two problems Albert has given a satisfactory reply to the objection which states that if prudence is a virtue it must have a mean. Since prudence is an intellectual virtue, its mean is not determined in a proper matter but receives its determination from reason (logice). Only by implication and, as it were, indirectly, can prudence be said to have a mean. Strictly speaking, however, prudence does not have a mean.[71]

5. Proper act of prudence

We shall now say a final word in summary regarding the matter of prudence. We have seen Albert define the matter of prudence as eligibile ad opus rectum.[72] The concern here is with an object of choice. A good action is envisaged, e.g., an act of fortitude. This is the opus rectum. In view of this act certain choices have to be made with regard to ways and means, time, and other circumstances. It is up to prudence to direct in the making of such choices in regard to the matter of any virtue or good moral act.

Prudence directs and guides in making these choices. The *eligibile* is the object of choice. Similarly, by implication, the *fugibile* is also included under the matter of prudence. Prudence often directs a man to flee certain choices since such choices would not lead to a good action, but rather to an evil action.

This discussion of the matter of prudence also throws some light on the act of prudence. Albert started out by asking what the proper act of prudence might be.[73] In the solution to this question he says that the act of prudence is multiple. Actually, the act of prudence involves the whole *processus* of the human act. Prudence has the same acts as practical reason. We might ask at this point whether there is an act of prudence which might be called the proper act of prudence, although Albert himself does not name such an act. The definition of the matter of prudence suggests this possibility. The definition is given in terms of the *eligibile*. The *eligibile* is the matter and consequently the object of the virtue. This matter, as we have seen, is in terms of an object of choice, which in turn involves an act of choice (*electio*). If we refer to the article on the act of prudence we see that prudence in itself involves many acts which are either antecedent acts or consequent acts.[74] The consequent act of prudence in itself, Albert says, "est ut perfectio, prout regentis est perficere."[75] Further he says, "Consequens autem actus est electio."[76] In view of this it would seem correct to say that *electio* is the proper act of prudence in itself. Choice is made in the light of the principles of natural law and attendant circumstances and with a view to an action. Albert brings these elements together:[77]

> . . . in illis determinatur vera materia prudentiae, quae est eligibile ad opus per rationes iuris et honesti et utilis, ut dictum est.

It is true that we have also heard Albert say that prudence is an imperfect virtue unless action follows.[78] Action cannot follow without the command (*imperium*) of prudence. However, the command of prudence is not viewed by Albert as an act of prudence *secundum se*. Rather, it is an act of prudence when prudence is viewed, "secundum quod imperat motum et opus."[79]

It would seem safe to say, in view of what we have noted, that, for Albert, the proper act of prudence in itself is choice. True, Albert does not say this in so many words. However, from his teaching regarding the act and the matter of prudence, he seems to imply this conclusion. Lottin himself says, "Envisagée en elle-même, la prudence comporte plusieurs actes mais l'acte définitif, pour Albert comme pour Philippe, est la choix, *electio*; les autres actes y disposent . . ."[80]

Since prudence is so closely related to the matter of the other virtues, we must now try to see more specifically the relation of prudence to these other virtues. The relation is expressed by saying that prudence is the *auriga virtutum*. We shall examine this notion of *auriga* more closely. We shall also see whether there is any doctrine of the connection of the virtues implied in the notion of *auriga*.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRUDENCE AS THE AURIGA VIRTUTUM

The sixth subject to be treated by Albert in this question on prudence is, "qualiter prudentia non tam est virtus quam auriga virtutum."[1] The source of this notion has already been mentioned. It is an image which Albert received from St. Bernard. Bernard says:[2]

> Discretio quippe omni virtuti ordinem ponit; ordo modum tribuit et decorem, etiam et perpetuitatem . . . Est ergo discretio non tam virtus, quam quaedam moderatrix et auriga virtutum, ordinatrixque affectuum et morum doctrix.

This text brings together two notions which we shall examine. There is the notion of _auriga_ used in a metaphorical sense and there is the notion of _discretio_ playing an ordering role in the moral life. A third development will be the identification of _discretio_ and _prudentia_. The question which Albert asks is significant in bringing these various traditions together. Before we look at the treatment Albert gives of this subject we shall examine the background of the question.

1. Traditional use of _auriga_ image

The first topic will be the metaphorical use of the term _auriga_.[3] It means a charioteer. We can expect it to be used in the context of the games, carrying with it certain metaphors of horse racing. (Certain of the Latin Fathers use auriga metaphorically. The metaphors range from rather general concepts to specific psychological and moral applications. In St. Ambrose we read a general use of the term as applied to Saint Paul:[4]

> Scit et ille gentium doctor, bonus morum auriga nostrorum, et quidam interiorum rector affectuum . . .

St. Paul is described as a guide of our morals similar to the way a charioteer guides his horses. Note too that the notion of auriga is immediately linked with the notion of rector--Paul is also the director of our interior passions or feelings.

In Saint Augustine the term auriga is used in both a psychological and moral context. That Augustine felt there was a problem concerning the soul-body relation is clear enough. Several times he came to grips with this question. In one text he does this quite clearly:[5]

> Tu certe vivis. Habes corpus, habes animum. Visibile est corpus, invisibilis est animus. Corpus habitaculum, animus habitator. Corpus vehiculum, animus utens vehiculo, corpus quasi vehiculum, quod regatur, animus auriga corporis tui.

In this psychological context the soul is likened to a charioteer which rules the body. Again the term is closely linked with the concept of ruling and directing (regatur).

In another place the imagery of auriga is applied to a man, in this case Elijah.[6]

> Habemus et nos spiritualem nostrum aurigam sanctum prophetam Eliam, qui quadrigae igneae superimpositus tantum cucurrit, ut metas prenderet caeli.

Here we have several other terms associated with chariots, viz., quadrigae (team of four horses), meta (the goal or turning posts in a race). The metaphor is extended even further in the sentence immediately preceding our text.[7]

There is also a moral application of the term in Augustine when he warns against letting pride be man's auriga.[8] In another text the reference is not as direct, but perhaps is more significant. Augustine is concerned again with what man is and the supreme good of man. Is man body alone or soul alone or a soul and a body harnessed together?[9] He is not at all certain of the answers to these questions. However, he is certain of one thing: when it is a question of morals we are not concerned with the body. In fact, just as the body when ruled by a virtuous soul is ruled better and more worthily, so whatever perfects the soul will be man's supreme good. There then follows this sentence:[10]

> An vero, si mihi auriga obtemperans, equos, quibus praeest, alit ac regit, commodissime atque ipse quo mihi est obedientior, mea liberalitate perfruitur, negare quisquam potest non solum quod auriga, verum etiam quod equi sese optime habent, mihi deberi?

It would seem that here Augustine is suggesting a parallel. The horses refer to the body of man. The auriga refers to the soul. However, for good ruling the soul itself must be a virtuous soul. The soul as *auriga* must be perfected by virtue if it is to rule and guide in a worthy manner. Augustine continues: "Nemo autem dubitaverit quin virtus animam faciat optimam."[11] Note in this context too the close relation between soul-*auriga*-rule-body.

Finally, in St Jerome we also encounter a metaphorical use of the term *auriga*. The traditional four moral virtues are looked upon as an *auriga* leading us to heaven:[12]

> Vis scire quales Dominus quaerat ornatus? Habeto prudentiam, justitiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem. His caeli plagis includere, haec te quadriga, velut aurigam Christi, ad metam concitum ferat.

Virtue, like a charioteer, rules the soul and with the reins of doctrine controls the passions of man:[13]

> Virtus vero cum aurigae modo animum rexerit, et quasi in curru stans, impetus eius et varios appetitus doctrinae habenis composuerit.

From these few examples it is clear that the term *auriga* was used in a moral context by men who were popular and who were read in the Middle Ages. Usually referred to the soul itself or virtue, the image of *auriga* does not seem to be linked with any one virtue. However, it is linked with one concept, namely, the concept of ruling. If one virtue should emerge in the tradition as a ruling virtue, then it would be natural that this virtue be called the *auriga* of the other virtues and of the moral life in general. That is what happened. The virtue which emerged was the virtue of discretio.[14] In Cassian we find an outline of its central role as the ruling virtue.

2. Discretio

Cassian wants to treat of men who showed discretio as the first of the virtues and the moderationis generatrix.[15] The lack of this virtue and the attendant lack of judgment and knowledge darken the whole body by obscuring the eye of the mind and our actions with the blindness of vice.[16] Through the examples and descriptions of the ancients we see that discretio, "fontem quodammodo radicemque cunctarum esse virtutum."[17] Only through discretio can the monk hope to arrive at perfection:[18]

> Cum qua ad consummationis excelsa fastigia minore possit fatigatione conscendi et sine qua multi etiam propensius laborantes perfectionis nequiverint culmen attingere. Omnium namque virtutum generatrix, custos moderatrixque discretio est.

One might call the last sentence of this text a hymn to discretio. Cassian calls discretio the generator, the guardian and moderator of all the virtues. It is in the function of moderator that the ruling aspect of the virtue is to be found.

The Collationes of Cassian were well known to the Middle Ages. Also circulating in the Middle Ages were various Vitae Patrum. In the form in which they were brought together in Migne's *Patrologia*, the fourth book is entitled, *Excerpta ex Severo Sulpicio et Cassiano*.[19] This work served as a channel for many sayings of Cassian. In chapter forty-two we read:[20]

> In omnibus ergo quae agimus, discretio anteponenda est. Manifestissime enim declaratur nullam sine discretionis gratia perfecte posse vel perfici vel stare virtutem. Et haec dicente Antonio, universorum sententia definitum est, discretionem esse quae fixo gradu intrepidum monachum perducat ad Deum, et praedictas virtutes iugiter conservet illaesas. Omnium namque virtutum genitrix et custos atque moderatrix discretio est.

Except where Cassian reads *generatrix* and the above text reads *genitrix*, the two texts are identical.

Through Cassian the notion of the central role of *discretio* came to the fore and was taken up by the later periods. Because of the nature of *discretio* *vis-à-vis* the other virtues, it can easily be seen how one could say that it is not so much a virtue as the moderator of the other virtues. This is what St. Bernard did. Employing a metaphorical use of the term *auriga* and combining it with expressions which are highly reminiscent of Cassian's terminology he made his famous description of *discretio*.[21] It would not seem that he really was denying that *discretio* is a virtue; but because of the important role it plays *vis-à-vis* the other virtues he says it is not so much a virtue as the *auriga* of the virtues.

The assimilation of discretio to prudence is something which we find in the later period with Philip the Chancellor and Albert. However, even at the time of Bernard a parallel between these two virtues emerges. For Bernard himself prudence is the mother of fortitude, the arbiter among the pleasures of the senses and the necessities of life and keeps them within the just milieu. It is prudence which consequently gives birth to temperance.[22] After dealing with the connection of the other three cardinal virtues Bernard hastens to speak of prudence:[23]

> Restat ut doceamus ab hac communione prudentiam non excludi. Nonne ipsa est, quae modum, diu animi neglectu posthabitum, et vitiorum invidia quasi in abditis reclusum, et coopertum quadam vetustatis caligine, prior reperit et advertit? Propterea dico tibi: a paucis advertitur, qui paucorum prudentia est.

Even here we see a certain parallel between the role of discretio and the role of prudence. What difference is there in calling discretio the genitrix virtutum and prudence the mater of fortitude and temperance? What is the difference in calling discretio the moderatrix virtutum and prudence the virtue, "quae modum . . . prior reperit et advertit."? At this time Abelard himself was saying the same things about prudence that Bernard was saying about discretio. Abelard reports that some say that the discretio of prudence is rather the mother or the origin of the virtues than a virtue itself. He continues:[24]

> Prudentia quippe est haec ipsa morum scientia, quae ut tractatus ethicus tradit, rerum bonarum et malarum scientia dicitur, hoc est ipsa bonorum discretio sive malorum, quae videlicet in seipsis proprie bona dicenda sunt aut mala . . .

Notice the use of the definition of Cicero in this text. Again Abelard says:[25]

> Prudentia itaque, sicut fides vel spes, quae malis aeque ut bonis hominibus conveniunt, non tam virtutes dicendae sunt quam ducatum quemdam vel incitamentum ad virtutes praebere.

In Richard of Saint Victor we see a certain lack of determination in distinguishing between discretio and prudentia. In his Adnotatio in Psalmum CXLIII Richard provides us with an interesting but rudimentary outline of what we would call the acts of discretio. He himself calls them 'grades'. He uses the word digitos of the first verse of the psalm to discuss these grades.[26] There are five grades of discretio as there are five fingers. These grades are: diiudicatio, deliberatio, dispositio, dispensatio, moderatio. After his very interesting analysis of these acts Richard points out that sometimes discretio is taken in a strict sense and then it is really a grade of prudence:[27]

> Notandum autem quod discretio quandoque stricte accipitur, et tunc nihil aliud quam quod superius diiudicationem diximus intelligitur, ut sint quinque gradus prudentiae: discretio, deliberatio, dispositio, dispensatio, moderatio.

Again, sometimes deliberation is taken in a larger sense so as to include the subsequent members:[28]

> Secundum hanc acceptionem prudentiae
> videntur inesse tantummodo membra duo,
> discretio videlicet atque deliberatio.

In Richard we see an identification emerging between _discretio_ and _prudentia_. The direction of this identification is towards a disappearance of _discretio_ and an emphasis on _prudentia_. As Dingjan says: "Comme _mère_ _des_ _vertus_, la prudence, qui était sa [_discretio_] rivale, remportera la victoire finale."[29]

In William of Auxerre the text of Bernard is cited as a definition of _discretio_. However, it is used in the context of his discussion of prudence and understood to apply to prudence.[30] This suggests that by the time of William the two notions were used interchangeably. In Philip the Chancellor the term _discretio_ is dropped and the text of Bernard is made to refer to prudence:[31]

> Secundum praedicta ostensum est quomodo
> prudentia se habeat ad alias virtutes
> ut principalior eis, utpote que non est
> tam virtus quam auriga virtutum, sicut
> dicit beatus Bernardus.

3. Prudence as _auriga_ in Albert

Philip's discussion brings us to Albert. Only against a background such as we have described can Albert's question be properly understood. The article is not about _discretio_ but about prudence. But the question would not be asked at all if there had not preceded it a parallel discussion about a virtue which was being assimilated to prudence.[32] Further, we have seen that Bernard was not the first to use the term auriga in a moral context. The way was prepared for Albert by the tradition before him. However, as we shall see, the answer to the question does not rely on this tradition. True, Albert's auctoritas is Bernard, but his reasons are those of Aristotle.

This sixth article takes up two questions. The first is how prudence is said to be the auriga virtutum. The second, beginning at the seventh objection, asks: "Utrum prudentia sit virtus principalis."[33] We shall begin with the first question. It is composed of six objections designed to show that prudence is not the auriga virtutum. These objections are followed by contrary arguments in which Albert proposes three reasons to show that prudence is the auriga of the virtues. The general solution to the question is based on the notion of the directing role of reason in life. Here we see the strong Aristotelian reasoning that characterises Albert's handling of a problem suggested by the words of St Bernard. The general solution is as follows:[34]

> Dicimus cum beato Bernardo, quod prudentia non tam est virtus quam auriga virtutum. Sicut enim ratio est dirigens inferiores vires, sicut dicit Philosophus et nos probavimus hoc in tractatu De anima, ita etiam habitus rationis est dirigens in tota vita et opere habitus aliarum virtutum et prospiciens, quid rectum vel non rectum sit in omni virtute.

It is this directive nature of reason on which Albert bases his arguments to prove his point. These arguments are three and are to be found in the sed contra.

The first argument proceeds from the notion of a projected action (operabile). Every possible action is first a potential object of choice (eligibile) according to reason. However, this reason correctly choosing is reason which directs us in our actions. The virtue whose function it is to choose through right reason will be directive in every human activity and this virtue is prudence. Therefore, prudence is the auriga in every act of virtue and is not so much a virtue as the auriga virtutum.[35] The third argument is similar to this. It is based on the proportionality: as a power is related to a power, so its habit is related to the habit of the other power. The power is reason which directs the concupiscible and irascible appetites in the manner of an auriga. Its habit will direct the habits of these appetites. The habit of reason is prudence; the habits of the irascible and concupiscible appetites are fortitude and temperance.[36]

The virtue of justice is not mentioned in this context but it is considered elsewhere and we shall include it here. In the sixth objection Albert says that if the virtues need an auriga, this would particularly pertain to the virtues in the rational part of the soul. According to this view justice would not need an auriga since, like prudence, it is in reason itself.[37] In his reply to this objection Albert holds that justice too needs an auriga since it must be ruled like any other virtue:[38]

> Ad aliud dicendum, quod iustitia non est in ratione, secundum quod ratio convertitur super aliis regendo, sed potius est in ipsa, prout respicit opus sibi determinatum, quod est ordinare ad alium secundum rationem debiti. Sic autem indiget ratio regente sicut etiam inferiores potentiae.

There is no contradiction here, as Albert points out. Reason rules under the aspect of choice. Choice must be guided in every virtue, even in justice. Consequently, prudence is also the auriga of justice. In justice itself reason rules but according to another formality, viz., in the matter of the adjustment of what is due to another.

The third argument Albert uses is based on the relation between prudence and the perception of circumstances. The habit whose function it is to discern circumstances through its parts is directive and ruler in every work. The parts of prudence, viz., memory, understanding, foresight, have this function of discerning circumstances. Therefore, prudence is not so much a virtue as the auriga virtutum.[39]

In his replies to the objections Albert clarifies further the way in which prudence is the auriga of the virtues. If virtue is more certain than every art, as Aristotle says, then it does not need an auriga which functions in a directive capacity.[40] Albert points out that any virtue has the certitude of its act and its mean.

It does not have to depend on another in executing its own proper act and for the discernment of its proper mean. However, how the act is to be carried out or ordered to the end only prudence considers and so prudence alone is directive in this sense.[41] The second objection is similar to the first. Virtue operates after the manner of nature and nature is more certain in an operation than anything teaching it. If virtue is so certain in its operation it does not need a teacher as an *auriga*.[42] While explaining Cicero's definition of virtue, Albert explains what it means to say that virtue operates *in modum naturae*:[43]

> Ad aliud dicendum, quod cum dicitur 'modo naturae', notatur similitudo virtutis ad naturam in movendo ad opus, et sumitur ibi natura pro forma. Sicut enim forma movet in natura certe et determinate, sic virtus movet ad medium determinate et certe. Determinate quidem quantum ad objectum, certe autem quantum ad circumstantias.

Albert turns the argument back on itself. It is true that virtue operates as nature and therefore it, as nature, does not determine the end nor the preparations for the act. Therefore, in order to be perfect, in so far as it is the good of man, prudence must be present to each virtue.[44] The third objection proposes that if prudence is the *auriga virtutum*, then it must be the *auriga* of another virtue of prudence which indeed is false.[45] The reply points out that this is false since we would have to go on to an infinity of prudences being *aurigae* of prudence. In fact, however, the objection is not applicable. When we say prudence is the *auriga virtutum*, the *virtutum* here refers to virtues with determined actions and determined matter. This is not the case with prudence as we have already seen. Its only act is the act of the ruler ordered to the acts of the other virtues.[46]

Prudence, then, is the *auriga* of the virtues. In order to execute their acts in the multiple circumstances of life they must be guided through the various possibilities of choice open to them. The virtues are still virtues in their own right. They have their own determined matter and their own determined acts. However, they are not sufficient to themselves. It is prudence which guides and directs their actions so that the act called for here and now will be the proper act for this time and in these circumstances and for the end proposed. Without prudence the other moral virtues are blind and do not conspire together for the good of man. If this is so, and prudence is so necessary, then are the virtues as such connected with one another?

4. Connection of virtues

The problem arises in the fifth objection. This objection states that whatever virtue gives the *modum* this is the virtue which will direct virtue. The *auriga* only directs by giving the *modum viae*. *Modus* here seems to mean the way of going about things in a moderate or balanced manner. The *modus viae* would be the moderate or balanced exercise of moral actions. In other words the *modus* would correspond to the *medium* of Aristotle. This objection we are considering is taken from St. Bernard who says that temperance gives the *modus*. Consequently, temperance must be the *auriga* and not prudence.[47] The solution to this question could be found in Bernard himself or in previous expressions of Albert. In the same eighth chapter of the first book of the *De consideratione* Bernard speaks of temperance as born of the necessity of finding the mean among necessities and pleasures.[48] When speaking about prudence Bernard says that it is prudence which first finds and calls attention to the *modus*.[49] Albert himself understands Bernard as teaching that prudence finds the *modus* and *medium* of the other virtues.[50] However, Albert does not follow either of these possible ways to a solution. Temperance does not give the *modus* to the other virtues. What Bernard says must be understood of what is said of temperance by appropriation and not properly. In every action there are four aspects which can be appropriated to the four cardinal virtues. There is the aspect of the difficult which has a relation to fortitude; there is *modus* which concerns temperance; there is the useful according to the order to society or to what is owed, and this touches on the similitude of justice. All of these aspects precede choice according to right reason and this touches upon what is similar to prudence. Albert is saying that in every act of virtue these aspects are present. Since they are similar to what is proper to each virtue they are said of each virtue by appropriation. In fact, however, each of these aspects refers to one special virtue in a proper sense.

The reason for saying this brings Albert to speak about the connection of the virtues. He says that each one of these aspects refers to a special virtue properly speaking:[52]

> . . .quia non credimus, quod civiliter loquendo habita una habeantur omnes, sed bene concedendum putamus, quod quacumque habita habeatur prudentia secundum quid, scilicet secundum electionem operum ad illam virtutem facientium.

This reason Albert gives presupposes two possible relations. There is the one relation in which all of the virtues are so related that if we have one we have them all. This thesis Albert is not ready to admit; on the contrary, he denies it. The other is the relation of prudence to all of the other virtues. This Albert admits in a qualified sense. If one virtue is had then prudence is had to the degree that to exercise the virtue the element of choice must be present. It is prudence which guides this choice. Choice is the perfection of the act of prudence in itself.[53]

Albert says that he will show whether and how the phrase, "habita una habeantur omnes" should be understood in the question following the tract on the theological virtues.[54] He had promised this discussion previously in the De bono.[55] At that place he had quoted Augustine's De trinitate to the effect that the virtues are all united.[56] However, this promised treatment nowhere appears in the De bono. If we judge from the few words in the reply (De bono, IV, 1, 6, ad 5), we would say that, for Albert, the moral virtues are not connected in such a way that one can say, "una habita habeantur omnes". This conclusion is reinforced when we look ahead to the Commentary on the Sentences.[57]

5. Prudence as principal virtue

One question remains to be treated. Albert had asked whether prudence is the principal virtue. Philip had said that it was more principal than the other virtues since it was the auriga virtutum.[58] Albert in the seventh objection proposes two arguments for the supremacy of prudence, two for justice, two for fortitude and one for temperance. He says in his reply that since each of the virtues can be shown to be more worthy than the others according to different points of view, "illa quaestio parum valet."[59] He is ready to grant all the arguments of the objection since they only conclude to the dignity of the respective virtue in a relative or qualified sense. He shows how fortitude and justice and temperance can be principal virtues from different standpoints. He then speaks of prudence:[60]

> Si autem respiciatur bonum hominis, secundum quod est hominis, tunc prudentia tenebit principatum, quia haec etiam alia bona virtutum facit esse humana.

This is a fitting way to end the discussion of prudence taken in itself. It is reason which characterises the humanity of man. Through reason man acts with vision and counsel and deliberation and choice. In the train of this process action will proceed rationally and, consequently, in a specifically human fashion. The goods chosen in the right circumstances will be human goods. The virtues exercised under the direction and guidance of prudence will be exercised in a rational and human manner. In this way prudence makes the goods of the virtues human goods, since they proceed from right rational principles.

After Albert has dealt with the virtue of prudence taken in itself he moves on to a discussion of the parts of prudence.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE AS ENUMERATED BY CICERO

The second question in Albert's tract on prudence deals with the subject of the parts of prudence.[1] Both Cicero and Macrobius speak of the parts of prudence. These authors provide the sources for Albert. The last article of the question takes up the question of the three-fold division of the intellectual virtues which Albert found in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. We shall begin with the parts which Cicero enumerates since Albert devotes four of the six articles of this question to these parts.[2] This is the integral text of Cicero in which these parts are given:[3]

> Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum neutrarumque scientia. Partes eius: memoria, intelligentia, providentia. Memoria est, per quam animus repetit illa quae fuerunt; intelligentia, per quam ea perspicit quae sunt; providentia, per quam futurum aliquid videtur ante quam factum est.

1. Memory in Aristotle

Memory, then, is the first of the parts which Albert takes from Cicero. While the words of Cicero lie behind this division, the discussion in the first article is presented within an Aristotelian framework. Consequently, it might be well if we very briefly outlined the

Aristotelian teaching concerning the subject of memory.

Aristotle wrote a work entitled, *De memoria et reminiscentia*.[4] In this work he investigates two topics. The first is memory (*μνήμη*) and rembering (*μνημονεύειν*); the second is recollection (*ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι*). Aristotle wants to know the nature of each, their cause, and the part of the soul to which they belong.

At the end of the chapter on memory and remembering Aristotle summarises his findings:[5]

> As regards, therefore, what memory or remembering is, it has been shown that it is the state of a presentation, related as a likeness to that of which it is a presentation; and as to the question of which of the faculties within us memory is a function [it has been shown] that it is a function of the primary faculty of sense-perception, i.e., of that faculty whereby we perceive time.

The first mark of memory is that it is related to the past (449b15). It is of something that was once experienced and is now remembered as past. The second mark of memory is that it works from images which are seen as related to the past and not to themselves. In order to have memory a subject must first be able to perceive time and this is done through the primary faculty of sense perception or the *sensus communis*.[6] In addition, the subject must have a faculty of retention which is imagination. When such time conditioned images are possessed through imagination we call the state of having them memory, and the act of calling them up, remembering. We must distinguish between that by which we perceive time and that by which the images are retained. In this case, subjects will be possessed of memory who are possessed of the requirements for memory. Man alone does not fall into this category but other animals as well (450a15).

Aristotle considers recollection next. It implies everything that has already been said about remembering and memory. Recollection is an act involving remembering and the consequent actualised memory. Ross describes it succinctly:[7]

> Recollection is the actualising, whether with or without effort, of memory which has become merely potential, i.e., has disappeared from consciousness.

Recollection is different from relearning or rediscovery. It implies the presence in those who recollect of a starting point over and above that from which they originally learned. "Acts of recollection, as they occur in experience, are due to the fact that one movement has by nature another that succeeds it in regular order." (451b10) This movement begins from a point (A) and goes towards a point (B) which we are trying to recollect.[8] This movement must be such as can be made by one's own effort. The basic necessity here is that, "one must get hold of a starting point." (452a13)

Recollection differs from memory in one very important respect. While memory is common to man and some other animals, recollection is peculiar to man alone (453a9). The reason for this is that, as Aristotle says, recollection is a kind of syllogism. To recollect involves setting up movements implying investigation and inference. To investigate in this way is only possible to those with the power of deliberation. This power man alone possesses (453a10-14).

2. Memory as part of prudence

With this background we can now return to Albert's treatment of memory as a part of prudence. He begins with the definition of memory which Cicero gives: "Memoria est, per quam animus repetit ea quae fuerunt."[9] In the solution Albert makes two points. The first is a refinement of his saying that memory is a part of prudence. The memory involved here is memory in so far as it falls under the notion of reminiscentia.[10] Reminiscentia is the Latin word used to translate what is called recollection in Aristotle. Albert saw three points on which recollection differs from memory. The points he makes are really a summary of the treatment by Aristotle. Recollection involves a reasoning process similar to syllogistic reasoning and so is characteristic of man alone. Memory does not involve this process and so is possessed by some animals. Recollection begins from determined starting points (a principiis determinatis) and does not rely on the imagination to recollect its object. The third difference is that recollection can use notions which are not naturally related to the thing to be recollected. In this way customary associations can be helpful in recollection. Memory, on the other hand, uses proper images of the thing and proceeds from such images to the thing of which they are images.[11] It is not simply the faculty of memory but the memory as expressed through the facility of recollecting that is part of prudence. Recollection involves investigation and a certain kind of syllogistic reasoning; these in turn imply deliberation which, we have seen, are all aspects of the complex act of prudence.

One of the definitions of prudence which Albert considers is from Augustine: "Prudentia est amor ea a quibus adjuvatur, ab his quibus impeditur, sagaciter eligens."[12] In order for prudence to exercise this choice it is necessary for it to begin from a determinate starting point and, through a consideration of probable means, to arrive at the action desired.[13] Albert concludes: ". . . et ideo cum proceditur ex praeteritis, utitur memoria, secundum quod est pars reminiscentiae."[14] As will become clearer when we consider understanding and foresight, a moral action is something that has to be posited in the proximate future. At the time of consideration and deliberation the action is not yet in existence. When considering whether such an act should be done, one of the considerations is a scrutiny of actions in the past with their effects and with their moral qualities. The consideration of such acts through recollection aids the prudent man in making a good moral decision in the present. Albert says this well in a sed contra:[15]

> Prudentia est cognitio agendorum bonorum et malorum; cognitio autem haec multum iuvatur ex praeteritis, quia per praeteritum cognoscit, qualiter se habeat in futuris; ergo memoria erit pars prudentiae.

The fourth objection would seem to destroy this argument. Albert points out that every direction concerns what is or will be. Nothing that was in the past can be now or in the future. Consequently, no direction can be concerned with the past as past. Now, prudence is directive in present matters which are now or in future matters which are able to be. Memory is concerned neither with what is nor with what can be and so memory cannot be part of prudence.[16] It is true that the past as past contributes nothing towards directing present or future activity. However, when we say memory is part of prudence, the past is not taken as past. It is taken, "ut stans adhuc in anima per rationem et effectum."[17] In this sense there is a certain presentiality conferred on the past as it is possessed in the memory. By "per rationem" Albert means that what is remembered carries with it the notions of good and evil. These notions are in a sense atemporal and are useful in deliberation. By "per effectum" Albert means that what is possessed in memory carries certain notions which inform the subject of the advantage or harm to himself of the action contemplated.

This aspect too has a certain atemporal character about it. When the past is understood in this sense then, "illud multum confert ad cautelam futuri."[18]

Another argument is based on two texts of Aristotle. Aristotle says that intellectual virtue needs time and experience.[19] Time and experience are needed, according to Aristotle, for the production and development of intellectual virtue. In the Metaphysics he says:[20]

> Now from memory experience is produced in men; for the several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience.

From these two texts Albert concludes that it seems that memory both generates prudence and is a part of prudence.

In the replies to the objections Albert clarifies the sense in which memory is a part of prudence. Prudence is an intellectual virtue while memory is basically a faculty or power. It would seem that as a faculty memory cannot be said to be part of prudence. This is the sense of the first objection. Memory is a part of the soul and not a habit. To be part of prudence, the part must be a habit.[21] In his reply Albert makes a two-fold distinction. The first is between the basic facultative capacity to repeat things of the past and the ability plus the habit of voluntarily recalling things of the past. Secondly, this habit can be a cognitive habit of speculative intellect or a moral habit of practical intellect. Insofar as memory is part of prudence it is this moral habit which is a virtue of the practical intellect pertaining to prudence.[22]

The importance of recollection is shown in the next reply. It had been objected that memory is on the part of the rational; therefore, the habit of memory cannot be part of prudence since prudence is properly of reason. Memory is part of prudence insofar as it is connected with (*immiscet se*) recollection. Recollection is of the rational soul since it is *syllogismus quidam*. In this way, through its association with recollection, memory is a habit of the rational soul.[23]

The second article of this question treats of the *ars memorandi*. This is a long treatment of how to go about developing and improving the memory. Such an art is necessary because of the peculiar difficulty of retaining the past. In the article on understanding, an objection is advanced asking why Cicero does not have an *ars intelligendi* similar to his *ars memorandi*.[24] Albert says the reason is because understanding is concerned with the present which is not difficult to retain. This is not so with regard to the past and so an *ars* is called for.[25] In the article on the art of remembering Albert follows a work he thought was by Cicero, viz., *Ad Herennium*.[26] Although we do not intend to discuss the subject as such, we should like to look at the solution.

Albert says that the *ars memorandi* of Cicero is the best. It is particularly helpful in matters pertaining to life in general and trials (iudicium) in particular. In these matters, the memory is particularly helpful to the ethician and rhetorician. Since human acts are concerned with particulars, it is necessary that they be in the soul through corporeal images and this is only by means of memory. Albert continues:[27]

> Unde dicimus, quod inter omnia quae spectant ad prudentiam, summe necessaria est memoria, quia ex praeteritis dirigimur in praesentibus et futuris et non e converso.

Cicero had distinguished between natural memory and memory contrived through art.[28] Natural memory is "quae nostris animis insita est et simul cum cogitatione nata."[29] That contrived by art: "Artificiosa est ea, quam confirmat inductio quaedam et ratio praeceptionis."[30] Albert agrees with this two-fold distinction and gives his own understanding of it:[31]

> Naturalis est, quae ex bonitate ingenii deveniendo in prius scitum vel factum facile memoratur. Artificialis autem est, quae fit dispositione locorum et imaginum, et sicut in omnibus ars et virtus sunt naturae perfectiones, ita et hic. Naturalis enim perficitur per artificialem. Hoc tamen notandum, quod in omnibus istis memoria posita sit pro reminiscentia, sicut supra determinatum est.

In addition to clarifying the notion of memory, this text contributes to an understanding of something Albert had said in the first question on prudence. An objection was raised, one inspired by Cicero's definition of virtue, that prudence is not virtue. Cicero says: "Nam virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus."[32] The objection argues that since prudence proceeds rather after the fashion of art and not nature, it is not a virtue.[33] In his reply Albert argues that prudence inclines to a work according to the mode of nature and not art. He concludes: "Et si vellemus totum exprimere, quod est in prudentia ordinante ad opus, diceremus, quod inclinat sicut natura habens artem."[34] A prudent man, with a certain expertise in the art of memory, would be an example of prudence operating through nature but possessed of art.

3. Understanding and circumstances

The second part of prudence is understanding. Cicero defines it: "Intelligentia, per quam ea perspicit quae sunt."[35] The understanding in question here is that understanding which falls under the notion of virtue and which is part of prudence. Albert says that understanding is a logical and intellectual virtue and a _pars_ _potestativa_ of prudence. The kind of part that a _pars_ _potestativa_ is will be seen later. Albert then defines in his own words what understanding is:[36]

> Intelligentia enim est discretio et lumen, quod nascitur in animo ex penetratione subtili eorum quae circumstant praesens negotium.

This understanding is a virtue which enables the moral agent to see and to judge in matters of moral deliberation. It arises through the consideration of the various circumstances surrounding an action that is contemplated. The virtue strengthens the prudent man in his choices as to what must be done or avoided. In this way it completes or fills out in a certain way the power of prudence and so is a part of prudence.[37]

The first objection argues that from the definition it seems that this understanding is a habit of the speculative intellect and so is not a virtue. If this is so, then understanding is neither a virtue nor a part of a virtue. The reply says that the use of the word animus in the defintion suggests that Cicero means the practical part of the soul which moves and operates. Consequently, understanding is part of the practical reason. Continuing, Albert shows how in saying that the soul "prospicit ea quae sunt" we have an equivocation. The "quae sunt" can be understood in two ways. The speculative intellect considers "ea quae sunt". However, it does so insofar as they are true and not under the formality of their presentiality or of any time differentiation. On the other hand, the practical intellect comprehends "ea quae sunt" precisely under the formality of their presentiality. It considers the matters which surround the present action that is contemplated.[38]

The fourth objection takes issue with the term prospicit. This verb refers to some kind of foresight or seeing future things. Consequently, the verb prospicio is incorrectly linked with the notion of "ea quae sunt". Rather, it should be in the definition of foresight. The reply is based on a subtle distinction. Understanding as part of prudence rules in the performance of acts through a consideration of the present matters in an action. Consequently, it is operative prior to the action's execution and prior to choice. Its function is truly to foresee but not as far into the future as is the case with foresight.[39]

In connection with the fifth objection the subject of circumstances arises. It is objected that the understanding abstracts from every difference of time and so it no more perceives the present than the past or the future. This is true of the speculative understanding since it is concerned with the universal. The practical understanding, however, is not of the universal but of the actual conditions surrounding the matter at hand. The actual is particular and the particular is connected with time and so understanding does not abstract from time. An indication of this is that time is one of the loci of rhetoric. This is seen in the question De circumstantiis.[40]

Understanding and this question regarding circumstances are closely linked together. In the present article understanding is described several times as being concerned with "quae negotium praesens circumstant";[41] or as being "collatio praesentium"[42] or "consideratio praesentium in negotio."[43] The *praesens negotium* is the projected act under consideration. The *quae circumstant* are the circumstances which surround the act and which make some contribution to the moral character of the act.

At this point we shall consider the role of circumstances in the moral thought of Albert. He has a rather elaborate division of the good. The first general division is into *bonum naturae* and *bonum moris*.[44] The moral good is what interests us here. This is divided:[45]

Bonum moris:
- Gratiae
- Consuetudinis:
  - In genere
  - Ex circumstantiis
  - Virtutis politicae

Albert distinguishes between what is *simpliciter primum in moribus* and the *bonum in genere*. The first is the basic voluntary human act which is possible to receive predication of either praise or blame, i.e., can be virtuous or vicious. It is a possible human act conceived abstractly as equally related to the two contraries of virtue or vice. The *bonum in genere* adds a further determination whereby the balance is shifted through a certain ordering to one of the contraries, to the good of virtue.[46] Consequently, the *bonum in genere* does not totally abstract from every moral circumstance. It simply abstracts from the circumstances which would determine specifically this act as an act of a specific virtue:[47]

> Ad aliud dicendum, quod bonum in genere non abstrahit a quacumque circumstantia, sed tantum ab illa quae determinat speciem virtutis.

The next step is to consider the _bonum ex circumstantia_. Albert devotes three articles to a consideration of circumstances.[48] The main sources for his discussion are the _De inventione_ of Cicero and the _De differentiis topicis_ of Boethius.[49] There are three main points considered in regard to the subject of circumstances: what is the meaning of circumstances, what do circumstances contribute to the moral act, what are the circumstances.

Albert finds in Boethius a definition of circumstances: "Circumstantiae sunt, quae convenientes substantiam rhetoricae quaestionis efficiunt."[50] The circumstances have to be assembled together in the right person and concerning the right deed in question. In judicial inquiries, for example, if the proper circumstances are not brought together properly, the lawsuit (_causa_) will not stand in court.[51] The circumstances add further determinations which shed light on the matter at hand. In moral matters circumstances give a further being to the act. Albert says:[52]

> Dicendum, quod circumstantia proprie informat actum secundum illam formam quae dat esse honesti vel vituperabilis.

This determination is over and above the consideration of the mere voluntary act. It is a further determination of the *bonum in genere*. It arises from a consideration of the act in its various circumstances. Because it is an act in *these* circumstances it is either a good act or an evil act. Albert says that it is because of this fact that the rhetorical subject of debate arises. It is objected that, according to the definition, circumstances are concerning the extrinsic elements of a thing. What is extrinsic to the thing does not make or constitute the thing. Since circumstances constitute the rhetorical question, they should rather be called the forms of the act.[53] Albert points out that these circumstances do not give being to the act insofar as it is an act. There is an act which has been executed whose being or reality does not arise from the circumstances which admittedly are extrinsic to the being of the act. However, the circumstances do give further determination to the act making it an *actus honestus* or *vituperabilis*. Consequently, these circumstances are intrinsic to the uprightness or blameworthiness of the act. Those qualifications hinge upon the circumstances' being what they are. The being of moral uprightness arises from the mode of the act rather than from the act itself. All the circumstances taken together are called the *modus* of the act.[54] This determination is in the order of formal causality.

The notion of circumstances arises from the background of rhetoric. In rhetoric, they are used to determine the particular subject of debate. In ethics, however, circumstances are called singularia. The reason for this is because the human act is a singular thing and in particular circumstances. As Albert says, person is not a circumstance, but this or that person.[55]

It is the circumstances which are called "ea quae circumstant negotium". In order properly to know the moral uprightness of an act the prudent man must know what it is that determines this moral uprightness. If, as Albert says, the complex of circumstances "dat esse honesti actui" then the only way the prudent man can judge the act is to judge it with its circumstances. This is to see the act in its full particularity, to know the circumstances. This is to have a developed understanding. If this is had, then in the words of the solution: "Prudens efficitur potens ad eligendum id quod est operandum vel fugiendum."[56]

4. Foresight

Understanding, however, is not enough. When considering the parts of prudence, we are considering virtues which are operative before the act is performed. We saw Albert admit that, in a sense, even understanding is concerned with some foresight. It is concerned with the immediate future of an act to be done. In speaking about negotium and its circumstances we are not speaking as casuists looking back on a moral act and trying to come to a judgment about it. We are actually speaking about a possible or proposed action. Such an action can have many possible effects which must be taken into consideration before acting. When we talk about proposed or possible acts we get to the very heart of the matter of prudence. The possibilities and effects of the act must be considered. We come to the third part of prudence mentioned by Cicero, viz., providentia or foresight. Cicero defines foresight: "Providentia est, per quam futurum aliquid videtur, antequam factum sit."[57] Through foresight something future is seen before it occurs. The apparent contradiction here will occasion clarification on the role of probability in ethical matters. The solution to the article is simply a non-argumentative statement:[58]

> Dicendum, quod providentia est pars prudentiae, iuvans electionem operabilium ex consideratione futurorum possibilium accidere, propter quae etiam consiliamur.

The first objection, taking up Cicero's definition, makes the most incisive charge. It is impossible to know the future before it happens in moral matters. Moral actions are dependent on free choice. Matters which are dependent on free will cannot be known before they occur, not even by angels.[59] This is true. However, foresight is not concerned with the future insofar as it is dependent on free choice. To illustrate this Albert describes the method by which a moral agent would use foresight. The agent would suppose an action as performed. He would then conjecture what would happen in the factual order or as a point of law. As a result of this conjecture he would be in a position to judge whether the proposed action would be good or not. Foresight does not advance into the future insofar as the future depends on free choice. The agent does not claim that *this* action will occur and *these* results will follow. Rather, viewing the act as a supposition, he is in a position to judge of its moral worth when he views the cases thought conjecturally to result from the act.[60]

The question arises in this connection ~~as~~ to the certainty of such foresight. Nothing of an uncertain character would be a rule in human actions and a part of prudence. Foresight is not certain but rather probable from the standpoint of the future. This is so since it does not proceed from something necessarily. If it is certain that B follows necessarily from A, then knowing A, our knowledge of B as following A will be certain. There is a necessary relation between A and B. From another point of view however, foresight can be said to be certain. It is certain according to a particular order which it has to the future. This order is supposed as the cause or antecedent of such a future case. Here the relation between A and B is not necessary. However, supposing A to happen, then A is seen as a kind of a cause of future effects. There is an order between A and the things which follow from it. These effects are what must be grasped by foresight.[61]

Two objections are raised concerning the starting point of foresight. If it is about the future, then how can it consider future things at all? The consideration of future actions must have some principles from which to begin. These actions are particular and contingent. Consequently, they do not have a determined and permanent cause as principle. Foresight will have no principle from which to proceed. Moreover, since these actions do not even exist, foresight cannot be focused on the actions as such. Therefore, foresight can be said to focus on these future actions neither from the standpoint of their principles nor from the standpoint of the actions in themselves.[62] Albert denies that foresight has no principles from which to begin. The supposed deed here is in a particular set of circumstances. The principles are the circumstances of this projected action. Albert says:[63]

> Procedit enim providus sic dicens: Supponamus hoc iam esse factum et videamus, quid sequatur. Et secundum ea quae probabile est sequi per ius vel consuetudinem vel effectum, aestimat, utrum hoc sit faciendum, quod supposuerat iam esse factum.

In this way there is a starting point, viz., the act in its supposed or projected circumstances. The supposition involved here is not whether there is an act but in the sense that one would say: "Suppose I have twelve fingers." The supposed act as such is quite certain. Because it is an action it must be supposed to occur in particular circumstances of agent, time, place, etc. These circumstances are the principles from which foresight takes its start to examine the possible effects of the act. At the end of his reply to the third objection Albert says:[64]

> Unde patet, quod tale futurum habet ordinem ad antecedens ut signum vel causam et non omnino contingens est ad utrumlibet.

Here we have an analytical structuring of foresight. The futurum seems to be what one conjectures will happen if a particular act is performed. It is related to an antecedent, viz., this supposed particular act. The act is either a cause of the futurum or at least an indication that the futurum will occur. In either case the futurum is not totally contingent with regard to the antecedent act. There is some order from antecedent act to future effects, be the effects taken strictly as proceeding from a cause or at least loosely as being indicated by a sign.

A particular action must be done in a particular time. The moral consideration of action cannot abstract from temporal conditions; neither can the prudent man abstract from the consideration of time. The act he is to perform is not yet realised. It is an operabile--a possible action. The effects of the action and its repercussions must be taken into consideration. This makes a consideration of the dimension of the future important. Then there is the actual moral uprightness of the act to be considered. An act which is good in its moral being might be forbidden because of possible evil effects. This makes a consideration of the act in its total moral nature important. This consideration is not done in the light of the universal principles of synderesis. It is done as it were by looking downwards. It is done by looking downwards at the àct with its circumstances. This is the function of insight which looks to the present. However, the prudent man has a history. He has acted in the past, has learned from the past and can benefit from this experience. It is the function of memory to aid the prudent man's present choice through the consideration of the past. Memory, understanding and foresight are the parts of prudence, dividing prudence according to the three dimensions of time. They are three virtues which make up prudence.

5. Prudence as totum potestativum

It is not enough, however, to say that prudence has three parts. The concept of 'part' here is very important and must be investigated further. In the solution to the article on understanding Albert calls this virtue pars potestativa of prudence. In the solution to the article on the divisions made by Macrobius Albert says:[65]

> Dicendum, quod Tullius tangit partes prudentiae principales, in quibus perficitur et integratur potestas eius tota.

The principal parts of prudence are very special parts. Are they *partes potestativae* which implies that prudence itself is a *totum potestativum*?

In his discussion of the division of the good Albert says that the division is a "divisio totius potestativi sive virtualis." The whole in question is composed of parts hierarchically arranged so that the perfection of the whole is completed only with the final or ultimate part. The parts are arranged in an ascending hierarchy with the higher part including virtually the perfection of the lower. In this case the perfection of the whole can be perfectly predicated of the last part and only imperfectly of the lower parts. All the parts, however, are needed for the complete perfection of the whole. This is a potential whole or *totum potestativum*.[66]

In the *De IV coaequaevis* Albert identifies three wholes. There is the *totum universale* which is in each of its parts and predicated equally of its parts. There is the *totum integrale* which is not in any of its parts nor can it be predicated of them. The *totum potestativum* holds a middle place between these two. It is similar to the integral whole in that it is composed of parts. It is similar to the universal whole in that it can be predicated of its parts; but it differs from the universal whole since it is not equally predicated of all its parts.[67]

This conceptual framework is used by Albert in his attempt to elaborate a unified doctrine of the moral virtues. The moral virtues are certain powers and their parts are potential parts:[68]

> Dicendum, quod virtutes morales sunt potestates quaedam et suae partes sunt partes potestativae, sicut fere est in omnibus spiritualibus totis et partibus. Partes autem illae recipiunt quidem praedicationem totius secundum rationem imperfectam et habent ordinem, ita quod actus partis primae supponitur in secunda parte et aliquid additur, sicut alibi diximus.

Although said in the context of the discussion about fortitude, this text seems to refer to the moral virtues in general. By moral virtues is meant the four cardinal virtues. The parts of fortitude, however, are also called virtues: "Dico autem divisas esse virtutes . . . "[69] The parts of temperance are also spoken of as being parts of a potential whole.[70]

In regard to the parts of prudence Albert is not so clear in situating the discussion within the context of the potential whole. We have seen some indications which suggest that he is doing this:

1. Understanding is called virtus intellectualis.[71]

2. Understanding is a pars potestativa of prudence.[72]

3. Understanding fulfills the power of prudence: ". . . complet secundum aliquem modum potestatem prudentiae."[73]

4. Memory is spoken of as being summe necessaria.[74] The use of the superlative seems to suggest some kind of order among the parts.

5. Albert calls the parts of prudence which Cicero gives "partes principales, in quibus perficitur et integratur potestas eius tota."[75]

These five points are the only evidence we have to aid us in determining whether prudence is a potential whole. What follows can only be conjecture on our part. The strongest statements are made in regard to understanding. It is directly called a potential part. Now, if it is such a part, it must be a part of some whole. The other two elements are also called parts. And through these parts the potestas tota of prudence is perfected and integrated. The whole of prudence would seem to share in the notion of integral whole in so far as it is integrated out of parts. Since one of these parts is called a potential part, however, it would suggest that prudence is a potential whole whose parts are memory, understanding and foresight. To be a potential whole necessitates a certain hierarchical arrangement of parts with one being the ultimate part. Memory would seem to be the ultimate part. This is not because the past has any priority, but because for the past to be of any aid to us in the present it must presuppose that, when the past was present, understanding and foresight were operative. This leaves understanding and foresight.

Albert says that understanding fulfills (complet) the perfection of prudence. Foresight is about a future, more future than understanding. The perfection of understanding is simply extended in foresight to a more remote future. Foresight is virtually contained in understanding as are both foresight and understanding virtually contained in memory.

The problem in determining the nature of prudence as a potential whole is the intellectual character of prudence. Albert constantly distinguishes between prudence as a virtue of the will and prudence as a virtue of the intellect. He also distinguishes between the virtue of prudence and the act of prudence. Prudence is a habitus voluntarius as is every virtue. The subject of inherence of prudence is the intellect or reason. We have suggested elsewhere that the proper act of prudence is choice which is an act of both the will and reason. Knowledge of various sorts contributes to the act of prudence. It will be noted that Albert speaks of all three parts of prudence in reference to their contributing to the act of choice.[76] All three parts are habits of the practical intellect and so in a wide sense can be called virtues. There are two dimensions to prudence. There is the dimension of the will which culminates in the act of choice which seems to be the proper act of prudence. There is the intellectual dimension operating through examination, investigation, counsel and judgment. In so far as prudence encompasses both dimensions, it would not seem to be a potential whole. At least there is no indication that it is so. However, when seen in its intellectual dimension it would seem to be a potential whole whose parts are memory, understanding and foresight. These are prudence in its intellectual dimension, but not the whole of prudence. There is no perfect prudence without choice and action and these are not included by Albert under the parts of prudence.

In calling prudence a potential whole we are simply literally translating totum potestativum. This does not render the notion fully. The whole in question should be seen as a dynamic structure. This is the full perfection or excellence of the whole. The power of the whole arises from the power of the parts which, when integrated together, contribute to the fullness of the whole on the one hand and share in its perfection in varying degrees on the other. The intellectual dimension of prudence is just such a dynamic structure. The prudent man in the contingencies of life cuts across the three time dimensions in order to see and judge the moral uprightness of the action he contemplates. This is not all of prudence to be sure. It is the vision of prudence, without which the options open to the prudent man could only be chosen as by a blind man. With the perfection of prudence in its intellectual dimension, the prudent man is enabled to see the options open to him in their true light. In this way, "prudens efficitur potens ad

eligendum id quod est operandum vel fugiendum."[77]

CHAPTER SIX

THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE AS ENUMERATED BY MACROBIUS AND RELATED TOPICS

1. Parts enumerated by Macrobius

In Macrobius, Albert found another enumeration of the parts of prudence.[1] Macrobius says that reason, understanding, circumspection, foresight, willingness to learn, caution are in prudence.[2] Since understanding and foresight have been treated under the division of Cicero, Albert says he will not treat of them again. Albert views the parts dealt with in this article as more general conditions for prudence and not only as parts:[3]

> Macrobius autem et alii non tantum ponunt partes prudentiae, sed etiam conditiones actus ex modo et effectus generaliter consequentes omnes partes prudentiae. Modus autem actus est astutia, circumspectio, cautio; sequela vero est disciplina secundum aliquas diffinitiones ipsius, ut infra dicetur.

We shall see what members of the various divisions are parts of prudence, what are general conditions for the act of prudence, and what members are eliminated from the framework of prudence.

Albert begins with ratio. He finds a definition of ratio in the Liber de Definitionibus of Isaac Israeli. Isaac says that reason is a power which makes the cause run to what is caused. This does not seem to be the way we should understand ratio in the enumeration of Macrobius. According to Isaac reason is syllogistic and uses argumentation. In the argument it is always at least the cause of the consequence although it is not always the cause of the one drawing the consequence in the argument.[4] Furthermore, reason is a power of the soul and is the subject in which the intellectual virtues inhere. This reason cannot be a part of prudence since it is the subject of the virtue of prudence.[5] Albert replies to both objections together.[6] Reason is not understood here to be a power of the soul.[7] It is taken in the sense of Isaac with an application, as Albert says, to the special matter of morals. He then shows how reason, when it is applied, is to be understood. Reason is:[8]

> . . . discursus eorum quae sunt ut causa operans per rationem iuris vel utilis vel honesti in causatum electione opus.

Ratio would seem to be an ability to reason in moral matters. It is as it were a cause which operates through these various notions in order to effect an action. The effect in question is the action which arises ultimately through choice. This reasoning ability, however, does not proceed by way of syllogism or logical argument. Albert says it proceeds disponendo et sententiando in view of performing some action. Reason organises the investigation into ways and means and passes judgment on what is to be done or avoided. This is not strictly speaking syllogistic reasoning. It is only so called if we should mean the rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme.[9]

It is objected that the range of vision of a person with circumspection covers the past, present and future. Circumspection would involve memory, understanding and foresight and so would not be part of prudence but would comprise the whole of prudence.[10] In reply Albert makes two main points. The first is that since circumspection does not deal with the *matter* of prudence Cicero does not treat of it. Cicero was dealing with the core of the virtue of prudence. The parts he enumerates are parts of prudence according to the matter involved. Rather, circumspection is a condition for prudence *secundum modum*. This means that circumspection is concerned with the act of prudence. Prudence principally consists in choosing those things which will be of aid in performing a particular action. Circumspection consists principally in seeing all the means which aid in making a choice. Choice is in terms of action while circumspection is in terms of choice. In this way the power of prudence is strengthened. Circumspection considers the notions involved in performing an action. It does this, not under the aspect of temporal determinations, but rather, "secundum quod sunt determinantia electionem unam potius ex eo, quod solvuntur omnia dubitata in contrarium quae possunt obviare."[11]

Docility does not seem to be part of prudence or even a habit or a virtue. Rather, it is a certain natural disposition of our makeup or of reason.[12] Albert says there is a natural docility, of which the objection speaks, and a docility or openness to learn which is a matter of habit. The docility ex habitu is described thus:[13]

> . . . quando aliquis ex studio vel inventione vel auditu de facili acquiescit rationibus eligibilis ad opus, eo quod cognoscit illas esse iustas et veras. Et haec est conditio actus prudentiae, sicut dicit Macrobius.

Docility, as a condition for the act of prudence, involves a certain intellectual openness in the face of the truth. It is an ability to recognise and assent to the truth when it is present.

There seems to be only an accidental difference between caution and prudence. The cautious person is one who avoids danger. This is impossible unless he can foresee the future in some way. Consequently, it would seem that foresight and caution are identical.[14] In his reply Albert points out that caution teaches how to avoid danger in a special way. In matters of danger direction is difficult and error dangerous. Such matter demands a special condition to aid the prudential decision. This is caution. Caution has to do with special cases of danger and so is more narrow than foresight.[15] It might be said that foresight is further aided and strengthened in dangerous situations when caution is present.

Albert then organises three of the aspects which Macrobius adds over Cicero. All three make a contribution to the act of prudence. Circumspection aids the act of prudence in its investigation (inquisitio). Docility aids the act of prudence in coming to a determined decision to act and in expressing this decision (sententia). Caution aids the act of prudence in avoiding subsequent danger.[16] In this sense these 'parts' which Macrobius mentions are conditions facilitating the act of prudence. Unlike Cicero's parts they are not directly related to the matter of prudence.

2. Parts enumerated in Proverbs I, 2-5

Albert next turns to certain other features which are found in Proverbs.[17] These are what Albert calls eruditio (instruction), astutia (adroitness), scientia (knowledge), disciplina (learning), gubernatio (guidance). Albert spends considerable time discussing these five features which he finds in the Bible. He first makes an over-all judgment concerning them. They are more general or broader than are the parts of prudence. They are broader on two counts. First, they extend to a wider area than the specific area of human choices with which prudence is concerned.[18] Secondly, they are broader in the sense that they are aimed at giving knowledge through comparisons (scientia parabolica) and such features proceed from both human and divine notions.[19] Of such matters Albert says: " . . . et ideo a philosophis non considerantur."[20]

However, in the solution to the article, two of these aspects from Proverbs are placed among the conditions of the act of prudence either through the mode or the effects of the act. Adroitness (astutia) is said to be one of the conditions for the mode of the act of prudence. However, Albert says of astutia: "Et ideo patet, quod nec prudentiae pars vel conditio."[21] In so far as adroitness proceeds both according to human and divine notions, it cannot be said to be a condition of the mode of the act of prudence. However, in so far as it operates in the human arena it can be said to be so called. It fortifies us against the sorrows and depressions of life. Such fortification is necessary if choice and decision are to be made clearly. This interpretation seems to be the only one whereby we can reconcile Albert's two apparently contradictory statements regarding astutia. Albert also says that learning (disciplina) is a condition of the act of prudence from the standpoint of the effects of the act.[22] Albert gives four definitions of learning, the first from the Gloss on Hebrews and three from Hugh of Saint Victor.[23] The definitions of Hugh are used to show that learning is not a special habit. When considered as the intellectual apprehension of moral knowledge, learning is rather a general habit which instructs in propriety in all the actions pertaining to life. The text from the Gloss refers to the learning one acquires through the experience of punishment (verberum). In this sense learning does not connote a determined part or a condition of prudence. Rather it connotes in a general way the correction of ignorance of any kind through punishment.[24] It seems difficult to reconcile the reply to the ninth objection with the statement in the 'solution' that learning is an effect following generally upon all the parts of prudence. A reconciliation might be made if we say that learning does refer to the effect following upon the parts of prudence but that it is also more general than this. It is not exclusively proper to prudence, although it does have some relation to prudence.

There is one last aspect which Albert mentions, viz., calliditas. He realises that neither Cicero nor Macrobius nor Proverbs mentions this feature. However, he says it bespeaks a habit ordered to prudence. It seems to mean a certain native ability or practical wisdom. If this is so, the parts of prudence are insufficiently enumerated.[25] Albert simply replies that the term calliditas has an evil ring about it. It properly connotes a subtlety in finding deceptions and things that are harmful. It is not placed among the species of good habits by the Fathers or the philosophers.[26]

3. Aristotle's division of intellectual virtue

In the final article of this question Albert discusses the division of intellectual virtue as found in Aristotle.[27] In the translation of the *Ethica nova* we read:[28]

> Dicimus autem harum et has quidem intellectuales has autem et morales: sapientiam quidem et fronesim et intelligentiam intellectuales.

Albert understands these virtues as relating to the regulation of the moral life in some way. He calls them general habits of intellectual virtue. The emphasis here is on the word 'general'. They have an over-all role to play in moral matters. *Sapientia* or wisdom in its moral consideration is a habit of moral matters with knowledge of the principal cause in the ethical consideration. This cause is the final cause. The final cause is happiness (*felicitas*) or the absolute good (*honestum*) which is the end of the appetite. The function of wisdom is to give knowledge (*scientia*) of the end. *Phronesis* in this division is to be taken in the strict sense. It is a habit of moral matters with knowledge of natural and positive law and with the determination of what is upright (*rectum*) and not upright. Understanding (*intelligentia*) means nothing more than prudence. It connotes the simple knowledge of objects of choice in particular cases.[29]

In the case of each of these habits Albert insists that they are to be understood in the context of a moral interpretation and in a very wide sense. He says of wisdom: " . . . dummodo non referatur ad materiam quamlibet, sed ad propriam, scilicet ad causam causarum in moralibus."[30]

We have mentioned that *phronesis* in the Grosseteste translation was rendered *prudentia*. In this article Albert distinguishes between *phronesis* and *prudentia*. *Phronesis* connotes a greater knowledge of moral matters than is demanded by *prudentia*. It is for prudence to give *quia* knowledge while *phronesis* (and wisdom) determine through *propter quid* knowledge.[31] *Quia* knowledge is arrived at by arguing from an effect or a remote cause or a necessitating reason which is not a cause. *Propter quid* knowledge reasons from an immediate and proper cause. In Albert's view, since *phronesis* argues from notions of natural and positive law, its knowledge is called *propter quid* knowledge. It is a movement downwards from principles to facts. Prudence, according to this differentiation, would seem to argue from circumstances and more remote causes to determine choice and so its knowledge would be *quia* knowledge. Albert is certainly making a distinction between *phronesis* and *prudentia*. In the second half of the third objection Albert asks why Aristotle does not mention *prudentia* which is "primarily intellectual virtue."[32] He makes no reply to this objection, perhaps because he felt it was answered in the solution to the article. In the first objection we find an even more curious statement. Albert says that Cicero in the

De officiis expressly (*expresse*) says that the Greeks call *phronesis*, *sapientia* and he refers to his previous treatment on prudence where he cites his *auctoritas*. The apparatus of the *De bono* gives no variant readings for this statement. However, if we look to Cicero and Albert himself we find that Albert is mistaken here. Cicero says:[33]

> Princepsque omnium virtutum illa
> sapientia, quam σοφίαν Graeci
> vocant . . . prudentiam enim, quam
> Graeci φρόνησιν dicunt.

On two occasions at least Albert cites verbatim this sentence of Cicero in its correct form.[34] It is clear at this point that Albert saw a distinction between the strict meaning of *phronesis* and *prudentia*. He was faced with a text of Aristotle and tried to make the best of it. This, however, does not explain the mis-citation of Cicero. It was probably made from memory when Albert was pre-occupied with the Aristotelian division. The whole sixth article is an example of what happened when Albert tried to cope with an Aristotelian doctrine of prudence while lacking the complete text of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

We shall now summarise briefly Albert's teaching regarding the parts of prudence. The central factor is choice, the definitive and perhaps the proper act of prudence. It is through the relation to choice that various other habits and virtues are said to be parts of prudence. The various aspects which Albert calls 'parts' of prudence are all related to the cognitional dimension of prudence. He distinguishes three types of relation. There are those habits which are properly speaking parts of the virtue of prudence. Prudence, in its intellectual aspect, is these parts. It is one organic whole composed of these parts. They range over the three time dimensions, learning from the past, judging the present situation and conjecturing about possible future effects if a particular act were done. These are strictly speaking the principal parts of prudence, viz., memory, understanding and foresight. These parts are virtues, which, when taken together form one whole which is prudence. In addition to these three aspects which Albert found in Cicero, there are others which he found in Macrobius. These are not so much parts of prudence in the sense of the Ciceronian parts, but are rather what Albert calls conditions for the act of prudence. These conditions too are ultimately related to choice and precede choice. In order for choice to be correct choice in the circumstances, the agent must be able to investigate and judge correctly the various contingencies involved in performing an act. He must have a certain facility in reasoning from the general principles of morals to the concrete judgment he has to make in each situation. The facility is called 'reason' (ratio). Perhaps it should be rather called 'reasoning' if reasoning is understood not as an act but a disposition and habit. In order to reason well a certain facility at considering the many elements which enter into making a choice must be had. Doubts are encountered and must be resolved. Options are open and a determination on one or several must be made. This is the area of circumspection which consists principally in seeing all the means which contribute to making a prudential choice. After all of this there is still the necessity of being able to see the truth when it is presented. This ability is called 'docility' or openness to learn. It is a certain habitual disposition whereby one assents with ease to the reasons for a particular choice because these reasons are good and just. 'Caution' is a special condition for the act of prudence in the particular situation of danger. It is of value in the special area which demands caution because of the difficulty of proper direction and the danger which lies in error. The virtues as enumerated by Aristotle are not considered as parts of prudence or as conditions for the act of prudence. Rather, they are of a more general nature without which the whole intellectual structure of prudence would not stand. 'Wisdom' grasps the ultimate cause of the moral life which is happiness. Phronesis is the habitual knowledge of the general principles of moral judgment. 'Understanding' (not the Ciceronian) is the simple knowledge of the things to be chosen in view of particular concrete action. This is the general outline of the parts of prudence.

4. Traditional uses of term *prudentia*

The two questions in which Albert analyses the notion of prudence are couched in philosophical terms which owe much to Aristotle. Even when philosophical terms are borrowed from elsewhere, e.g., from Cicero or from Augustine, they are as often as not elucidated in the light of Aristotelian analysis. However, the notion of prudence was also found in a theological context carrying with it a theological usage. Albert was not unaware of this phenomenon and he sought to clarify the situation. In the first question on prudence he asks: "Utrum prudentia sit virtus simpliciter vel multiplicter dicta."[35] Albert is here concerned primarily with the use of the term *prudentia*, and only secondarily with the thing it is used to describe. He wants to know whether the term is used in an unqualified sense or with several meanings in the various contexts in which it is encountered. Albert found the term in several different contexts with several different uses. He must examine this situation to see whether the usages are valid and to what degree. From an examination of Albert's treatment of this question it seems that he is actually confronting his own analysis of prudence with a more traditional theological use of the term.[36] The main divisions of prudence which Albert deals with are as follows:

1. The three-fold division in St. Basil: he is called prudent who craftily harms another for benefit to

himself; he is called prudent who trips up and deceives another out of anger or envy without further good effect to himself; he is called prudent who looks to his own good and astuteness without harm to himself and chooses favorable things or in difficult times keeps the faith with caution and regard.[37] The remaining divisions, he tells us, he will gather together in a summary fashion from the glosses of the Fathers.[38]

2. The division: *prudentia carnis* and *prudentia spiritus*. This division is related to the *Gloss* on Rm VIII, 6.[39]

3. The division: *prudentia apud semetipsum* and *prudentia apud proximum*.

There are other uses of the term in the *Gloss* but Albert concentrates on these three.

There is no need to examine Albert's discussion of these aspects in detail, although Albert himself deals with them at great length. The explanation which Albert gives in regard to each of these uses of the term is based on a fundamental distinction. This distinction is provided by Albert in the solution to the article. Albert distinguishes between speaking of prudence *per prius* and *per posterius*. *Per prius* refers to the primary and principal sense of the term. When 'prudence' is used *per prius* it is used in the strict sense. In this sense it is one of the cardinal virtues. To explain the strict sense Albert furnishes us with a description of prudence which draws together the essential points developed in his previous treatment:[40]

> Principaliter enim dicitur prudentia scientia practica consequenter ad voluntatem ordinata, ea a quibus adiuvatur ab his a quibus impeditur, sagaciter eligens.

This is prudence in the strict sense of the word. Per posterius means a secondary or wider sense. This is not to say there is no relation between the two senses. There is a relation but it is a hierarchical relation in which the per prius sense is the more proper sense. The secondary sense is explained:[41]

> Per posterius autem vocatur prudentia sagacitas vel sollertia inveniendi bonum sibi vel simpliciter etiam in quacumque materia . . .

Since this prudence is operative in quacumque materia the possibility is open for evil acts to be called prudent. Albert says that because of the matter and adjoined passion sometimes this secondary sense of prudence is used in a context of evil, sometimes in a context of good. It is open to both.

Albert's discussion with regard to the division of St. Basil and the other uses of the term prudentia relies on this fundamental distinction. These more traditional uses employ the term in a secondary sense. They do not completely differ from the primary sense in their meaning, but they do not completely share in this primary and principal sense. Albert, in his replies, proceeds to show where the sameness lies and where the differences lie between the primary sense of prudentia and the secondary senses as exemplified in the more traditional theological uses of the term. We shall not follow this long discussion of Albert. It will be sufficient to say that he deals with each division on the basis of his fundamental distinction between the primary and secondary senses of the term prudentia. All of the elements raised in this fifth article are reduced to the secondary meaning of the term.[42]

At the particular time of writing the De bono, this relatively long treatment of the various uses of the term prudentia was necessary. The two questions in the De bono on prudence gather together in systematic form a whole tradition of moral thought. Albert has sought to determine the essential nature of prudence and in so doing must distinguish this prudence from more traditional interpretations of the term. This article adds nothing to the understanding of the meaning of the cardinal virtue of prudence. It does, however, emphasize at every turn the difference between the strict and proper sense of prudence and other meanings which are only secondary and wider. They all share in some way in certain aspects of the virtue of prudence. None of them are identical with the full meaning of the virtue of prudence which Albert elucidates in the first four articles of the first question on prudence.[43]

In the twelve articles we have studied Albert the

Great presents a unified doctrine of prudence. He owes much to the previous discussions concerning prudence and discretio. However, he was able to gather the various elements together into a systematic treatise on prudence. The possibility for doing this was provided largely by the works of Aristotle which Albert possessed. Nonetheless, Albert left his own mark on this treatise. What originality Albert shows was created with the aid of Aristotle. This originality is revealed particularly in Albert's solution to the scientia-prudentia problem. The solution was arrived at by using the Aristotelian notion of practical knowledge and by placing the whole of prudence under the dynamic thrust of the will. In this way the totally moral character of the virtue of prudence was assured. Whatever closer comparison between Albert and Philip the Chancellor might reveal (and from a rapid reading of Philip's treatment of prudence we believe the parallel to be great) at least in this point Albert makes an advance over Philip.

Albert's over-all doctrine of prudence is marked by certain definite directions:

1. In spite of his having solved the scientia-prudentia problem, prudence is still defined by Albert as scientia. Despite everything, prudence for Albert remains in the genus of knowledge.

2. Prudence is very closely allied with a doctrine of natural law. Natural law provides the principles of

practical reason by which prudence judges the moral character of projected actions. In this context the syllogism model of moral reasoning from principles of natural law down to the expression of the command to act (*sententia*) plays an important role.

3. Because of the generic identification between knowledge and prudence, and because of the relative infallibility of prudential reasoning guaranteed by natural law, prudence is singularly independent of the moral virtues. Surely, there is some relation between prudence and the other cardinal virtues. Prudence is the *auriga virtutum*. Materially, it finds its matter in the matter of the moral virtues. Wherever the element of choice is present, prudence will be present. However, there is no word about the *need* that prudence might have for the moral virtues. There is no word about the need for balance and order in the affective dimension of life in order to ensure clear perception for prudence.

It would seem that these three characteristics are the major points in the *De bono* doctrine of prudence. This doctrine was built up independently of Aristotle's *ex professo* treatment of prudence which is to be found in *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI. We shall move on now to examine Albert's doctrine of prudence after he was in possession of the complete *Ethics*. In our study we shall keep in mind the three characteristics mentioned above. This is important since Aristotle's prudence has very little in common with the prudence as characterised by these three points. If Albert is to benefit from Aristotle, it will mean a radical departure from the prudence of the De bono.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE UNEDITED COURSE: THE DEFINITION AND NATURE OF PRUDENCE CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

1. Importance of *Unedited Course*

The *De bono* of Albert the Great is not only one of his earlier works, it is also only one of a great number of works. However, it is the only work in which Albert presents a systematic treatment of the virtue of prudence and, because of this, the *De bono* is of unique value. We have already noted the problem connected with taking the doctrine of the *De bono* as the final word of Albert concerning prudence. At the time of his writing the *De bono* Albert did not yet have the complete text of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This means he did not have the full doctrine of prudence as outlined by Aristotle in the sixth book of the *Ethics*. Consequently, we must examine the writings of Albert on prudence which post-date the translation of the complete *Nicomachean Ethics*. Unfortunately, Albert never again wrote a systematic and independent treatment on the virtues in general or on prudence in particular. He did, however, write two commentaries on the *Ethics* of Aristotle. While the use of commentaries to arrive at Albert's thought is dangerous, as we shall see, it is the only way open to us. Not to examine these later works, and to rest our

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The De bono was probably written about 1240/43. In 1922 A. Pelzer reported the discovery of a yet unedited commentary on the complete Nicomachean Ethics different from the edited Paraphrase we already possess.[1]

The date of the Unedited Course depends on two other dates, viz., the date when Thomas Aquinas was with Albert as a student, and the date of the Grosseteste translation of the Ethics. Contrary to what Pelzer had said in an earlier article, it would seem that the completed translation was not in circulation before 1246-47.[2] From the standpoint of this Greco-Latin translation, the commentary of Albert would have to be after 1246/47. In 1248 Albert was sent to Cologne to be Regent Master of the newly founded Studium Generale. From 1248 to 1252 Thomas Aquinas studied at Cologne under Albert.[3] These dates are in harmony with the evidence regarding the circulation of the new translation made by Grosseteste. Albert could not have possessed this work before 1246/47 even if he and Thomas were together in Paris prior to their Cologne association. Thomas would have had no opportunity to hear Albert after 1252. We would say that the *Unedited Course* dates from the Cologne period (1248-52) of Albert's teaching. It enjoys unique interest in that it was delivered by Albert and reported by Thomas.[4] The *Unedited Course* is known in several manuscripts.[5]

Since we are interested in the thought of Albert and not in his expertise as a commentator, a problem arises. This problem is native to the use of any commentary for the exposition of the thought of the man who is commenting. The problem is compounded in view of the strong statement of Albert in his Prologue to the Commentary on the *Physics*. There he tells us his purpose is to explain Aristotle and not give his own opinion.[6] This seems to be a general policy regarding commentaries on Aristotle. On the other hand, Albert is not simply interested in the words of Aristotle. He is interested in the truth. Aristotle is not God and so can err. In such cases Albert will not hesitate to contradict him.[7] This last statement can be used to at least argue for the possibility of using an Albertine commentary for the thought of Albert himself. The *Paraphrasis on the Ethics*, by its very nature, is somewhat difficult to use in this regard. However, it will be recalled that the *Unedited Course* is composed of literal commentary and questions. In these questions Albert raises doubts, difficulties and objections and attempts to find a true answer for them. Consequently, in these questions we should be able to find the thought of Albert on whatever point is being discussed. It is true that the questions are raised in the light of the difficulties Albert finds in the Aristotelian text. But the solutions are meant to meet both the demands of the text and the demands of truth. In these questions we can presume to find the thought of Albert. As Grabmann says:[8]

> Durch die Handhabung der quaestio kommt in dem ungedruckten Ethikkommentar Alberts sein eigener Lehrstandpunkt viel schärfer zur Geltung als dies beim gedruckten Kommentar der Fall ist.

Albert was once removed from the Greek text of Aristotle. In using a Latin translation which was extremely literal, and apparently without a personal knowledge of Greek, Albert was at a certain disadvantage.[9] Our relation to Albert is somewhat analogous to the relation of Albert to Aristotle. We have a text of Albert and from it we must attempt to understand him. However, there are problems here which must be mentioned. We have to chart a course between these problems and we must outline the principles which will be operative in our charting. There are four fundamental problems we should not lose sight of. There are the two Aristotelian problems: the text of Aristotle and the proper interpretation of Aristotle. Then there are the two Albertine problems: the text of Albert and our interpretation of Albert. These problems are not simply logically possible problems but are met at every turn. Our prime concern is with the interpretation of the thought of Albert concerning the virtue of prudence. Now, in the case of the Unedited Course, this task cannot be accomplished without a suitable text. Consequently, we have provided what we think is a suitable text for Book VI, chapter 5 of the Ethics as found in the work of Albert. The text includes both the nine questions on prudence and literal commentary, followed by two final questions. This will be found as an Appendix at the end of the thesis and textual references will be made to it. Chapter five is not the only place where prudence is discussed by Aristotle. In fact, the full doctrine of prudence and its relation to the other virtues is only developed in the last chapter of Book VI. Citations of these further texts in the commentary of Albert will be made from the V manuscript but will be checked against S.

In connection with the text of Albert there is another problem: does the Latin translation render the Greek text of Aristotle faithfully? This problem immediately introduces the question of the correct text of

Aristotle. As far as Aristotle is concerned we shall accept the text of Rackham but check it where need be with other editions.[10] We can do nothing about Albert's Latin text. Right or wrong translation, it was the only one he knew. However, where it seems necessary we shall point out textual problems: either problems of conflict between the Greek and the Latin text, or problems of the proper reading of Aristotle himself.

This leaves the question of the proper interpretation of Aristotle. We cannot enter into a discussion of the meaning of the doctrine of Aristotle and Albert's either correctly or incorrectly interpreting Aristotle. We shall make one exception. In the problem of the connection of the virtues, it will be instructive to confront the interpretation of Albert with an outline of Aristotle's views on the subject. This will be a guage whereby we can measure the influence of the new Aristotelian material on Albert.

It seems that only when the enormity of the problems are brought out can one justify oneself from not entering into them. Such a realisation must excuse one from apparently saying so little about peripheral textual problems and problems of interpretation which can only lead into innumerable isolated discussions. There is no denying that these problems are real and call for answers. But a work studying the doctrine of prudence in Albert is not the place to tackle them.

With regard to the Unedited Course we shall study the nine questions on prudence with which Albert prefaces his literal commentary. We shall then study the three virtues connected with prudence which Aristotle mentions later and finally study the relationship of prudence to the moral virtues.

The commentary of Albert on Nicomachean Ethics VI, 5 comprises two parts, a literal commentary and questions. The questions are distributed according to Albert's view of the plan of the fifth chapter.[11] The chapter falls into two main divisions: treatment of prudence in itself and secondly the part of the soul which prudence perfects. The first part has two major divisions: introductory remarks regarding the method of treatment and secondly the difference of prudence from science and art. This second division comprises two parts. Firstly, Albert says that Aristotle shows that prudence is not science. This section concludes with a definition of prudence. Secondly, Aristotle shows that prudence is not art. He does this from two standpoints. Firstly, according as art is a virtue, prudence is shown to be different from art. This section concludes again with a definition of prudence. Secondly, according as art is not a virtue, prudence is shown to be different from art for various reasons. The second big division regards the part of the soul in which prudence is to be found. This second section falls into two divisions. Firstly, Aristotle says prudence is in the opinative (calculative) part of the soul and so prudence, according to Albert, is distinct from science. Secondly, Aristotle says that prudence is not of reason alone, and so, according to Albert, it is distinct from art. The proof of this is that prudence cannot be forgotten.

Albert distributes his questions in view of this over-all division of chapter five. He asks nine questions concerning the treatment of prudence in itself. These questions are followed by the literal commentary. The treatment closes with two last questions which are meant to elucidate the second part of the chapter, viz., the part of the soul which prudence perfects.[12]

2. Definition of prudence

The first, second and fifth questions of the *Unedited Course* directly bear on the definition of prudence. We shall deal with these questions first. The first question asks whether the phrase *cum ratione vera* is correctly in the definition, "et videtur quod non sit cum ratione vera."[13] Judging from the second question, the definition of prudence which Albert has is really a conflation of two definitions in the fifth chapter.[14] The first definition says prudence is "verus habitus activus cum ratione." (1140b4) The second says that prudence is "habitus operativus cum ratione vera." (1140b20) Albert substitutes *activus* for *operativus* in the second definition as the proper definition according to genus and difference as we shall see.[15] Consequently, the definition of prudence which Albert had would be, in its nominative form: "Prudentia est habitus cum ratione vera circa humana bona activus." The first question deals with the notion of "cum ratione vera", the second with the notion of "circa humana bona".

The solution to the first question says that the phrase "cum ratione vera" is very advisedly placed in the definition of prudence. This true reason is the ruler in the operations of prudence and every operation needs a ruler. As it stands this solution is not very informative, particularly because of its legislative language. What kind of a ruler is this true reason? Is it a legislator laying down laws and demanding obedience to these laws? In the reply to the fourth objection Albert clarifies the meaning of ratio as used here. It was objected that ratio means either the definition of something or a power of the soul. Neither of these meanings is suitable in the definition of prudence. In reply Albert points out that ratio has more meanings than the two given in the objections. He continues:[16]

> . . . et hic ratio sumitur pro fine. Dicimus enim qua ratione fecisti hoc et respondetur ut hoc contingeret. Unde etiam in littera dicit quod prudentes sunt qui ad finem studiosum bene ratiocinantur quia ratione finis dirigitur aliquis in his quae ad finem sunt.

Here prudence is placed within the context of ends and means. It relates to both. Prudence must have a true end. This is part of its definition. In view of this end it is able to direct in the means (*in his quae ad finem sunt*) to the end. Obviously the right end is of paramount importance in this regard. The introduction of the notion of end clarifies the role of ruler which prudence enjoys. Prudence is not a ruler in the sense of one who lays down laws and obligations. Prudence directs and points out the way in moral activity. To this degree prudence is a ruler but not a legislator. We shall see later the exact relation between prudence and the end.

The first three objections of this question confront true reason with the contingencies with which prudence deals. The point is that it is difficult to see how prudence which deals with the contingencies of human action can be said to have a *vera ratio*. In each of the replies Albert agrees that if we take contingent matters as such or particular acts as such there is no question of a determined truth. However, contingent actions are performed by a human rational agent. Insofar as actions proceed from reason and under the direction of reason and the universal notions of reason, there is some determination. Further, the actions are performed in view of an end which is one and determined. Albert is clear in this matter:

> . . . sed secundum quod sunt praeordinata

> a ratione sic magis se habent ad unum quam ad alterum et sic est ipsorum aliqualiter determinata veritas.[17]
>
> Sed secundum quod exeunt ab universalibus habent aliquam determinationem.[18]
>
> Sed secundum quod stant in ordine rationis et conceptione finis sic habent veritatem in causis suis ratione ordinante et voluntate determinante ad finem ordinata.[19]

The structure of the virtue of prudence is beginning to emerge. The term 'structure' is well used since this is how Albert will view prudence, viz., after the manner of a logical structure bearing both on the universal and on the particular.

The second question deals with that part of the definition which says that prudence is a habitus activus: "Secundo videtur quod non sit activus habitus cum ratione vera." "Habitus activus" can best be translated, "habit concerned with action." The solution to the question consists in a literal exposition of the definition of prudence:[20]

> Dicendum quod Aristoteles in diffinitione quam ponit de prudentia comprehendit et materiam ipsius per hoc quod dicit quod est circa humana bona, et iterum actum eius per hoc quod dicit activus, et genus ipsius per hoc quod dicit habitus, et regitivum actus per hoc quod dicit cum ratione vera.

The first objection uses a familiar phrase of Averroes: "Intellectus practicus movet per suam scientiam."[21] This knowledge is true reason. Albert then says that since this formula takes note of the diversity between habit concerned with action and true reason, Aristotle should have said that prudence was simply true reason. In reply, Albert points out that indeed habitus activus and vera ratio are really the same, but a logical distinction can be made. He then gives another definition of prudence: "Est enim prudentia habitus in ratione existens quo eligit vel refutat ad opus ea quae pertinent ad humanam vitam."[22] There is here a two-fold aspect in prudence. Taken from an entitative point of view, prudence has its being in reason and this justifies us in naming it 'true reason'; but from the point of view of operation, prudence has the character of an 'active habit'. Albert sees no incoherence in having it both ways. Albert continues, " . . . et ut haec distinctio notetur, posuit propositionem mediam."[23] This phrase is not at all clear. It seems that what is meant here is that in view of action prudence must go beyond the true reason or the simple habit. It does this in syllogistic form by composing a minor proposition which will mediate between the true reason and the action to be performed. In view of later statements of Albert, this would seem to be the sense of this reply. Consequently, prudence is not simply true reason, but it is also a habit concerned with action.

The second objection posits a dilemma. The habit of prudence is either sufficient or insufficient. If it is sufficient, then it perfects the soul with regard to all human actions and so there is no need for the other virtues. This is false since all the moral virtues are ordered to prudence. If it is insufficient then it does not sufficiently perfect the soul. This is against the intention of Aristotle who teaches that whoever has prudence in an unqualified way has all the virtues. Consequently, prudence cannot be a habit concerned with action. The reply explains how prudence is to be understood. Prudence is the *auriga virtutum* Albert says. Here we have the notion from the *De bono* introduced. This use of the image of *auriga* suggests a certain direction in Albert's view about the relation of prudence and the other virtues. It is a traditional view which he had discussed in an article in the *De bono*.[24] At this point Albert attributes the *auriga* notion to Aristotle (" . . . sicut dicit hic prudentia est auriga virtutum.")[25] As *auriga*, prudence can be a *habitus activus* without falling into the pitfalls of the objection. In its function of choosing with a view to action prudence is sufficient unto itself. But for the execution of the action there must be other virtues following upon and serving prudence.

Using Augustine's definition of prudence, it is objected that prudence should be called a *habitus electivus* rather than *activus*.[26] In reply Albert distinguishes between the standpoints of Augustine and Aristotle. Augustine speaks of the act of prudence from the standpoint of reason. This is the act of choice. Aristotle, however, in his definition is considering prudence in so far as it is operating in the matter of the moral virtues. Albert concludes the reply to the sixth objection with these words: "Est enim media quodammodo inter intellectuales et morales . . ."[27]

Previously, when speaking of the division of the intellectual virtues, Albert had explained this notion of being a mean between the intellectual and moral virtues. A virtue can be called intellectual from three standpoints. First, according to its subject, since it is the perfection of the mind. Secondly, from the standpoint of its generation, since it is generated through experience and time. Thirdly, from the standpoint of its object, as wisdom is concerned with the highest causes. Prudence is an intellectual virtue on the first two counts. With regard to its object, however, prudence has more in common with the moral virtues since it is the reason of those things which are to be chosen with a view to action. Consequently, although prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue, it is said to occupy a middle position between the intellectual and moral virtues.[28]

Without even raising the subject Albert, in the second question of the *Unedited Course*, provides a solution for the *scientia-prudentia* problem. We have already drawn attention to the fact that in spite of Albert's discussion of this problem, prudence in the *De bono* is defined as *scientia*. This is clear when Albert registers his agreement with the definition of Harialdus.[29] Again, when Albert himself defines prudence in his own words he defines it as *scientia*.[30] In the question we have just examined in the *Unedited Course* Albert says that prudence is generically a *habitus*. In agreeing with Aristotle Albert frees himself from the *scientia-prudentia* problem which seems to arise at every turn in the *De bono*.[31]

The fifth question considers the last part of the definition, viz., that prudence is *circa humana bona*: "Quinto videtur quod prudentia non sit tantum circa humana bona." The solution is simple and straight-forward. Prudence is only concerned with human goods. Albert then says what these human goods are. They are the operations of the moral virtues. From this solution it would seem that at least in a broad sense prudence is directly related to the operations of the moral virtues. In the solution to the second question Albert had said that the expression "circa humana bona" signified the matter of the virtue of prudence.[32] In view of the solution to the fifth question we can conclude that the operations of the moral virtues are the matter of prudence. Here we see a close link between prudence and the moral virtues. This is a repetition of the doctrine of the *De bono* regarding the matter of prudence.

The first objection in this question is interesting since it uses an argument already used in the *De bono*. From the *De officiis* of Cicero one would gather that prudence concerns everything that is knowable (omne scibile).[33] Everything that is knowable is of wider extension than human goods and therefore prudence cannot be only about human goods. In the De bono Albert was anxious to distinguish the kind of knowledge involved in prudence and in this way to interpret Cicero. In this question of the Unedited Course he is content to say that 'prudence' in the Cicero reference is being used in a wide sense so as to include all the intellectual virtues. This reply is characteristic of Albert's approach to Cicero in the Unedited Course. The different treatments can be explained, it would seem, through a consideration of sources. In the De bono Cicero was an important source and authority who had to be used and properly interpreted. In the Unedited Course Aristotle is now the source and authority. Cicero enters the scene more as a representative of an earlier viewpoint who must very often be explained away rather than interpreted.

The fourth objection brings up a subject which is cause for a separate question and the reply serves as an introduction to the question. It is objected that a function of the prudent man is counsel. However, we do not take counsel merely in matters of human goods which are called agibilia. Artisans also take counsel in their work which are called factibilia. The reply to the objection follows Aristotle in this regard. The counsel of prudence is counsel without qualification concerning those things of which a human agent takes counsel in general. When we speak of counsel in the works of art we are speaking of a qualified counsel, viz., the counsel of the artisans as a class. This is not the counsel of prudence.[34]

As if the immediately preceding reply presumed on the distinction between doing and making, the sixth question begins: "Sexto videtur quod factio contineatur sub actione."[35] The distinction between making and doing is a further distinction of practical knowledge. _De anima_ III 10,433a14-16 is the classic text for Aristotle's distinction between speculative and practical knowledge. These are distinguished on the basis of their respective ends. In other passages, Aristotle, when distinguishing the different kinds of knowledge, mentions three, viz., speculative, practical and productive.[36] In this case 'practical' does not embrace the whole of practical science as distinguished from speculative science. Rather 'practical' refers to moral activity. In the medieval translations the notion of 'practical' came to be associated with the _actio_ vocabulary while the notion of 'productive' was associated with the _factio_ vocabulary.

The difference between making and doing is stated by Aristotle in this fifth chapter of Book VI of the _Ethics_.[37] There is no formal solution for the sixth question; there are simply three replies to the three objections. The first objection says that the only category that making can be placed under is the category of action. Therefore, making would be reduced to the category of action and so there would be no generic distinction between them. In reply Albert says that actio is not here taken as a category but, " . . . pro operatione cuius principium est in ipso concipiente singularia."[38] This expression parallels closely the definition of a voluntarium in Aristotle:[39]

> Voluntarium videbitur utique esse cuius principium in ipso sciente singularia, in quibus est operatio.

The similarity of expression seems hardly accidental. The action involved is a voluntary act whose principle is internal to the agent. This agrees with Aristotle's description of doing or acting:[40]

> . . . while in the case of things done it [the principle] is in the doer--viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are the same.

On the other hand the matter of production is moved by some extrinsic principle and so through the operation of art, not action but making is signified, since art is ordered to the making of something. The extrinsic principle of which Albert is speaking here seems to be an end outside of or beyond the operation itself. It is important to note this since Aristotle, when speaking of the principle of productive science, speaks of an internal principle, viz., reason, art or some faculty.[41] This is so since even a productive making of an artisan is an action. The basic difference between making and doing of moral action lies in the difference of ends.

Albert explains this in the reply to the second objection of this sixth question. However, since a text of Aristotle clearly lies behind the reply of Albert, we shall look at the text of Aristotle and Albert's literal commentary on it first. Aristotle says:[42]

> Factionis quidem enim alterum finis. Actionis autem non semper. Est enim ipsi eupraxia finis.

These terse phrases can only be translated in a very free manner:

> For indeed the end of making is other [than the act of making.] [The end] of action is not always so. For a good action is its own end.

Here moral action and productive operation are distinguished on the basis of their ends. In the literal commentary Albert says that at factionis (1140b6) Aristotle is showing the difference between art and prudence. He continues:[43]

> Primo ex parte materiae tali ratione: omnis factio est ad alium finem extra se; sed actionis non semper est alius finis quia eupraxia, id est bona actio virtutis est sibi ipsi finis; ergo actio et factio differunt et sic prudentia et ars.

Note that the text reads: "Actionis autem non semper." The "non semper" is not in the Greek text. Albert interprets these words as referring to arts of a particular class which are concerned not with factibilia but with actibilia. However, in spite of their being concerned with actibilia, their end is still outside of the operation itself. An art of this class would be the art of military leadership.[44]

This text of Aristotle lies behind the reply to the second objection of the sixth question. This objection states that prudence is not sufficiently distinguished from art by something which is suitable to some one of the arts. But acting is suitable to an art, viz., the art of leading an army. Consequently, the notion of action does not sufficiently distinguish prudence from art. In the reply Albert makes a three-fold distinction. On the one hand, there is prudence which is the exercise of a particular intellectual virtue. Secondly, there are the productive arts which the Greeks, Albert says, call *tigne* (i.e. *τέχνη*). Between these extremes there are certain arts which share with prudence the fact of their being *circa humana bona*. To this degree they can be called actions or as the Greeks call them, according to Albert, *eupraxiae*. On the other hand, these good actions share with the productive arts and differ from prudence in having an end which is outside of the action itself. Such arts are politics, economy and military leadership. In military leadership it is clear that the end of leading is not leading but something other, namely victory.[45] Albert explains the difficulty in distinguishing between these three classes on the basis of the lack, in the Latin language, of separate words to signify both the *eupraxiae* and the *tigne*. There is only the word *ars*.[46] Albert in another question summarises the matter treated in this sixth question:[47]

> . . . quamvis ars ducis habeat actum eo quod circa agibilia operatur non tamen habet finem actus in se quia operatio est propter aliud, scilicet propter victoriam. Sed prudentia habet actum et finem in suo actu quia non prudenter agit nisi propter prudenter agere.

The outlines of the virtue of prudence are becoming clearer. Prudence is an intellectual virtue which is concerned with the operations of the moral virtues. It has a regulative and directive role in human moral actions and as such is not concerned with the productive operations of art. Because it is concerned with human actions which are particular and contingent, prudence is distinguished from science. Science is concerned with the universal and the necessary. The exercise of the virtue of prudence is its own end and not something outside of this action. In this way prudence is distinguished from art.

3. Syllogism model for prudence

We mentioned earlier that Albert assigns a certain structure to the virtue of prudence. This structure is first outlined in the eighth question. The question deals with the remarks of Aristotle concerning temperance. Engaging in etymological analysis, Aristotle says that 'temperance' signifies 'safeguarding prudence'.[48] Aristotle continues to explain how temperance is the safeguard of prudence.

The discussion of Aristotle (1140b11-20) is viewed by Albert as moving in three steps. The first is the etymological statement. The second step is Aristotle's reason which begins at 1140b13. This is where Aristotle points out that pleasures and pains do not destroy all beliefs, but only the beliefs concerning action. The third step demonstrates how temperance is the safeguard of prudence by showing how the principle of action can be destroyed (1140b16). At this point in the literal commentary Albert explains Aristotle, using the views elaborated in the eighth question. In order to see the doctrine in context we shall look at Albert's application in the literal commentary before we examine his explanation:[49]

> Tertio, ibi: principia quidem enim (1140b16) ostendit quomodo corrumpit quantum ad principium sui quia principium operabilium est id cuius gratia fit operatio. Sed propter delectationem vel tristitiam non statim in promptu apparet hoc principium in quantum est terminus operis, neque apparet quod gratia huius oporteat operari et eligere omnia propter hoc scilicet finem illum delectatione velante oculos rationis in minori propositione et conclusione quia malitia, id est inordinata delectatio large pro quolibet vitio est corrumptiva principii quod est finis in quantum est terminus operis huius.

Albert is viewing prudence here as structured according to a syllogistic pattern. Temperance is the safeguard of prudence insofar as temperance controls inordinate pleasure. Inordinate pleasure blinds reason in such a way that reason goes wrong in the minor premise and consequently it goes wrong in the conclusion. To understand this literal explanation we must refer back to question eight.

The question begins: " . . . et videtur quod inconvenienter dicat temperantiam salvare prudentiam." In the solution Albert distinguishes between prudence itself and the *existimatio* of prudence. These are not identical but the *existimatio* is the *dictamen* of prudence.[50] This enunciation of prudence is threefold. There is the enunciation of the major proposition. This is the universal knowledge formulated in some form of command, e.g. one must not fornicate. Then there is the enunciation of the minor proposition. This is the statement of the results of particular knowledge of the proposed action, e.g. to have sexual intercourse with this person is to fornicate. The enunciation of the conclusion of the syllogism is the passing of the judgment (*sententia*) as to whether the action must be done or not. This is the knowledge which Albert calls *scire in agere*. It is knowledge which immediately results in action.[51]

Working within this structure, Albert attempts to explain how temperance can be the safeguard of prudence. He does this by showing the corruptive influence of what he calls the pleasure of intemperance. First of all this pleasure does not destroy the habit of prudence but only its enunciation or judgment. Furthermore, it does not corrupt the enunciation of the major proposition because the agent knows in a universal way that fornication is forbidden. However, such intemperance can be partially corruptive in the minor proposition. It is corruptive since it proposes to itself the particular instance without its subordination to the universal knowledge. For example, the agent views the woman simply as beautiful and does not pay attention to the fact that having sexual intercourse with this beautiful woman would be fornication. In this way an unbridgeable gap is breached between the major and the minor propositions. Consequently, the proper conclusion is totally destroyed since reason is blinded and the force of the major has no influence in forming the conclusion. The agent then forms a judgment contrary to what should be made and he fornicates with this beautiful woman.[52]

The theoretical basis for this analysis and structuring of the virtue of prudence is provided later by Albert. He asks whether prudence is concerned more with particulars than with universals.[53] In the Prior Analytics Aristotle analyses error and the relation of universal knowledge to particular knowledge.[54] Near the end of this analysis he says:[55]

> For to know is used in three senses: it may mean either to have knowledge of the universal or to have knowledge proper to the matter in hand or to exercise such knowledge; consequently, three kinds of error also are possible.

Albert calls the third aspect, i.e. the exercise of knowledge, scire in agere and explains it in this way:[56]

> . . . et scire in agere quod est in conclusione cum (S; quod V) scire in operabilibus (S; operationibus V) de faciendo sit sicut conclusio (S; cognitio V) in scibilibus.

Albert finds in Aristotle this three-fold structuring of knowledge and applies it to the structure of prudence. He says that just as knowledge is perfected in these three ways so prudence is also structured in this way. He continues:[57]

> Oportet quod prudentia tribus perficitur, scilicet cognitione universalis per quam dirigatur, et cognitione in particulari per quam proponuntur sibi illa circa quae est opus, et cognitione in agere quod est in sententiando de ipso opere.

Prudence needs both knowledge of the universal and knowledge of the particular in order to be effective in action. In this way prudence can be the auriga virtutum moralium. In the reply to the fourth objection in the question the above material has been taken from, Albert says that as the perfection of reason, taken in itself, prudence consists in the knowledge of universals.[58] He continues:[59]

> Secundum quod est directiva aliarum oportet quod perficiatur cognitione particularium in quibus sunt opera inferiorum virium et sic perficitur prudentia quae est auriga moralium virtutum.

Here again the universal knowledge of the major premise has privileged position. Does this privileged position reflect on the central nature of prudence?

Saint Albert believes that this structuring indicates something particular about the substantial nature of prudence. In the tenth question he discusses the part of the soul which prudence perfects. Aristotle says that prudence is in the calculative part of the soul. The first objection says that a habit which enunciates truth and does not err is not in a part of the soul that can err. Since prudence is such a habit it will not be in the calculative part.[60] Albert's reply is very strong:[61]

> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia numquam fallit in maiori propositione ubi est tota virtus ipsius sed in minori et in conclusione fallit ut dictum est. Et hoc non est prudentiae secundum quod huiusmodi sed convenit ex defectu materiae immixtione passionum.

Prudence now is infallible in its universal knowledge. Any fallibility or error that might occur in regard to prudence is not due to the virtue as such. It arises from improperly controlled passion. Consequently, there can be wrongdoing apparently as a result of a prudential reasoning process. However, such wrongdoing does not arise as a result of error in the directive universal knowledge, but because of a blindness of reason which does not relate the particular knowledge to the universal.

In this connection it would be well to look at the eleventh question. This question discusses the last sentence of the fifth chapter of Book VI of the Ethics. There Aristotle says:[62]

> But yet prudence is not a rational

> quality merely, as is shown by the fact that a purely rational faculty can be forgotten, whereas a failure of prudence is not a mere lapse of memory.

Albert explains the first part of this statement in his literal commentary in these words: "Et primo proponit et dicit quod non est habitus cum ratione solum sed etiam principia innata."[63] Over and above being a habit prudence is in possession of certain innate principles. Perhaps it is through these principles that prudence finds its infallibility in the major proposition. These remarks are amplified in the eleventh question.

This question is concerned with the last part of the statement of Aristotle just cited, viz., that prudence cannot be forgotten. The question begins: "Secundo videtur quod prudentiae possit esse oblivio."[64] In the solution Albert distinguishes between prudence entirely and without qualification and the application to a particular action. With regard to the former there can be no forgetting. Regarding the latter he says:[65]

> Sed potest esse quod aliquis efficiatur minus habilis ad applicandum ad opus et huius ratio est quia universalia iuris sunt in nostra natura in quibus substantialiter est prudentia. Et ista semper permanent.

With the mention of the universalia iuris we have the key to Albert's conception of prudence. As we have seen in the De bono, the universalia iuris are the first principles of the natural law. They are the innate principles mentioned by

Albert in his literal commentary. They are in our nature and are permanent. In fact they are as permanent as human nature itself. Further on in the solution, after pointing out how memory can be necessary in the application of prudence, Albert says: "Sed quantum ad principia est semper manens quia haec virtus maxime humana est."[66] The principles of prudence or the *universalia iuris* are part of our nature and so cannot be forgotten. However, we must note that it is in these principles that prudence is *substantialiter*.[67] Previously, Albert had said that the *tota virtus* of prudence is to be found in the major of the syllogism. Now he says that prudence is substantially in the universal principles of natural law. Consequently, it seems that we can say that the major proposition is the expression of the principles of the natural law which are part of our nature. This is the core of prudence. It is interesting to note that in the closing paragraphs of the *De bono* treatment of prudence in itself Albert concludes by drawing attention to the humanizing quality of prudence. It is prudence which makes the good acts of the virtues human.[68] In this eleventh question Albert says that prudence is a virtue which is *maxime humana*.

In the application of prudence to particular actions, however, we need more than universal principles. We need experience and time and other written laws. It is in this context that we find use for Cicero's *ars memorandi*. By implication we can say that without such memory we would forget the lessons of the past and in this way there would be forgetfulness regarding the application of prudence but never regarding prudence as a habit in itself.

We have examined the Unedited Course, Questions, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11. In calling prudence a habitus rather than scientia Albert avoids the long discussions of the De bono. However, the image of prudence which emerges here is a prudence quite similar to the prudence of the De bono. The syllogism model of prudence remains and is perhaps developed a step further. At least Albert's views are expressed more explicitly. The core of prudence is located substantially in the major of the syllogism. Albert's notion of natural law is carried over into his commentary on the Ethics. Prudence seems to rule infallibly and inviolately through natural law. It rules infallibly since the principles of natural law are part of man's nature. It rules inviolately since it cannot be corrupted in these principles. Error and wrongdoing can occur but this is not because of the delicate nature of prudence as such. It is because the reasoning process through the minor of the syllogism can be confused through passion. In its application prudence needs external aids. All that is missing from this analysis are the terms 'synderesis' and 'conscience' to make the parallel with the De bono complete. These terms could hardly be expected in a commentary on Aristotle. The elements for a less natural law oriented concept of prudence are present in the text of Aristotle. However, where these are encountered Albert interprets them in the light of his earlier views.[69]

We shall now pass on to a consideration of the relation of prudence to the other virtues. In what we have seen already the image of *auriga* is still prominent. Prudence is the *auriga virtutum*. This is an image from the *De bono*. Aristotle has much to say about the relation of prudence to the other virtues. We want to see whether the views of Aristotle on this matter affect Albert's consideration of the relation of prudence to the virtues.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE *UNEDITED COURSE*: THE RELATION OF PRUDENCE TO THE VIRTUES

There are two classes of virtue to which prudence is related. There are the virtues which are actually parts of prudence. These virtues aid and contribute to the effectiveness of prudence. Then there is the relation of prudence to the moral virtues. This is a question of the mutual relation or of the connection of the virtues. We shall first discuss the virtues which are parts of prudence.

1. Virtues which are parts of prudence

We have already seen Albert's analysis of the parts of prudence from the *De bono*.[1] In that work the parts which Cicero enumerates are the most important parts. They are the parts which, when taken together, form the potential whole which is prudence. In the *Unedited Course* these same parts, viz., memory, understanding, foresight, are again mentioned. However, they seem to have lost their central importance. In the fifth question we edited Albert mentions these parts. It is objected that, according to Cicero, prudence has regard to everything knowable. In the reply Albert says that Cicero speaks of prudence in a wide sense in such a way as to include in itself all the intellectual virtues. Albert continues:[2]

> Unde etiam dividit ipsam in providentiam, memoriam et intellectum. Sed Aristoteles hic proprie loquitur de prudentia secundum quod est distincta ab aliis intellectualibus virtutibus.

In another place Albert describes the role of each of the parts enumerated by Cicero. He admits that these form a certain division but he continues:

> . . . sed haec non est essentialis divisio prudentiae sed modi quidam (S; quidem V) ipsius accidentales (S; activitates V). (V fol. 125rb)

The Ciceronian parts receive the same treatment in relation to Aristotle as the division of Macrobius had received in relation to Cicero.[3]

The three virtues which Aristotle describes immediately following his discussion of the five principal intellectual virtues now assume the position of the main parts of prudence. The virtues in Aristotle are, εὐβουλιά, σύνεσις and γνώμη. They might be translated as 'deliberative excellence', 'understanding' and 'consideration' respectively. These virtues are called by Albert the adiunctae of prudence. They are virtues which are related to some act of prudence which is not a principal act. For example, deliberation is an act of prudence. A mark of the prudent man is to be able to deliberate well about some good to be achieved (EN VI 5,1140a26). However, deliberation is not the principal act of prudence. Deliberative excellence in this sense is an adjunct of prudence.[5]

In Aristotle's own discussion of these virtues he is concerned to reduce them to prudence. There seems to be a certain pre-occupation with redefining a vocabulary whose speculative connotations in Plato departed from the ordinary use of the terms.[6] Albert sees them as filling out and complementing the effective functioning of the virtue of prudence.

Albert calls these virtues parts of prudence and asks whether they are necessary.[7] The solution is based on a distinction between universal virtues which are called principal and others which are called adiunctae. This is so for the moral virtues and Albert gives as an example temperance and the allied virtue of modesty. Regarding prudence he says:

> . . . ita est etiam in prudentia quod ipsa est universalis et adiunguntur sibi etiam quaedam aliae. Universalis autem dicitur virtus ex universali bono quod ipsa attingit ad quod etiam alia ordinantur circa quae sunt aliae virtutes, et ab universali ratione operabilium vel simpliciter sed secundum aliud genus, sicut patet in temperantia. (V fol. 126va)

Prudence has this universal reason of actions to be done in having a vera ratio and in the universal principles by which it orders and directs moral activity and attains the final end intended. However:

> . . . propter varietatem particularium quibus illa ratio applicanda et dubietatem ipsorum per quae deveniendum est ad finem illum, oportet ut inquirent per

> consilium recte ea quae prudentia imperat et rectum fiat iudicium de exitu in opus. Et sic in prudentia est recta ratio secundum se et simpliciter, sed in aliis adiunctis participata ad aliquem finem. (V fol. 126va)

The auxiliary virtues are a form of right reason. Their necessity arises out of the fact that in its directive role prudence must operate within the contingencies and uncertainties of particular moral activity.

Each has its distinctive function. After prudence has given the initial direction to the activity of the moral virtues much remains. Doubt and uncertainty remain as to the how (qualiter) of the act contemplated. First, ways are to be found by which the end intended is to be arrived at. This is done through the inquisition of counsel in deliberation so we have eubulia or deliberative excellence. When the ways (viae) have been found a judgment must be made about which are to be followed in view of the diverse circumstances of the situation. This judgment is the function of synesis which is applied through the common notion of prudence.[8] However, when the common notions of prudence are not applicable, consideration must point the way.[9] Of this consideration Albert says:

> Dicendum quod gnome est quaedam virtus valde necessaria ad humanam vitam propter casus qui non possint redigi ad regulam communem legis ut includatur finis legis. (V fol. 127vb)

All three of these virtues concern the same thing, viz., the object of prudence; but they do so in different ways. They are necessary to all men otherwise, "homo non poneretur in optimo quantum ad omnia quae requiruntur ad opus." (V fol. 126vb)

2. Proper act of prudence

In his discussion of these parts of prudence Albert suggests what the proper act of prudence is.[10] When speaking about the principal act of prudence he says that it is not deliberation, "sed magis eligere aut praedeterminare finem."[11] The end here is the finis ultimus intentus, the concrete human act to be posited in reality. This end is actually the conclusion of the prudential syllogism we saw above. The conclusion is a statement of the action to be performed or avoided. This is what Albert means when he says:

> Actus enim prudentiae est praeordinare finem et sic est suum quod praecipiat; quod praeceptum est de finali opere, quod nisi fiat, numquam quaereretur via exsequendi praeceptum. (V fol. 127ra)

This choice or pre-ordination of the end is in the form of a command. Albert sums up his view in this phrase: "Cum enim prudentia sit optime praeceptiva finis quod est finale opus intentum . . . " (V fol. 126vb)

The two virtues of deliberative excellence and understanding refer to the working out of ways to arrive at the intended end. We deliberate, and we judge concerning the matters about which we deliberate. These two virtues remind one of the processus of the human act which we saw when discussing prudence in the De bono.[12] Albert uses John Damascene to describe the dynamics of the human act. After the initial move towards the end, reason finds the means to the end. It deliberates about the possibilities and judges which means are suitable to the circumstances. There follows choice of the suitable means, and coincident with this choice is the command of reason to act (sententia). We have suggested that the proper act of prudence for Albert in the De bono was choice.[13] Now from the very nature of the case we would have to say that choice follows deliberation and judgment.

In the Unedited Course Albert again says that the act of prudence is choice or the predetermination of the end. This choice seems to differ from the choice described in the De bono. Albert asks whether synesis precedes prudence.[14] He distinguishes between priority of time and priority of nature. In time some acquired virtues are prior to others but some are not. There are some virtues connected in such a way that there cannot be the one without the other. In order to find out whether there is a priority of nature we must look at the acts of the habits involved, "quia ordo habituum est secundum ordinem actuum." (V fol. 127ra) If this is so then by order of nature prudence is prior to synesis. The reason for this is because the determination of the end is a necessary condition for the determination and judgment of ways to reach the end.

> Et sic patet, cum finis semper prior sit in intentione et ordinatione, quod prudentia naturaliter praecedit istos habitus. (V fol. 127ra)

After discussing the texts we have just seen Lottin says: "Jusqu'ici Albert ne fait que préciser les thèmes de la _Summa de bono_ . . . "[15] It is true that much of the immediately preceding appears very much like the analysis of the _De bono_. However, in placing prudence prior to _synesis_ and the auxiliary virtues, it seems that Albert does more than _préciser_ what he has already said. Following along a path already begun he continues to see prudence properly speaking in its universal role. Albert in the _Unedited Course_ identifies choice and predetermination of the end. This end is the subjective intention of the agent. The conclusion of the prudential syllogism expresses the determined intention of the agent. Once this is done, deliberation and judgment regarding ways to this end follow. Prudence as such becomes closely linked with the end and the auxiliary virtues seem to be directed to the means.

3. Connection of virtues (previous view)

There is another relation of prudence to the virtues. It is what is commonly treated as the connection of the virtues.[16] We have already mentioned this problem in relation to prudence as the _auriga_ of the virtues.[17] It was pointed out that while Albert admits a certain connection of all the virtues in prudence he does not provide the promised treatment of the phrase "habita una habeantur omnes".[18] We also quoted Lottin to the effect that prior to the knowledge of the complete text of the Nicomachean Ethics the theologians (Albert was one of them) unanimously denied the connection of the acquired virtues.[19] There is one place where Albert treats of the connection of the moral virtues prior to his knowledge of the complete Ethics. In order to be clear on his opinion about this topic and the reasons for it we shall examine this treatment.[20]

The article asks: "Utrum virtutes politicae sunt connexae?" In support of an affirmative reply Albert enlists the statements of an imposing array of authorities from Seneca to St. Bernard.[21] In the solution Albert says that even the philosophers are divided on the subject of the connection of the virtues. He describes one theory at some length and identifies it with that of the Stoics. However, because Augustine does not agree with it Albert looks elsewhere for an answer. He finds it in Aristotle:[22]

> . . . ideo aliter dicendum est secundum Aristotelem in Ethicis, scilicet quod politicae virtutes generationem habent ab operibus, si sunt consuetudinales: vel ab experimento et tempore, si sunt intellectuales; et quia generantia connexa non sunt, ideo virtutes connexionem non habent.

This solution means that the expression "habita una habeantur omnes" does not apply. Albert provides a general solution to the authorities given in support of the connection of the virtues. There are certain general acts of the virtues but the virtues are not distinguished according to these general acts. However, in the acts of all the virtues there is present the element of choice (eligibile). To this degree prudence must be operative in all the virtues. This is not prudence properly speaking, however, but rather the general choice characteristic of every human action. In a certain way, then, the virtues are connected in prudence because of the common element of choice. The treatment of Albert in the responses follows closely the lines of the De bono. This article of the Commentary on the Sentences represents a considered solution to the problem of the connection of the virtues. It confirms the statement of Lottin that this connection was denied prior to the knowledge of the complete text of the Ethics.

4. Aristotle and connection of virtues

With the advent of the complete text of the Ethics Albert encountered the clear statements of Aristotle concerning the relations between prudence and the moral virtues. This relation was so intimate that it was in reality a connection of the virtues. This doctrine is elaborated by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics VI. Faced with these texts of Aristotle, Albert could do nothing but attempt to understand and interpret them. We shall see what he made of them, bearing in mind his previous position.

It was originally planned to first analyse the texts of Aristotle according to a commonly accepted interpretation. Methodologically this would be the better approach. However, when we began this task it was found that it would carry us too far afield. We shall simply indicate some of the more relevant texts of Aristotle in this regard. There is one text in which Aristotle summarises his views concerning the connection of the virtues:[23]

> Practical wisdom (prudence) too, is linked to virtue of character, and this to practical wisdom, since the principles of practical wisdom are in accordance with the moral virtues and rightness in morals is in accordance with practical wisdom.

The principles mentioned here are the principles in moral activity. They are the end: "The first principles of action are the end to which our acts are means . . ." (EN VI 5,1140b16-17) Now, while it is true that we must know the end, the mind can be perverted from this end by vice.[24] Consequently, moral virtues must be cultivated in order to ensure a clear perception of the end. Moral virtue does not give this perception, but it safeguards it. As Aristotle says:

> For virtue and vice respectively preserve and destroy the first principle, and in actions the final cause is the first principle . . . (EN VII 8,1151a15-16. Ross tr.)

From these remarks of Aristotle we can see the importance of moral virtue in morals. It is as a preservative of the end that we must understand the remarks of Aristotle about virtue ensuring the rightness of our choice of the end.[25]

The second half of our summary from Aristotle says that rightness in morals is in accordance with prudence. In the definition of virtue Aristotle says that the mean is determined by logos. (EN II 6,1107a1) Previously he had said that for purposes of discussion he would assume as common ground that our actions must be κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. (EN I 1,1103b32) Again we encounter the problem of how to best translate logos. For the present we shall simply translate it 'reason'. Aristotle returns to this assumption in Ethics VI. He says:

> We have already said that it is right to choose the mean and to avoid excess and deficiency, and that the mean is as right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) prescribes. (EN VI 1,1138b19-20)

He then sets out to analyse the last phrase:

> In the case of each of the moral qualities or dispositions that have been discussed, as with all the other virtues also, there is a certain mark (τις σκοπός) to aim at, on which the man who knows the reason fixes his gaze . . .; there is a certain standard (τις ὅρος) determining those modes of observing the mean which we define as lying between excess and defect, being in conformity with right reason (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον). (EN VI 1,1138b21-25)

What Aristotle wants to find out is what is this right reason and what is its standard.

The standard is that at which all aim in human actions, the truly human good. This good will be found to be contemplation. At the end of the sixth Book Aristotle says what the right reason is. He first recalls his discussion of the definition of virtue:

> A proof of this is that everyone, even at the present day, in defining virtue . . . adds that it is a disposition determined by right reason; and the right reason is the reason determined by prudence. (EN VI 13,1144b21-24)

He continues by making a further precision on what he had said earlier. He had said that virtue must be according to (κατά) right reason.[26] However, virtue must not simply be in accordance with, but must co-operate with right reason. Consequently, it should be said that virtue is μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. (EN VI 13,1144b26-27) It is entirely conceivable that one act according to the advice and counsel of another who had right reason. He would be acting in accordance with another's judgment but another could not make prudential decisions for him. Consequently, he would not be prudent nor virtuous. Finally, Aristotle answers the first question posed at the beginning of Book VI, viz., what is right reason? "Prudence is right reason in matters of conduct." (EN VI 13,1144b27-28) The first obvious conclusion from this is that there can be no moral virtue without prudence, the reason being that right reason is part of the very definition of moral virtue. Aristotle says:[27]

> These considerations therefore show that it is not possible to be good in the true sense without prudence, nor to be prudent without moral virtue.

This is the explanation of the last phrase of the text from the tenth Book. Aristotle concludes this section:[28]

> . . . since, while moral virtue enables us to achieve the end, prudence makes us adopt the right means to the end.

These texts should be sufficient to indicate the general teaching of Aristotle concerning the connection of the virtues. This teaching is reduced to the two propositions: "No moral virtue without prudence."; "No prudence without moral virtue." Albert, even at the time of the De bono, was ready to admit the first at least in some degree. We shall now look at what he said about this general teaching in the Unedited Course.

5. Connection of virtues

First of all there is a distinction between prudence and the moral virtues. Prudence does not render the moral virtues superfluous, nor does it take over their tasks. In the third question that we edited Albert says by way of introduction: "Tertio videtur quod non sit distincta ab aliis virtutibus." The solution distinguishes between prudence taken substantially and what follows upon prudence. In itself or substantially prudence is a virtue distinct from the other virtues, having its own proper act. However, insofar as it is the ruling and directive agent in moral action, prudence becomes involved in the works of the other virtues much as the intention of the first ruler must be found in everything ruled by it. In this sense prudence is not a virtue distinct from other virtues. The replies to the objections draw upon the distinction made above. The act of prudence in itself is the act of ruling which is distinct from the acts of the other virtues.[29] Insofar as prudence is considered in itself it has a *materia propria*, i.e., human goods under the formality of their being possible objects of choice. However, insofar as it moves other virtues to action prudence has its matter in the other virtues.[30] The reply to the third objection will introduce us to the remaining texts of Albert. Using Eustratius, it is objected that since prudence is said to be composed out of the moral and intellectual virtues, prudence cannot be distinct from these.[31] In reply Albert points out that this composition is not essential to prudence. Prudence is a single habit and essentially an intellectual virtue. Albert, however, calls the composition *exigitiva*. If prudence is to be perfect there must be moral virtues following upon it and right reason directing. It should be noted that the moral virtues are frequently said to be *exsequentes* or *subservientes* with regard to prudence. These terms suggest a certain subordination of the moral virtues to prudence. We must try to discover first how Albert conceives the relation and connection between the moral virtues and prudence.

Albert says: "Sexto videtur quod virtus moralis non faciat intentionem rectam".[32] In the Ethics Aristotle says that, "[Moral] virtue is a mean state in the sense that it is able to hit the mean."[33] Moral virtue does not do this through the aid of a rational art reasoning about the end. It does it as a certain nature tending to its end:

> . . . sed sicut quaedam natura tendens in suum finem sicut dicimus quod grave motu suo tendit in proprium locum. (V fol. 130ra)

This example of a heavy body indicates the naturalness of the relation between moral virtue and the end. The proper place of a heavy body is downward and unless something obstructs it, it will seek what is called its proper or natural place. It is in this sense that moral virtue is said to make the intention right. It does so, but not in the sense that moral virtue has the conception of the end and prescribes[34] it. Moral virtue naturally inclines to the end of man and in this sense, if followed, our intention of the end will be correct. The point here is the difference between how the will and reason relate to the end. Agreeing with Augustine, Albert says, "Intentio est voluntas praestituens finem." Here the end is not prescribed but is rather had by will and intention is the subjective movement towards the end. Reason, on the other hand, has a conception of the end and rationally presents the end after the manner of what Albert calls in this context an ars ratiocinativa. (V fol. 130ra)

Albert asks whether the moral virtues are _rationes_: "Primo utrum virtutes sint rationes et dicit Socrates quod videtur."35 No doubt Albert has in mind the Latin text of Aristotle: "Socrates quidem igitur rationes virtutes aestimabat esse . . . " (1144b28-29) In his solution Albert distinguishes between the moral virtues in themselves and the moral virtues in so far as they attain their end through operation. In addition he uses the distinction "secundum rationem" (κατά) and "cum ratione" (μετά). Now, as we have seen, this is not a distinction both elements of which Aristotle uses. Rather, the substitution of μετά for κατά was a further step in the definition of virtue. Albert says that since moral virtue consists in a certain mean established in operations and the passions, the actions and passions demand to be ordered and rectified like the means themselves. There is needed something else to give them their direction, namely, reason perfected by prudence. In this way moral virtue is _secundum rationem_. Nature moves only to one term but the characteristic of a rational power is to perform opposing actions, to act and not to act. As far as tending to the end moral virtue does this on its own since it is "quaedam natura tendens in suum finem." This end, however, is arrived at through human actions in which there is much diversity. Consequently, for the moral agent to perform these actions he must be guided by discretion and direction. If moral virtue is considered as reaching its end it must be *cum ratione*. Reason must be part of the very structure of moral virtue and this comes about through prudence. Albert concludes:[36]

> Et ideo virtus moralis differt a ratione secundum substantiam, sed tamen est secundum illam et cum illa, ut dicit Philosophus.

From this text we see that moral virtue needs reason and cannot be without it. It needs reason as perfected by prudence.

In another text Albert is explicit on this need for prudence. The question begins: "Secundo videtur quod habitus morales, si sine prudentia habeantur non sint nocivi."[37] Here Albert is speaking of moral habits. It seems implied that these habits are not yet quite virtues and need something further. Prudence is this further element. Albert says, "Dicendum quod morales habitus habent a prudentia esse virtutis."[38] It is prudence which constitutes moral habits as virtues. The principle involved here is: "Non idem utitur modo et dat illum." The moral virtues use a certain mean or mode in their particular matter and justice uses a certain rectitude. Prudence gives them this because it determines the mean of the moral virtues. The mean is the form of virtue. This is why prudence is said to be the source of the being of virtue.[39] Behind this reasoning stands Aristotle's definition of virtue. Albert says: "Unde in secundo dixit quod est medium secundum rectam rationem, ut sapiens et prudens determinabit."[40] Moral habits also depend on prudence for their operation:[41]

> . . . quia virtus moralis non potest consequi finem suum in quem tendit per modum naturae sine his quae sunt ad finem, quorum directiva (V) est prudentia.

This is the same notion we encountered earlier. Prudence is the source of rectitude for the moral virtues:[42]

> . . . rectitudinem non habet nisi sicut utens et recipiens ipsam a prudentia, sicut est rectitudo in tota natura a primo motore.

There can be no doubt then that prudence is absolutely essential for the very existence of the moral virtues. In another place Albert summarises the ways that moral virtue needs prudence: "Secundo videtur quod virtus moralis indigeat prudentia ad quattuor."[43] He says that he has already shown how moral virtue needs prudence for the mean of virtue and for the attainment of its end. Moreover, moral virtue makes choice right by desiring the proper good and makes the intention right by tending to this good. For these two functions moral virtue also needs prudence.

Albert first proves that moral virtue needs prudence to make choice (_electio_) right. He alludes to the definition of choice by Damascene.[44] Choice is the preferring of and opting for one thing over the other of two things proposed. In choice Albert sees two moments. There is the moment of preference (_praeponere_) which is an action of reason since it involves distinguishing. There is also the moment of opting (_optare_) which is not an activity of reason but of rational appetite. If moral virtue is to perfect choice then it needs reason in its role of preferring or distinguishing between the options open. Consequently, it needs prudence by which reason is perfected in moral matters.

We have already seen above that moral virtue makes the intention right.[45] In that place there was no mention of the need for prudence in this regard. Albert repeats his prior conclusion: "Sed virtus moralis tendit in suum finem sicut natura quaedam." However, whatever tends to an end must either have the end presented or present it to itself. Moral virtue does not have its own end. Consequently, the end and union with the end must be presented to it by something. This something is reason. In this way moral virtue differs from natural operations which have their own ends from the first mover. However, once the end is presented by reason, of itself moral virtue tends to the end and needs nothing else to do this.

These texts show that Albert accepts the proposition: "No moral virtue without prudence." To this degree he has a doctrine of the connection of the virtues in prudence. However, Albert says practically nothing about the need which prudence has of the moral virtues. The most that we can gather from his texts is that moral virtues in some sense rectify the choice of prudence and the intention of the end. But even in these cases the moral virtues are dependent on prudence. Albert speaks of the need for all the moral virtues in order to be prudent but not the need which prudence has for the moral virtues.[46] The previous sentence is not self-contradictory. For Aristotle the presence of the moral virtues is necessary to ensure the clear vision of the end. Without the vision of the end there can be no prudence or right reason. It is not simply a question of being handicapped in the exercise of prudence because of the lack of moral virtue. There can be no prudence without moral virtue. This is not the view of Albert. Implicit in the notion of how temperance safeguards prudence is the need for moral virtue. Without moral virtue the full reasoning from major proposition to conclusion would not be possible. However, since we have seen that prudence is to be found essentially in the enunciation of the major, even here there is no absolute need for moral virtue.

Lottin says that Albert has no proof for the maxim: "No prudence without moral virtue." and as far as the maxim: "No moral virtue without prudence." the proofs of Albert are independent of the text of Aristotle.[47] This seems to be true. The reason for it is Albert's concept of the nature of the virtue of prudence. We have seen Albert situate prudence in the major premise of a syllogism concerning action. This is where the tota virtus of prudence is to be found. As Lottin says, "Et voici que la prudence a pour fonction principale de dicter les premiers principes de la loi naturelle."[48] This position of prudence we have already seen in our analysis of the act of prudence from the De bono and the De homine. These are the thought patterns which influence Albert in his Unedited Course. Albert is, as it were, a prisoner of his prior concepts and is unable to grasp the thought of Aristotle concerning the nature of prudence and the connection of the virtues. Lottin summarises the situation well when he says:[49]

> Et c'est ainsi qu'Albert, rivé encore à ses écrits antérieurs et à la tradition patristique, pouvait se flatter de donner leurs sens plenier aux anciens axiomes, qui voyaient dans la prudence la mater et l'auriga de toutes les vertus. Mais ce faissant, il effleurait à peine la pensée d'Aristote sur la connexion des vertus.

The two subsequent works in which Albert treats of prudence add nothing further to his doctrine of prudence. The Paraphrasis on the Ethics which he wrote shortly after the Unedited Course is exactly what its title says it is, i.e., a paraphrase. It is an extended exposition of the Ethics in Albert's own words interlaced with the Latin text of Aristotle. It is very much like a continuous literal gloss on the text with the absence of elaborate divisions. The brief remarks of his own on prudence, the virtues allied with prudence and the connection of the virtues add nothing further to what we have already seen. In his last and unfinished work, the Summa Theologica, Albert does not treat expressly of the virtue of prudence. When he does mention it he uses the same language and expresses the same views as he does in his earlier works.

CONCLUSION

We have been guided by a two-fold goal in this study. The first was a desire to understand the teaching of Albert the Great concerning the virtue of prudence. However, Albert's historical situation was unique. Shortly after he had written his detailed systematic treatise on prudence, the complete Latin text of Aristotle's *Ethics* began to circulate in Europe. This fact provided another goal which could not be ignored. This second goal was a desire to ascertain the influence which the new Aristotelian material had on Albert's later views concerning prudence.

The *De bono* presents a comprehensive teaching regarding the virtue of prudence. Prudence is an intellectual virtue which is operative throughout the whole moral life. It guides moral decisions and to this degree its proper act is choice, the culmination of deliberation. Its perfect flowering is moral action, without which it is not perfect. While it lacks a proper matter in a material sense, formally it finds its proper matter in the matter of the moral virtues and other human action. It is truly the *auriga virtutum* and perhaps with more justice could be called the *auriga vitae moralis*. When Albert says that prudence lacks a proper matter, he is not speaking about an impoverished prudence. He is simply drawing a conclusion from the fact that prudence is a virtue of practical reason which is universally operative. It is not restricted to any one field of choice or human decision.

However, when all of this has been said, we have not yet put our finger on the core of Albert's teaching concerning prudence. It seems to us that when Albert says, " . . . ratio actum dat, prudentia autem informat eum per rationes iuris et expedientis et honesti."[1] he mentions the very core of prudence. In this statement lies the strength and the weakness of Albert's doctrine of prudence. In associating prudence with this notion of natural law, Albert succeeded in finding a human basis for the moral life. Man is provided with the instruments whereby he can judge right and wrong. He is in possession of a natural law whose principles are the innate first principles of practical reason. He is guided in deliberation and in judgment and in decision by these principles. They are his through nature and he has the security of their possession. If prudence is the virtue of practical reason and if its role is universal in the moral life, then prudence will find its strength in these principles. They become operative and are brought to bear on moral deliberation by means of the virtue of prudence. In this way prudence is the specifically human virtue, which, as Albert says, makes the good actions of the virtues human actions. It makes them human by informing the acts of man with specifically human and moral principles of action. But as we said, in this association between natural law and prudence lies the weakness of Albert's doctrine of prudence.

This weakness makes itself felt in two important areas. Albert was unable to see the necessarily close connection which should exist between prudence and the moral virtues. The moral virtues are not simply necessary to keep the passions quiet so that prudence can be applied. They are necessary in order to keep us oriented in the right direction, viz., towards the end of man. The end of man is the goal and gauge of human moral activity. Without this end there can be no proper estimation of the moral qualities of projected actions. However, if man by nature is in possession of the principles of moral specification, then the moral virtues are not seen to be so necessary. Certainly, they are necessary for total and integral moral maturity. But they are not necessary for the very essence of prudence. The second area in which the natural law orientation of prudence is felt is in Albert's meeting with Aristotle. The earlier ideas of prudence seemed to be very strongly held by Albert. When he encounters another viewpoint he interprets it in terms of his previous teaching. In the Unedited Course the very substance of prudence is to be found in right reason. But it is a right reason which is 'righted' through its possession of the first principles of natural law.

It should be pointed out here that we are not criticising Albert's teaching concerning natural law. We are criticising the association between natural law and prudence. This association is mediated through synderesis in the De bono and is more direct in the Unedited Course.[2]

We have already seen that Albert has no hesitation in saying that he will contradict Aristotle when truth is at stake. Despite this warning, we are convinced that in the Unedited Course Albert actually believed that what he was saying about Aristotle was Aristotle's own teaching concerning prudence. This is not difficult to understand. In the De bono Aristotle had proved helpful in many areas. This is particularly true in the area of psychology and the virtues in general and fortitude and temperance in particular. With regard to prudence Aristotle's notions of practical intellect and intellectual virtue had been most helpful to Albert. It was only natural that when Albert encountered the ex professo teaching of Aristotle on prudence that there would be a tendency to project his earlier analysis onto his interpretation of EN VI, 5.

Before bringing this study to a close we shall make a few remarks of an historical nature. If anyone reads the literature prior to Albert on discretio and prudence he will see that certainly Albert had a fund of material on which to draw. By contrast, he will be struck by the organisation and system which Albert was able to accomplish in the De bono apropos the questions on prudence. Albert seems to have drawn on all the available sources for his elaboration of the doctrine of prudence. One aspect of Albert's originality lies in his success in the integration of a vast tradition of prior speculation. More cannot be said in this regard before a thorough comparison between the De bono of Albert and the unedited Summa de bono of Philip the Chancellor has been made.

Lottin has pointed out the doctrinal advances made by Albert over his predecessors.[3] We need not repeat these conclusions here. However, there is one point which is of paramount importance. All of the discussions prior to Albert had been theological in character. By this we mean that the natural order did not afford the solid basis on which a moral teaching would be erected. Right reason was a gift of God; true virtue was theological virtue; the norm of reason was the will of God. Perhaps Albert's greatest contribution lies in his having provided a solid foundation for a natural ethic.[4] Man's nature is defined by his rationality. In reason the foundation for a natural ethic is to be found. Albert does not hesitate to see in reason this foundation. If reason is the foundation of a natural ethic, natural law provides the necessary autonomy for this ethic. If natural law provides the autonomy, prudence provides for the exercise and application of a natural ethic in the circumstances of human decision. Albert is not being rhetorical when he calls prudence maxime humana. In Albert's doctrine of prudence we see a decisive step taken towards a natural ethic in the moral speculation of the West. It is here that Albert's claim to originality lies.[5]

Voltaire once referred to prudence as "cette sotte vertu".[6] There is an uneasiness today about the use of the term 'prudence'. It seems to connote cowardice or keeping on the safe side. It certainly does not connote the risk attendant on human decision making. This perhaps explains why so many English translations prefer to translate φρόνησις as 'practical wisdom' and why Gauthier prefers the French term 'sagesse'. Perhaps we are faced with an inevitable development of language. Perhaps the term 'prudence' can no longer be used today. Perhaps 'prudence' and 'prudential' must be reserved to describing the somewhat unattractive area of isolated self-interest. Aristotle, the earlier medieval writers and Albert would have some difficulty today understanding our use of the term 'prudence'. Albert's doctrine of prudence at least reminds us that, no matter what the word, there is a place for reason in ethics. He reminds us that if we are to find direction and guidance in moral actions, this direction must come from man's reason. It is an old lesson taught by Aristotle and developed in his own way by Albert. Over and above providing a further insight into the historical development of a most important notion, Albert's doctrine of prudence reminds us of the value of reason in ethics. This reminder is sufficient compensation for a detailed analysis of the doctrine of prudence in Albert the Great.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. "Au XIIe siècle, le traité de la prudence est, peut-on dire, encore inexistant." O. Lottin, "Les débuts du traité de la prudence au moyen âge," *PEM*, III, 255.

2. See treatment of moral virtues, *In II Sent*., D. 33, qq. 2-3.

3. *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, 47-56.

4. For discussion of the question of Thomas' copying the lectures of Albert, see A. Pelzer, "Le Cours inédit d'Albert le Grand sur la Morale à Nicomaque recueilli et rédigé par S. Thomas d'Aquin," in *Auguste Pelzer, Etudes d'Histoire littéraire sur la scolastique médiévale. Recueil d'articles mis à jour à l'aide des notes de l'auteur*, eds., A. Pattin and E. Van de Vyver (Louvain, 1964), p. 272 ff. The article appeared originally in *RNP* 24 (1922). The commentary of Averroes on the *Ethics* was translated from Arabic to Latin about 1240/43 but it seems this full text did not circulate widely before the translation from Greek. See A. Jourdain, *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*, nouv. éd. et augmen. par C. Jourdain (Paris, 1843) p. 144 for epilogues attesting to these dates. The complete text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* was first known and used in the translation of Robert Grosseteste which began to circulate in 1245/46. See D. Callus, "The Date of Grosseteste's Translations and Commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius and the Nicomachean Ethics," *RTAM* 14 (1947) 207.

5. Albert the Great, *Alberti Magni, Opera omnia ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum edenda, apparatu critico, notis prolegomenis, indicibus instruenda*, curavit Institutum Alberti Magni Coloniense, T. XXVIII, *De bono*, Primum ediderunt H. Kühle, C. Feckes, B. Geyer, W. Kübel (Munster: Aschendorff, 1951). For the title as, *De bono*, cf. Prolegomena, pp. xiii-xiv. The work will be cited as *De bono*.

6. There is some doubt as to the date of composition of the *Commentary on the Sentences*, Book I. See Lottin, *PEM*, VI, 277-284.

7. The secondary literature on the topic of prudence in Albert is practically non-existent. The most significant work on prudence as such and on many allied topics has been done by Dom Lottin. The pertinent articles are to be found in the general collection in six volumes, *Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles* (Gembloux, 1948-1960).

8. Fr. Dingjan, *Discretio: Les origines patristiques et monastiques de la doctrine sur la prudence chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Assen, 1967). I received this book only after completing my thesis and so was not able to use it as thoroughly as I had wished.

9. Page numbers in brackets in the following remarks refer to the work of Dingjan.

10. See Ph. Delhaye, "La place de l'éthique parmi les classifications scientifiques au XIIe siècle," *Miscellanea moralia in honorem E.D.A. Janssen* (Louvain, 1948).

11. See Ph. Delhaye, "'Grammatica' et 'Ethica' au XIIe siècle," *RTAM* 25 (1958) 59-110; "L'enseignement de la Philosophie Morale au XIIe siècle," *MS* 11 (1949) 77-99. See also, M.-D. Chenu, "Horace chez les théologiens," *RSPT* 24 (1935) 462-65; R. Baron, "A propos des ramifications des vertus au XIIe siècle," *RTAM* 23 (1956) 19-39.

12. See F. van Steenberghen's discussion of the Barcelona manuscript (Ripoll 109) which Grabmann discovered in 1927, *Siger de Brabant* (Louvain, 1942) Vol. II, 415 ff. See in particular the schema on p. 417. Two works of Cicero are included, *De officiis*, and *De inventione*; both works are used by Albert in his discussion of prudence.

13. St. Bernard, *Sermones in cantica*, 49; PL 183, 1018D: "Est ergo discretio non tam virtus, quam quaedam moderatrix et auriga virtutum, ordinatrixque affectuum et morum doctrix." Cf. Dingjan, *op. cit.*, p. 134. *Auriga* means a 'charioteer' or 'driver'. In poetry it was used to mean 'pilot' or 'helmsman'. Its tropological sense is 'director' or 'leader'. It is difficult to translate the word *auriga* in our context since it carries nuances of manual direction and control which our car-driving society can only with difficulty understand.

14. Peter Abelard: "Nonnulli vero prudentiae discretionem

matrem potius sive originem virtutum, quam virtutem, nominant." *Dialogus inter philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum*; PL 178, 1652A. "Prudentia itaque, sicut fides vel spes, quae malis aeque ut bonis hominibus conveniunt, non tam virtutes dicendae sunt quam ducatum quemdam vel incitamentum ad virtutes praebere." *Ibid.*; PL 178, 1652-3. Cf. Dingjan, *op. cit.*, p. 156-7. Background is in Bernard, *Sermones in cantica*, 49; PL 183, 1018D; and *De consideratione* I, 8; PL 182, 737-739.

15. See Albert the Great, *De bono*, IV, 1, 1; Thomas Aquinas, *ST* II-II, 47, 4 and 5. Citations to the *De bono* of Albert will be given in this order:
Tractatus: Roman capitals.
Question: Roman lower case.
Article: Arabic.
Objections, Replies: Arabic.
Solution
Page number if necessary.
Line number if necessary.

16. *Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum*, 2nd. ed. (Ad Claras Aquas, 1916). The editors say the work was completed by 1150, cf. *ibid.*, Vol. I, XXXVI. For a more recent study of the date see, P. Damien Van Den Eynde, "Nouvelles précisions chronologiques sur quelques oeuvres théologiques du XIIe siècle," *Franciscan Studies* 13 (1953) 110-118. He has a slight preference for 1157.

17. P. Lombard, *op. cit.*, L. III, D. 33, chap. 1. See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 9, 12; PL 42, 1046.

18. *Summa aurea in quattuor libros sententiarum a subtillissimo doctore magistro Guillermo Altissiodorensi*, ed., Ph. Pigouchet (Paris, 1500). The *Summa aurea* is dated between 1215-1220, see P. Gál, *NCE*, 14, 921-2. We shall follow the treatment of Lottin, "Les débuts . . . ," *PEM*, III, 255-280. He considers William of Auxerre, pp. 257-259; and Philip the Chancellor, pp. 259-265. In this article are editions of texts of Philip otherwise unedited.

19. The section concerned with the virtues is fol. 121vb-212vb. "Dicto de liberatione generis humani, scilicet de Christo, dicendum est de his per quae liberat, scilicet de virtutibus de quibus hoc ordine agendum. Primo quaestiones praeambulas ad virtutes tractabimus. Secundo quid virtus et quis numerus virtutum et quae virtus in qua vi animae sita sit. Tertio de speciebus

virtutum per ordinem." fol. 121vb.

20. "De his igitur dicendum hoc ordine: primo quid sit unaquaeque; secundo de differentia earum; tertio de qualibet per se." *Ibid*., fol. 155va. Note that William begins immediately with the definitions of the virtues which Augustine gives and which are found in Peter Lombard, L. III, D. 33, chap. 1. See *supra*, n. 16 (When chapter references are not given in a *supra* reference, the reference is to the chapter in which it is found.) Note however, that William changes the order and mentions prudence first, then the order of Augustine: justice, fortitude, temperance.

21. *Summa aurea*, fol. 155vb. *a*: It seems we should read *prudentia* for *scientia* here, cf. question at 156va: utrum prudentia sit species specialissima. Regarding William and Philip the Chancellor, Lottin says, " . . . l'on s'aperçoit vite que tout s'y réduit à deux questions maîtresses: quel est l'acte propre de la vertu de prudence; quelle est l'influence de cette vertu sur l'économie générale de la vie morale?" *PEM*, III, 257.

22. "Duplex est iudicium rationis, scilicet iudicium discretivum et iudicium diffinitivum. Iudicium discretivum est ipsa discretio qua ratio iudicat aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum, et huiusmodi discretio non est virtus sed directiva virtutis, unde beatus Bernardus: discretio non magis est virtus quam auriga virtutum. Circa tale iudicium est scientia et non virtus . . . Iudicium autem diffinitivum est quo ratio imperat aliquid fieri vel non fieri et ad illud ultimum est virtus." *Summa aurea*, fol. 155vb-156ra Cf. *ibid*., fol. 63 va for similar distinction and use of Bernard.

23. Fol. 63va, cf. also 92ra. Note that William speaks here of the virtue of prudence coming into play "post opus naturae". This is so since the judgment connected with prudence follows what he calls the *iudicium discretivum* or the "iudicium quo iudicat quis quid faciendum." fol. 63va. This first judgment proceeds "per viam iuris naturalis". *Ibid*. This notion of the intellectual aspect of prudence proceeding from natural law will be developed later by Albert. The verb *sententio* in the text cited in this note is a late medieval development expressing the action signified by *sententia*. These terms are difficult to translate and a discussion of the problem will be given later.

24. For moral philosophy, see *Summa aurea*, fol. 156ra; for moral virtues, see *ibid*., fol. 156 va-vb.

25. "Unde dicunt philosophi quod prudentiae est omnia ad normam rationis dirigere, et hoc est consentire divinae voluntati." fol. 156va; see also 188rb, 189ra. The expression "ad normam rationis" can be found in several previous authors: Cicero, *De officiis*, I. 26, 92; Macrobius, *In somnium Scipionis*, I, 8, 7; William of Conches, *Das Moralium dogma philosophorum*, ed. J. Holmberg (Uppsala, 1921) p. 72.

26. Fol. 155va.

27. See *ibid*., fol. 156ra, and Cicero, *De inventione*, II, 53, 160.

28. William of Auxerre, *op. cit*., fol. 189ra; cf. Macrobius, *In somnium scipionis*, I, 8, 7. Note here William omits *docilitas* and renders *cautio* as *cautela*.

29. "Item philosophi dividunt prudentiam in monasticam, yconomicam, politicam." fol. 156va. This is the division of moral science, not of prudence, which was common to the Middle Ages from the time of Boethius. Although not explicitly in Aristotle as a division of ethics, it is suggested in the *Eudemian Ethics* I 8,1218b13, and in the *Nicomachean Ethics* VI 8,1141b23-1142a12.

30. *Summa aurea*, fol. 265ra, 190ra.

31. O. Lottin, "Le traité spécial consacré à la prudence y est cependant encore très rudimentaire." *PEM*, III, 257.

32. The *Summa de bono* of Philip is as yet unedited. It is dated about 1230/36 by N. Wicki, *NCE*, 11, 274. Most of the texts we shall use will be those edited by Lottin.

33. Lottin, *PEM*, III, 256.

34. See *supra*, n. 21.

35. Padua. Antonianum IX 156(214) fol. 136vb.
a. proprius: *om*. Toulouse. Bibliothèque de la Ville, 192, fol. 98rb; Bruxelles. Bibl. roy. 1801-03, fol. 168ra; Paris. Nat. lat. 3146 fol. 93vb. See O. Lottin, *PEM*, III, 259, n. 2.

36. See Padua. Ant. IX. 156. fol. 136vb. Full references to the texts of Augustine will be given later. Note that this Harialdus is said by Philip to be the author of _De requie mentis_. The editors of Albert's _De bono_ in a note, say they cannot identify Harialdus, see _De bono_ p. 221, note at line 63.

37. See _PEM_, III, 259, n. 3 for text.

38. Philip speaks here of "scientia boni et mali per modum incomplexi." _PEM_, III, 260, lines 9-10. This is knowledge which has a simple object and in this case, actions comprise this object. See P. Michaud-Quantin, _La psychologie de l'activité chez Albert le Grand_ (Paris, 1966) p. 134.

39. For these various distinctions, see text in _PEM_, III, 260.

40. See text in _PEM_, III, 261. For a discussion of the psychology of the human act, see Lottin, "La psychologie de l'acte humain chez Saint Jean Damascène et les théologiens du XIIIe siècle occidental," _PEM_, I^2, 393-414. Philip the Chancellor is discussed, pp. 405-410.

41. _PEM_, III, 263. Cf. Aristotle, _EN_ II 4,1105b2.

42. Cf. _PEM_, III, 263, and also William of Auxerre, _supra_, n. 24.

43. The mention of _inspectrix medii_ suggests that Philip has Aristotle in mind here: "Virtus autem omni arte certior et melior est quemadmodum et natura, medii utique erit inspectrix." _EN_ II 6,1106b14; _EV_ p. VI, 10. Each virtue finds its own mean between excess and defect.

44. _PEM_, III, 265, line 45. For whole previous analysis from n. 42, see text edited in _PEM_, III, 264-265. Dingjan, _op. cit._, p. 196 points out that Philip is the first to give the true meaning to the formula of Bernard. William of Auxerre associated this _auriga_ text with the _iudicium discretivum_ which was not a virtue. For Philip the virtue of prudence _is_ the _auriga_ of the virtues and at the same time a special virtue in its own right.

45. For discussion of the general situation with regard to the moral works of Aristotle in the Latin West, see A. Pelzer, "Les versions Latines des ouvrages de morale conservés sous le nom d'Aristote en usage au

XIIIe siècle," in the Pattin and Van de Vyver volume, pp. 120-187. The article is also to be found in its original form in, RNP 23 (1921). For Albert in particular see O. Lottin, "Saint Albert le Grand et l'Ethique à Nicomaque," PEM, VI, 315-331. Albert also had fragments which he thought were from Book VIII (really VII) of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. See Lottin, PEM, VI, 319. The complete fragment is edited by Lottin, *ibid.*, 329-31. The translations of the *Ethica vetus* and *Ethica nova*, although Greco-Latin translations, are different from the so-called *versio antiqua* done by Grosseteste. The only edition we have of this earlier translation is that of C. Marchesi, *L'Etica Nicomachea nella tradizione latina medievale* (Messina, 1904). Since this edition is defective in places the editors of the *De bono* correct Marchesi with two manuscripts when they feel it is necessary. See *De bono*, Prolegomena, p. XX. References to these parts of the *Ethics* are given by the page and line of the Marchesi edition.

46. Lottin, "Psychologie et Morale à la faculté des arts de Paris aux approches de 1250," RNP 42 (1939) 182-212.

47. See *supra*, n. 4.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1. There is considerable discussion concerning the precise date of the *De bono*. For literature on this subject, see *De bono*, Prolegomena, pp. IX-XIII. The editor refuses to commit himself on the exact date. For discussion of the date, see S. B. Cunningham, *The Significance of St. Albert the Great's De Bono in Early Thirteenth-Century Moral Philosophy*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1964. For works of Albert prior to the *De bono*, excluding the unedited *Tractatus de natura boni*, the editor presents the following chronological series: *De sacramentis*, *De incarnatione*, *De resurrectione*, *De IV coaequaevis*, *De homine*. See Prolegomena, p. IX; Lottin, "Ouvrages théologiques de saint Albert le Grand," *PEM*, VI, 269. From citations it seems certain that the *De bono* was prior to the *Commentary on the Sentences*, Bks. II-IV. There is some doubt whether it is also prior to Bk. I. From the discussion of Lottin on the subject we would say that the date of the *De bono* is 1240/43, see Lottin, *PEM*, VI, 277-284; Cunningham, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

2. In his earlier unfinished and unedited work, *De natura boni*, there is no discussion of prudence; see Lottin, *PEM*, III, 265, n. 2.

3. See *supra*, Introduction, for William, p. 6; Philip, p. 10.

4. Justice, prudence, fortitude, temperance. P. Lombard, *Sent.*, Lib. III, D. 33, chap. 1.

5. "Si autem attendatur difficile et bonum, in quo est virtus consuetudinalis, tunc prima erit fortitudo, quae maxime est circa difficile et bonum, et consequenter temperantia, quae post hoc consistit in magis difficile et bono, et tertio justitia et ultimo prudentia. Hunc ordinem videtur tenere Aristoteles in *Ethicis*." *De bono*, I, vi, 3, p. 81, 53. As a matter of fact this is the order in which these four virtues are treated by Aristotle.

6. See *De bono*, II, Prologus, p. 82.

7. Lottin says that Albert thought he was following the order of Aristotle, see "Les vertus cardinales et leurs ramifications chez les théologiens de 1230 à 1250," *PEM*, III, 191. There seems to be no evidence for this statement. In fact we know what Albert thought Aristotle's order was; see *supra*, note 5. By treating prudence before justice he seems to change consciously the order he thought Aristotle was following. Perhaps it is too strong to say that Albert was not following Aristotle at all. It seems at least that in dividing his treatment into first, the virtues in the passions and then the virtues in reason he was thinking of Aristotle, cf. *EN* II 7,1108b9 for reference to treatment of the 'logical' virtues after the virtues of the passions (this text is rejected as inauthentic but is to be found in the *Ethica vetus*, p. IX, 4. See R. A. Gauthier, *L'Ethique à Nicomaque* (Paris, 1959) Vol. II, 161.) See also Arist., *EN* III 10,1117b23.

8. *De bono*, IV, 1, p. 217.

9. See *supra*, Introduction, n. 35 for Latin text of Philip.

10. The definitions are treated in *De bono*, IV, 1, 2.

11. *De bono* IV, 1, 2, p. 221,43. Cf. Cicero, *De inventione* II, 53, 160. Albert refers to this work as *Prima rhetorica*. In the edition of the *De inventione*, for *utrarumque* we read *neutrarumque*. However, in the apparatus to the *De bono*, IV, 1, 2, p. 221,44, *utrarumque* is given as another reading for Cicero. This alternate reading is probably the one Albert had. The proper text for Cicero would seem to be *neutrarumque*; see definition in *De natura deorum* III, 15, 38: "Prudentiamne deo tribuemus quae constat ex scientia rerum bonarum et malarum et nec bonarum nec malarum?" See Dingjan, *op. cit*., p. 156, n. 2.

12. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 2, obj. 1.

13. *Ibid*., obj. 4.

14. *Ibid*., obj. 5, 6, 7.

15. " . . . sed vocat scientiam acceptionem boni et mali ut simpliciter vel sibi bonum et malum per appetitum rectum." *De bono*, IV, 1, 2, ad 1, p. 224.

16. "Et patet, quod in illa est id quod formale est in

virtute prudentiae, inquantum est habitus voluntarius." *Ibid*.

17. *Ibid*., obj. 3.

18. "Ut enim quisque maxime perspicit, quid in re quaque verissimum sit, quique acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et explicare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet." Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 5, 16.

19. *De bono*, IV, 1, 2, obj. 4.

20. Cf. *ibid*., ad 3.

21. "Et hoc contingit duobus modis, scilicet per rationem ipsius scibilis, quod idem est vel fere idem cum materia prudentiae, sicut est scibile theologicum et scibile ethicum et scibile iuris civilis vel canonici et, ut summatim dicatur, omnis scientia in qua agitur de faciendis vel non faciendis." *De bono* IV, 1, 2, ad 4.

22. "Alio autem modo est materia secundaria omnis scientia et hoc remotius, quia exercitium cuiuslibet scientiae valet ad discretionem eligibilium." *Ibid*.

23. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 2, obj. 5; and Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 6, 19, note printing error in edition of *De bono* which gives Cicero reference as I, 9, 19. Sciences enumerated by Cicero are astronomy, mathematics, dialectic, civil law.

24. "Omne enim bonum creatum fluxit a bono primo, inquantum ipsum est efficiens in se habens finem per intentionem. Et propter hoc esse creati numquam absolvitur a ratione boni, et tamen non est sibi idem esse quod bonum esse, quia esse est ab efficiente et bonum a fine movente efficientem." *De bono*, I, 1, 7, p. 14, 53 ff. See whole article: "Utrum omne quod est, inquantum est, bonum est."

25. "Ad aliud dicendum, quod omnia quae sunt, sunt bona bonitate naturae, quia scilicet sunt a bono. Sed non accipitur sic hic bonum, sed potius bonum secundum finem, scilicet quod est finis appetitus per rationem rectam movens ipsum; et sic est prudentia bonorum scientia." *De bono*, IV, 1, 2, ad 2.

26. The eighth and ninth objections make this point and are based on Rm 16,19, and Arist., *Metaph*., XII 9,1074b32.

27. Cf. Ambrose, *De paradiso*, chap. 12, 58; PL 14,305A; Boethius, *De differentiis topicis*, 2; Pl 64, 1184B.

28. "Ad aliud dicendum, quod Philosophus dicit hoc propter pronitatem ad malum adiunctam scibili alicui, et non propter ipsam scientiam, sed propter curiositatem in opere id quod docet scientia. Bonum enim est scire et omnino bonum . . ." *De bono*, IV, i, 2, ad 9.

29. See *De bono*, IV, i, 2, p. 224, 35-38. Good and evil are motive forces in the sense that they are final causes.

30. Albert, *ibid*., p. 221; Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 5, 15.

31. See *De bono*, IV, i, 2, obj. 14. Cf. Aristotle, *EN* II 3,1105b2-3; *EV*, p. IV, 22.

32. *De bono*, IV, i, 2, ad 14.

33. See *ibid*., obj. 15.

34. *Ibid*., ad 15.

35. Earlier in the *De bono* Albert says: "Ad id autem quod quaeritur ex incidenti, quomodo bonus sit regula et mensura veri, quod est in singulis, dicendum, quod inclinatio illius regulae et mensurae est in natura, perfectio autem in habitu virtutis." I, iv, 8, ad 2, p. 66.

36. *De bono*, IV, i, 2, p. 225, 90-95.

37. *De bono*, IV, i, 2, p. 221; see Macrobius, *Super somnium Scipionis*, I, 8, 4.

38. Cf. *De bono*, IV, i, 2, p. 226, 61.

39. Albert, *De bono*, IV, i, 2, p. 221; Augustine, *De moribus ecclesiae*, I, 15, 25; PL 32, 1322. This definition and the three which follow are identical with the definitions we saw in Philip the Chancellor, see *supra*, Introduction, p. 10. They are also given in the same order in which Philip gives them. This would seem to be strong evidence favoring the view that Albert was using Philip for his own treatment of the virtue of prudence.

40. *De bono*, IV, i, 2, p. 227, 13 ff.

41. "Item, eligere est actus liberi arbitrii constituti ex

ratione et voluntate; prudentia non est liberi arbitrii sic constituti; ergo prudentiae non est eligere." De bono, IV, i, 2, obj. 24. A continuation of this same objection claims that since choice pertains to the will and prudence does not, therefore it is not the function of prudence to choose.

42. See ibid., p. 221,57; Augustine De diversis questionbus LXXXIII, 61,4; PL 40, 51.

43. Albert, De bono, IV, i, 2, obj. 27.

44. " . . . scientia iuris et philosophia moralis sunt de faciendis et ideo ordinatae sunt propinque ad actum virtutis prudentiae, sed tamen non generant habitum ipsius, quia ille, eo quod voluntarius est, sicut omnis virtutis habitus generatur ex acceptione operabilium consequenter ad voluntatem ordinata." De bono, IV, i, 2, ad 27. The use in this context of knowledge being ordered propinque to the act of prudence and, in a similar context, other knowledge being related remotius (see De bono, IV, i, 2, ad 4), reminds one of a similar distinction made by Philip the Chancellor, see supra, Introduction, p. 11.

45. See De bono, IV, i, 2, p. 227,76-79.

46. Ibid., p. 221,61. Found among the works of Augustine, PL 40, 794. For information and literature on Alcher of Clairvaux who is said to be the author of De spiritu et anima, see P. Michaud-Quantin, NCE, I, 270-1.

47. See Albert, De bono, IV, i, 2, p. 227,96.

48. Ibid., p. 221,63. Regarding Harialdus, see supra, Introduction, n. 36.

49. "Ad id quod quaeritur de ultima, quae est Harialdi, scilicet quod 'prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum cum alterarum dilectione et alterarum detestatione scientia,' dicendum, quod illa melior est inter omnes, quia exprimit materiam et genus vel formam et diversitatem actus secundum materiam diversam." De bono, IV, i, 2, p. 228,16-22.

50. De bono, IV, i, 2, sol.

51. This notion of consequent and antecedent relation of reason and will should become clear at the end of Chapter Two. However, it should be noted here that

it is on the basis of this distinction that Albert is able to solve the traditional problem of prudence and knowledge.

52. There are two concepts or expressions which need further clarification. The first is that prudence, " . . . est in ratione consequenter ad voluntatem ordinata." The second is involved in saying that the type of knowledge which is part of the virtue of prudence is an _acceptio_. We have translated this term as "intellectual apprehension" and left it at that. This term is used in such expressions as "acceptio boni et mali", or "acceptio eligibilium", or "acceptio operabilium". The first expression will be studied when we discuss the problem of the relation of prudence to the will and reason; the second when we discuss the question of the proper matter of prudence.

53. Dingjan, _op_. _cit_., p. 136.

54. _De_ _bono_, IV, 1, 1.

55. _De_ _bono_, IV, 1, 1, sol.

56. "Sicut se habet motiva pars animae ad opus virtutis, sic se habebit habitus perficiens partem illam; sed inter motivas principalis est ratio; igitur habitus eius principalis est virtus." _De_ _bono_, IV, 1, 1, p. 218,51-54.

57. "Item, sicut se habet potentia ad potentiam, ita se habet habitus ad habitum. Sed potentia, quae est ratio, se habet ut regens alias; ergo habitus eius erit regitivus aliorum habituum." _De_ _bono_, IV, 1, 1, p. 218,61-64.

58. _De_ _bono_, IV, 1, 1, obj. 1. See Aristotle: " . . . virtutes autem voluntates quedam vel non sine voluntate." _EN_ II 4,1106a2; _EV_, p. V,11.

59. In this reply Albert refers back to the _De_ _homine_, q. 65, a. 2, ad 1 and ad quaest. 4; B., _XXXV_, 551 and 552, where he shows that the will is the general mover of all the powers of the soul.

60. "Et sic prudentia, secundum quod est virtus, est in ratione et est habitus voluntarius . . . " _De_ _bono_, IV, 1, 1, ad 1, p. 219.

61. See Aristotle, _EN_ III 1,1109b30; _EV_, p. XI,1-2.

62. See Aristotle, *EN* II 1,1103a14-17; *EV*, p. 1,1.

63. This objection is brought up twice. "Item, omnis virtus relinquitur ex passionibus et operationibus, in quibus est optimorum operativa. Prudentia non relinquitur ex his; ergo ipsa non est virtus." *De bono*, IV, i, 1, obj. 3; see Aristotle, *EN* II 2,1104b13-14; *EV*, p. III,15. The other side of this argument: "Item, alia sunt principia generationis prudentiae et alia principia generationis virtutis. Probatio: Quia ex operationibus generantur virtutes; prudentia autem per experimentum et inventionem et doctrinam; ergo virtus non habet rationem prudentiae nec e converso; ergo prudentia non est virtus." *De bono*, IV, i, 1, obj. 7; see Aristotle, *EN* II 1,1103a14-17; *EV*, p. 1,1.

64. *De bono*, IV, i, 1, ad 3, p. 219,60.

65. *De bono*, IV, i, 1, ad 7.

66. *Ibid*.

67. *De bono*, IV, i, 1, obj. 6. "Quoniam igitur presens opus non contemplationis gratia est quemadmodum alia (neque enim ut sciamus quid est virtus scrutamur, sed ut boni faciamur . . .)." Arist., *EN* II 2,1103b28; *EV*, p. II,12; editor corrects *faciamur* to *fiamus* in *De bono*.

68. *De bono*, IV, i, 1, obj. 6; see Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 6, 18.

69. " . . . quia prudentia virtus non est contemplandi gratia, sed potius propter opus, et etiam prudentia, quae est scientia moralium, non in doctrina tantum, sed in usu tantum est, ut boni fiamus, et non contemplandi gratia." *De bono*, IV, i, 1, ad 6, p. 220,48.

70. Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 7, 18. See *De bono*, IV, i, 1, obj. 6, p. 218,3 where after the words "primus ille" Albert says, "scilicet prudentiae."

71. Arist., *Metaph*. I 2,982b25-29; *Metaph*. *vetus*, ed. Steele, p. 259,8-10.

72. *De bono*, IV, i, 1, ad 6, p. 220-221.

73. Cicero, *De inventione*, II, 53, 159.

74. *De bono*, IV, i, 1, obj. 2.

75. *De bono*, IV, 1, 1, ad 2, p. 219,25.

76. *Ibid*., p. 219,37.

77. Arist., *EN* II 4,1105b13.

78. The following is the complete text of the matter we have been discussing.
"Licet enim aliquis per rationem accipiat id circa quod est prudentia, tamen prudentia, secundum quod est virtus, non est in ratione, nisi secundum quod est mota antecedenter a voluntate virtutis. Et ideo habitus sic generatus non est tantum rationis, sed est simpliciter voluntatis ut generantis ipsum, rationis autem ut subiecti tantum. Et ideo licet sciat rationes operum prudens, tamen non tam inclinat eum ratio quam bonum habitus et vis ipsius sicut in aliis virtutibus. Et hoc probatur duabus rationibus, quarum una est signum et altera est causa. Signum quidem est, quia videmus simplices idiotas non habentes rationem cognitionis operabilium per scientiam doctrinalem optime eligere ea quae adiuvant ad vitam virtutis, qui non inclinantur ad huiusmodi ex arte aliqua, sed potius ex ipsa vi habitus prudentiae. Causa autem est, quia si quaeramus ab aliquo prudente eligente operabilia facientia ad bonam vitam, quae sit ratio electionis horum et refutationis aliorum, dicet, quia recta ratio virtutis vel boni. Si vero quaeramus, utrum eligat id quod est rationis rectae, propter rationem convincentem vel propter bonum, quod est in recto vel honesto, dicet, quod non propter rationem, sed propter bonum, eo quod multi habentes rationem operantur e contrario. Igitur cum ars inclinet ex ratione convincente, natura autem ex habitu operante, patet, quod prudentia inclinat ad opus per modum naturae et non artis. Et si vellemus totum exprimere, quod est in prudentia ordinante ad opus, diceremus, quod inclinat sicut natura habens artem."
De bono, IV, 1, 1, ad 2.

NOTES

CHAPTER TWO

1. The act of prudence is treated by Albert in *De bono*, IV, i, 4: *Quis sit actus prudentiae proprius?* In connection with this article Albert asks whether prudence seeks a determined mean, *ibid*., p. 233,13. We shall treat of this question in connection with our treatment of the matter of prudence since its solution is intimately associated with the solution to the question regarding the matter of prudence. With regard to the problem of the act of prudence our discussion will depend on two articles by Dom Lottin, (1) "La psychologie de l'acte humain chez saint Jean Damascène et les théologiens du XIIe siècle occidental," *PEM*, I^{2}, 393-424; (2) "Le rôle de la raison dans la morale Albertino-Thomiste," *PEM*, III, 539,575.

2. *De bono*, IV, i, 4, sol, p. 234.

3. Avicenna, *Liber sextus naturalium*, I, 5E; fol. 5rb. Avicenna then proceeds to discuss the *virtus agendi* which he calls the *vis activa*. His definition of *vis activa* is as follows: "Vis autem activa est que est principium movens corpus hominis ad actiones singulas que sunt proprie cogitationis secundum quod intentionibus convenit ad placitum que approprìantur ei. Et habet respectum in comparatione virtutis vitalis appetitive et respectum in comparatione virtutis imaginabilis et extimabilis et respectum in comparatione ipsius ad se." Avicenna, *ibid*., 5rb. Albert adopts this same definition. The definition Albert gives is the same as that of Avicenna except for one phrase. Where Avicenna reads, "convenit ad placitum que approprìantur ei," Albert reads, "que ad placitum praeparantur ei." Since neither the text of Avicenna nor the text of Albert are critical texts, it is impossible to try to give reasons for the different readings. However, it should be noted that Albert knows another reading for this part of Avicenna and he refers to it in the response to the seventh objection: "unde alia littera habet sensibile" *De homine*, q. 63, a. 1, ad 7; B., XXXV, 541. We shall discuss the version in the text of Albert as we find it.

4. *De homine*, q. 63, a. 1; B., XXXV, 538.

5. What follows will be a discussion of the solution without explicit references to the text, *ibid*., p. 539-540.

6. Cf. Avicenna, "Intellectus vero activus eget corpore et virtutibus corporalibus ad omnes actiones suas." *op*. *cit*., 22vb.

7. This text is used frequently by Albert. The reference is to Averroes' commentary on Aristotle, *De anima* III 10,433a14-20. Albert is interpreting Averroes here and inferring that "intellectus practicus movet per suam scientiam." Averroes himself says, " . . . et intellectus, quando comprehendit aliquid, desiderabit per scientiam et movebit per desiderium, necesse est ut ipse intellectus sit movens secundum quod est desiderans, non secundum quod est comprehendens." Averroes, *In De anima*, III, text com. 49, fol. 193v.

8. Cf. Aristotle, *EN* I 13,1102b30-1103a4.

9. In our discussion of synderesis and natural law we shall have more to say about these *per se nota* principles.

10. See Avicenna, *op*. *cit*., 5va.

11. *Dignitates* is a Latin word which received a technical meaning because of its use in translating an Aristotelian term. The word it translates is ἀξιώματα. The term is used by Aristotle to refer to the first principles from which demonstration in a science proceeds. See *Post*. *Anal*., I 7,75b1; I 10,76b14. In the Latin translation of the *Posterior Analytics* found among the works of Boethius the Greek term is translated as *dignitates*. See PL 64, 720B, 722B; *infra*, n. 86.

12. *De homine*, q. 63, a. 4; B., XXXV, 543. In the text of the *De homine*, for *intelligentia* we read *intelligibilia*. The corrected reading is made in accordance with a note of G. Queneau, "Origine de la sentence *Intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus* et date du *Commentaire du De anima* de S. Albert le Grand," *RTAM* 21 (1954) 308, n. 5. The incorrect term of the printed edition seems to result from a faulty reading of the MSS. There is a further difficulty with regard to the text of Aristotle. The version in the *De homine* is not to be found in any of the edited texts of Aristotle which we have. The crucial phrase which

describes the difference between the speculative and practical intellects is "extendente se". This came to mean that the speculative intellect becomes practical through extension, and Aristotle was given as the authority. However, there is no phrase in the De anima of Aristotle to support this doctrine. The text as quoted by Albert clearly refers to De anima III 9,433a1-3. At this place the Aristotelian text reads, ἐπιτάττοντος τοῦ νοῦ. This was correctly rendered in the later Latin versions as "praecipiente intellectu". Queneau provides an explanation for this difference. Albert, at the time of the De homine was using the Vetus translatio of the De anima. The translator probably either misread the Greek or had a faulty text. In any case it would seem that there was a confusion between ἐπιτάττοντος (correct text) and ἐπιτείνοντος (extendente). L. Minio-Palluello discusses this problem, "Tre note alla Monarchia," in, Medioevo e Rinascimento: Studi in onore di Bruno Nardi (Florence, n.d.) Vol. II, 503-511; and in another article he actually found a Greek manuscript which reads ἐπιταθέντος for ἐπιτάττοντος. See, "Le texte du De anima d'Aristote. La tradition latine avant 1500," in, Autour d'Aristote, p. 226, and p. 226, n. 20. The later and correct version reads: "Amplius et praecipiente intellectu et dicente intelligentia fugere aliquid, aut prosequi non movetur, sed secundum concupiscentiam agit, ut incontinens." Text in Averroes, In de anima, Opera (Venice, 1574), Supplementum II, fol. 192r.

13. De homine, q. 63, a. 4; B., XXXV, 543.

14. Cf. Aristotle, EN II 2,1103b28; EV p. II,12.

15. "Bonum enim est primum movens: primus autem motus boni est eius cui fit nuntium de ipso." De homine q. 63, a. 4, sol; B., XXXV, 544.

16. As Albert says in the De bono, I, iii, 1, ad 4.5, "Actus enim semper singularium est et singularis."

17. "Voluntarium est, cuius principium est in ipso cognoscente singularia in quibus est opus." De homine, q. 63, a. 4, sol.; B., XXXV, 544. Cf. De bono, I, iv, 5; Aristotle, EN III 1,1111a20-21; EV, p. XIII,10-11; John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, II, 24; PG 94, 953D.

18. When Albert says in this context, " . . . et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus, quod nihil movet nisi in quantum est appetitivum." it would seem that he is referring to *De anima* III 10,433a10-433b30.

19. *De homine*, q. 63, a. 4, sol.; B., XXXV, 544.

20. Albert says, "Nec fit ibi extensio ad particularia, nec ad appetitum, eo quod speculativus nihil actuale considerat, ut dicit Philosophus." *Ibid*. The reference to Aristotle is vague and seems to refer not to any one text but rather summarises a general teaching regarding the speculative intellect.

21. *De homine*, q. 63, a. 4, ad 6; B., XXXV, 545.

22. Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, II 1,993b20. For the text used see W. Kübel, "Die Übersetzungen der Aristotelischen Metaphysik in den Früwerken Albert's des Grossen," *Divus Thomas* (Fri.) XI (1933) 241-268. Regarding this same difference Albert gives another text of Aristotle: "Practicarum intelligentiae non sunt termini: omnes enim alterius causa sunt, scilicet operis. Speculativae vero rationibus terminantur." *De homine* q. 63, a. 4, ad 6; B., XXXV, 545. This text refers to *De anima* I 3,407a23-24. The full Latin text reads: "Practicarum quidem enim intelligentiarum, termini sunt: omnes enim alterius causa sunt. Speculativae autem rationibus terminantur similiter." in Averroes, *In De anima*, I, text 48, 26r. There are several problems connected with this text which we can only mention: (1) The text as found in the Borgnet edition is incorrect. The *non* should be deleted. (2) The *non* is not to be found in the text of Aristotle in the edition of Averroes, nor in the *Versio antiqua* in the edition of Aquinas' commentary, nor in the Greek text of Aristotle. (3) If Albert did have a version with *non*, then he sees this as providing the hinge for the difference between the two intellects. (4) Even with the correction of the *non*, the medieval version we have is not a correct rendering of Aristotle. The sentence should not end with *similiter*. The point of the Greek text is that while both the practical and speculative processes of thinking have limits, they are terminated in different ways.

23. Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 7,1032a25-1032b30.

24. Cf. Avicenna, *op. cit.*, I, 5; fol. 5rb-5va.

25. *De homine*, q. 63, a. 3; B., XXXV, 542.

26. " . . . prout est natura quaedam et pars rationalis animae." *De homine*, q. 63, a. 3, sol.; B., XXXV, 543.

27. " . . . prout est potentia intelligibilia et operabilia." *Ibid*.

28. " . . . prout est principiorum operabilium." *Ibid*.

29. Cf. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, II, 25 and 27; PG 94, 957 and 960B-961A.

30. The concept of *universalia juris* will be explained later.

31. *De homine*, q. 63, a. 3, sol.; B., XXXV, 543. On the nature of the intellect, see Avicenna, *Liber sextus naturalium*, V, 6; 25vb-26vb; on abstraction from matter and the *appendicia materiae*, *ibid*., II, 2; 6vb and, V, 3; 24ra. That mind or intellect is *semper rectus*, cf. Arist., *De anima* III 10,433a26 ff.

32. *De bono*, IV, 1, 4, sol.

33. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, II, 22; PG 94, 941C.

34. *Ibid*.; PG 94, 944B-945B. Lottin furnishes a French translation of the relevant passages at, *PEM*, I^2, 395-396.

35. We shall outline the analysis of Damascene, leaving the key terms in Greek. When we come to consider the Latin translation we shall show how these words were translated and whence some of the problems arise.

36. See Lottin, *PEM*, I^2, 397; cf. R. Mols, *DHGE*, X (1938) 1365.

37. See Lottin, *PEM*, I^2, 397-399. The complete *De fide orthodoxa* has been translated, *De fide orthodoxa. Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. E. M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955). This Buytaert edition was severely criticised by Vansteenkiste, *Angelicum* 35 (1959) 91-98.

38. Lottin points out that from the context the proper translation of *διατίθεται* should have been *disponitur*, *PEM*, I, 398, n. 1. He continues: "Tous les théologiens du XIIIe siècle vont être désorientés par cette erreur de traduction." *Ibid*.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 399.

40. See Lottin, *PEM*, I², 400-403. He examines the classifications of the faculties of the soul in some of the early theologians. All of them, with the exception of Albert the Great, understand βούλησις to be deliberative will bearing on the means as well as the end. Albert alone seems to interpret John Damascene correctly here: βούλησις is a certain will, a general appetite regarding both possible and impossible matters. See *De homine*, q. 65, a. 1; B., XXXV, 549. Cf. *infra*, n. 127.

41. *De homine*, q. 63, a. 4; B., XXXV, 543-545.

42. Albert says: "Moventes autem per apprehensionem et appetitum sunt tres, scilicet intellectus practicus, et phantasia, et partes appetitus." *De homine*, q. 63, prol.; B., XXXV, 538. See, *De homine*, q. 62, a. 1; B., XXXV, 535.

43. "Est enim imperium secundum rationem boni simpliciter et sic movet intellectus practicus." *De homine*, q. 62, a. 1; B., XXXV, 535.

44. See *De homine*, q. 65, in prol.; B., XXXV, 547.

45. " . . . voluntas prout est ad intrinseca, universalis motor est virium ad actum." *De homine*, q. 65, a. 2, ad 1; B., XXXV, 551. " . . . voluntas uno modo dicta est motor generalis omnium potentiarum ad actum." *De homine*, q. 65, a. 2, ad quaest. 4; B., XXXV, 552.

46. *De bono*, V, iii, 1, ad 9.

47. "Dicendum, quod Damascenus ponit omnes actus rationis qui sunt ad consecutionem ultimi voliti, sive sint rationis in se, sive sint aliarum potentiarum per imperium rationis. Primum igitur est apprehensio boni simpliciter, sive finis; et continuo sequitur voluntas in illud ante omnem actum rationis. Unde hos duos actus supponit Damascenus, unum intellectus practici, et alterum voluntatis, quae tantum finis est, et non eius quod est ad finem. Ratio autem est eorum quae sunt ad finem. Primus autem actus est perscrutari sive perquirere per quae deveniatur ad finem; et cum multa inquirat, erit secundus eius actus examinare quaerendo consilium quod eorum melius sit ad

consecutionem finis. Post consilium vero suasum de uno dat iudicium de ipso tanquam illud melius. Et hoc cum aliis multis sit ei oppositum, praeoptat illud per consilium et praeeligit. Post electionem autem est imperium rationis ad agendum illud, quia mediante illo (*) obtinetur res; et hoc vocatur impetus ad opus. Quia id vero quod obtinetur est desideratum, non habetur sine gaudio; et hoc est fructus rei desideratae secundum quod fructus est cum gaudio uti, ut dicit Augustinus; et, quia appetitus pervenit ad finem intentum, cessat ab appetendo." *De homine*, q. 69, a. 2; B., XXXV, 567. **mediante illo*: Lottin, *PEM*, I^2, 411, quoting this text reads, *mandante illo*, but he gives no reasons for this reading. In this text Albert is consciously commenting on the text of Damascene, see *ibid*., prol.; B., XXXV, 566. There are a great many problems connected with the discussion of the human act. When Albert discusses the act of prudence he does not mention *liberum arbitrium*, but this notion plays a large role in other discussions of the human act, see, F. M. Drouin, "Le libre arbitre dans l'organisme psychologique selon Albert le Grand," *Etudes d'Histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale du XIIIe siècle*. Deuxième Série. (Ottawa, 1932) 91-120. There are also problems connected with the sources for the teaching on the human act. There is a large literature dedicated to this discussion which seeks to understand the thought and relative contributions of Nemesius, Maximus the Confessor and John Damascene. Michaud-Quantin, *op. cit*., pp. 149-157 raises problems regarding the real source of Albert's discussion of the human act. He suggests that perhaps in reality Albert is following Nemesius and not Damascene. We cannot go into these problems here. We shall try to follow the texts of Albert as given in the *De homine* and the *De bono*. The real source of Albert's doctrine is a moot question. We can at least say that Albert *thought* he was commenting the text of Damascene and he certainly uses the terminology of Damascene. We cannot discuss the role of *liberum arbitrium*. It does not enter into Albert's treatment of the act of prudence and he seems to feel no need of introducing it in the *De bono* which he could have done when discussing the act of prudence. There he was not committed to commenting the text of Damascene. An inevitable limitation of the Drouin article is that it could not make use of the as yet unedited *De bono*.

48. Lottin observes that in this passage Albert passes over in silence what in Damascene is called *sententia*, *PEM*, I^2, 411. Drouin, *art. cit*., p. 95, suggests

that the reason Albert does not deal with the subject here is because he has already dealt with it in a previous article. See *PEM* I^{2}, 411-2 and *PEM*, III, 541-2, for remarks on this text just analysed.

49. "Dicendum, quod actus prudentiae multiplex est. Quidam enim actus est ipsius secundum se et quidam est ipsius secundum quod imperat motum et opus. Et ille qui est ipsius secundum se, duplex est, scilicet antecedens, qui est ut dispositio et potentia ad opera virtutum, et consequens, qui est ut perfectio, prout regentis est perficere. Antecedens autem est multiplex. Primo enim per rationem accipit operabile, deinde examinat ipsum per rationes iuris et expedientis et honesti, deinde consiliatur apud se, qualiter acquiratur vel reprobetur, et deinde ordinat. Consequens autem actus est electio. Actus autem, quo imperat opus, est sententia de faciendo. Per omnem enim eundem modum, quo in tractatu De anima, quaestione De ratione dictum est de actibus rationis, ita hic dicendum videtur de actibus prudentiae. Prudentia enim et ratio practica eosdem habent actus, eo quod ratio actum dat, prudentia autem informat eum per rationes iuris et expedientis et honesti." *De bono*, IV, 1, 4, sol.

50. There are two notions here which must be elucidated later, (1) the notion of "rationes iuris et expedientis et honesti"; (2) the notion of *sententia*.

51. See *supra*, n. 47.

52. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 4, ad 1.

53. See *ad loc.*, in, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

54. *De bono*, IV, 1, 3, obj. 4; cf. Arist., *De anima* III 3,427b24-26.

55. *De bono*, IV, 1, 3, ad 4.

56. *Ibid*.

57. See *supra*, n. 49.

58. *De bono*, IV, 1, 3, ad 5.

59. *De bono*, IV, 1, 3, ad 5, p. 230,63 ff.

60. It seems that there is a text of Aristotle lying

behind this division. Aristotle says: "There are three things that are the motives of choice and three that are the motives of avoidance, namely the noble, the expedient, and the pleasant . . ." *EN* II 2,1104b30-31. The notion of the noble would correspond to the notion of *honestum*.

61. We have translated *honestum* as "the absolute good". It should be understood that by 'absolute' we do not mean any metaphysical notion of transcendence. It is meant simply to set off that type of good from the relative or the good-for-something and in the end to set it off from the useful which is a good-for-something. Michaud-Quantin describes the difference: "Sa distinction en honnête et utile ne fait qu'exprimer la plus ou moins grande proximité par rapport à la fin dernière du but immédiatement poursuivi . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 242.

62. In this same place Albert provides a definition of *honestum*: "Et similiter honestum est, quod sua vi trahit et allicit propria et connaturali sibi dignitate, quam praetendit." *De bono*, IV, 1, 3, p. 230,72. The definition is to be found in William of Conches and in Cicero. See Guillaume de Conches, *Das Moralium Dogma Philosophorum*, ed. J. Holmberg (Uppsala, 1929) p. 7, and, Cicero, *De inventione* II, 52, 157. The whole chapter (52) in Cicero seems to be modeled on the three-fold division of Aristotle, *EN* II 2,1104b30-31.

63. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 3, ad 3.

64. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 4, ad 3.4, p. 234,48. In this reply the older vocabulary of *discretio* and *discernere* is very prominent. *Discretio* here is one of the acts of prudence allied with counsel.

65. Cf. *supra*, n. 47.

66. *Ibid*.

67. " . . . per consilium enim discernendo pronuntiat, quid rectum aut non rectum sit." *De bono*, IV, 1, 4, ad 3.4.

68. *De bono*, IV, 1, 4, ad 3.4, p. 234,63 ff.

69. Cf. Lottin edition, *PEM*, I^2, 398 (III). The inclusion of the term *inquisitivus* would suggest that it is not a question here of pure appetite.

70. See *De bono*, I, iv, 7, obj. 1, p. 62.

71. *De bono*, I, iv, 7, ad 1.

72. See *supra*, n. 49.

73. See *supra*, n. 47.

74. See Lottin, *PEM*, I^2, 411.

75. We shall now try to clarify the notion of *sententia* as Albert understands it. In Damascene *sententia* is the Latin word used to translate the Greek term *γνώμη*. Lewis and Short, *op. cit.*, s.v. give the following meanings for *sententia*: "a way of thinking", "opinion", "judgment", "sentiment"; "purpose", "determination", "decision". See Liddell and Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, s.v. where the same meanings are given for *γνώμη*. In the Vulgate Bible the term *γνώμη* was frequently translated *sententia* in the sense of "opinion' or "judgment". See Wis. 7,15; Daniel 2,14; I Cor. 1,10. There is good reason to translate the Greek term by *sententia* in Damascene at PG 94, 945B. In Damascene *γνώμη* would seem to be an expression of appreciation for what was judged best. Choice follows this expression. In the Burgundio translation the passage in which we are interested was translated: "Deinde disponit et amat quod ex consilio judicatum est, et vocatur sententia." (*PEM*, I^2, 398). When Albert comments on the human acts of Damascene he omits the *sententia* from his analysis (*De homine*, q. 69, a. 2; B., XXXV, 567; see *supra*, n. 47). However, as Drouin points out (*op. cit.*, p. 95) Albert discusses *sententia* in another place (*De homine*, q. 65, a. 3; B., XXXV, 552-553) Here Albert is treating of *consensus*. He describes *consensus*: "Rationis consensus est quasi sententia de faciendo, secundum quod dicit Damascenus, quod sententia est dispositum et amatum quod judicatum est ex consilio" (*Ibid.*, p. 553). The *sententia* here is again an expression to act on the judgment concerning the best means. In another place Albert refers to a judgment which follows counsel and is the "promulgatio sententiae" (*De homine*, q. 69, a. 2, ad 5; B., XXXV, 568.), or "decretum illius iudicii" (*ibid.*) After this expression of satisfaction regarding the judgment of means, the agent can choose (*electio*). In these passages

Albert is following the order of acts of Damascene: *consilium*, *judicium*, *sententia*, *electio*. When we move to the *De bono*, the *sententia* becomes the last act of prudence (*De bono*, IV, 1, 4, ad 2); it is identified with the command to act: "Actus autem, quo imperat opus, est sententia de faciendo." *Ibid*., sol. p. 234. Reason commands and the *sententia* is the expression of this command to act. It would seem that this is the primary sense of *sententia* for Albert. *Sententia* is primarily associated with command. This is why Albert called *consensus* a "quasi sententia" (*De homine*, q. 65, a. 3; B., XXXV, 553). This is also why we shall see conscience described as operating "per modum sententiae" since the conclusion of the syllogism with which conscience is associated is given in the form of a command (cf. *infra*, p. 69). We would say then that the *sententia* in the act of prudence as described by Albert in the *De bono* is the expression of the command to act which follows choice.

76. *De bono*, IV, 1, 4, ad 2. Regarding the Cicero reference, see *De bono*, p. 225, note to line 72.

77. See *supra*, n. 47.

78. See *De bono*, I, iv, 6.

79. *De bono*, I, iv, 6; cf. Arist., *EN* III 5,1113a9-10; *EV*, p. XVI,3-4.

80. "Dicendum, quod prima diffinitio data ab Aristotele dicit tria, quae sunt de essentia prohaeresis sive eligentiae. Quorum primum est ex parte objecti, et hoc innuitur per hoc quod dicit 'consiliabile'. Consilium enim numquam est finis, sed eorum quae sunt ad finem. Nec omnium eorum quae sunt ad finem, sed dubiorum. Nec iterum omnium dubiorum, sed eorum quae per inquisitionem rationis utilia esse probata sunt ad ipsius finis consecutionem. Et hoc totum probabitur infra. Secundum est ex parte potentiae. Et hoc innuitur per desiderium ita, quod desiderium elargato nomine sumatur pro quadam voluntate, scilicet quae ex ratione utilis praeoptat alterum propositorum ad consecutionem finis. Tertium est actus, et hoc innuitur per hoc quod dicitur 'eorum quae in nobis sunt.' In nobis enim dicuntur esse operabilia per nos, idest, 'actus, quorum nos domini sumus.' (*EN* III 8,1114b31-32)." *De bono*, I, iv, 6, sol.

81. *De bono*, IV, 1, 4, sol., p. 234,34.

82. *Ibid*., line 35.

83. *De bono*, IV, 1, 3, ad 1, p. 230,14 ff.

84. *Supra*, p. 43.

85. *Supra*, p. 48.

86. *De homine*, q. 71, a. 1; B., XXXV, 593. Cf., "Et vocantur universalia iuris illa dirigentia nos in opere, in quibus non est error neque dubium, in quibus naturale iudicatorium rationis vel synderesis informatum accipit, quid faciendum sit vel non faciendum." *De bono*, V, 1, 1, sol. As references for the expression "universalia iuris" Albert sometimes gives Augustine and at other times St. Basil. However, the expression as such cannot be found in either author.

87. *De bono*, V, 1, 3, sol. " . . . et nihil est de illo iure naturali nisi universalia morum." *De bono*, V, 1, 1, ad 16. For a general treatment of natural law in Albert see, S. B. Cunningham, "Albertus Magnus on Natural Law," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 28 (1967) 479-502. For a treatment of the whole question of natural law in the Middle Ages, see, Lottin, *Le droit naturel chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs*, 2me éd. (Bruges, 1931).

88. "Ergo ius naturale est lumen morum impressum nobis secundum naturam rationis." *De bono*, V, 1, 2, p. 270,5-6.

89. See Lottin, "Syndérèse et conscience aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles," *PEM*, II, 103-349.

90. *De homine*, q. 71, a. 1, sol.; B., XXXV, 593.

91. *Ibid*., ad 3; B., XXXV, 593. Edition reads *naturatis* which is probably a printing error.

92. F. M. Henquinet, "Vingt-deux questions inédites d'Albert le Grand dans un manuscrit à l'usage de s. Thomas d'Aquin," *NS* 9 (1935) 283-328. Lottin is in agreement with the attribution to Albert, cf. *PEM*, II, 218, and 218, n. 3.

93. Although the question is conjecturally placed after the *De bono* (see Henquinet, *art*. *cit*., p. 325) its doctrine is a faithful commentary on the doctrine of the *De homine*, see Lottin, *PEM*, II, 220.

94. The expressions are to be found in Henquinet, *art. cit*., pp. 320-321.

95. *De bono*, IV, i, 4, sol.

96. *Ibid*., ad 2.

97. St Jerome, *Commentarium in Ezechielem prophetam*, I, 1; PL 25, 22B.

98. See *De homine*, q. 71, a. 1, ad 3; B., XXXV, 593.

99. *De homine*, q. 72, a. 1; B., XXXV, 599. Cf. also Henquinet, *art. cit*., text, p. 322 *in fine*; *De bono*, V, ii, 3, ad 3, p. 289,18 ff.

100. Cf. William of Auxerre, *supra*, Introduction, n. 23.

101. *De homine*, q. 72, a. 1, sol; B., XXXV, 599.

102. "Unde dicimus quod conscientia, de qua loquimur, est actus quidam rationis. Cum enim in sinderesi sint universalia iuris, ut dicit Augustinus, non sufficit ad opus, quia cum operationes sint circa particularia, universalia sunt imperfectissima in operibus. Oportet igitur esse aliquam potentiam, qua accipiat aliquod particulare sub illis universalibus, et est hoc ratio superior vel inferior, secundum quod rationes particulares accipit ab eternis et humanis rebus. Sed adhuc non est sufficiens hec ad operandum nisi decernatur faciendum vel non faciendum. Oportet igitur ut ulterius applicetur huic particulari decretum sinderesis quod erat de non faciendo vel faciendo in universali, et hoc est actus rationis, quia sicut dicit Ysaac, ratio est faciens currere causam in causatum, ut accipiatur causa non solum in essendo set etiam in consequendo, et iste actus rationis dicitur conscientia . . . " Henquinet, *art. cit*., p. 318.

103. *De homine*, q. 71, a. 1, ad 3; B., XXXV, 593.

104. *De homine*, q. 63, a. 3, sol; B., XXXV, 543. Cf. Avicenna, *Liber sextus naturalium*, I, 5; fol. 5va.

105. *De bono*, I, v, 1, ad 27. Cf. *De homine*, q. 65, a. 2, sol.; B., XXXV, 550-551.

106. Cf. *De bono*, I, iv, 2, sol.; Arist., *EN* II 1,1103a14.

107. Cf. Arist., *EN* 1,1103a33; and, II 4,1105a16.

108. *De bono*, I, v, 1, ad 29.

109. Law and moral philosophy are the subjects of *generant*. *De bono*, IV, i, 2, ad 27; see *supra*, Chapter One, n. 44.

110. "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod haec est falsa: Nulla virtus in ratione. Ad id autem per quod probat, dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum omnis voluntas in ratione est uno modo, et ideo recolendum est id quod diximus in tractatu De anima, quaestione De voluntate. Diximus enim, quod voluntas uno modo motor rationis est et antecedenter ad rationem ordinatur, et sic opus rationis voluntarium efficitur." *De bono*, IV, i, 1, ad 1. See *De homine*, q. 65, a. 2, ad id quod ultra quaeritur; B., XXXV, 551.

111. *De bono*, IV, i, 1, ad 3.

112. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, p. 229,31.

113. See *De bono*, IV, i, 2, ad 24.

114. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, p. 230,80 ff. Cf. Arist., *De anima* III 10,433a19; *Tr. vetust*. given in edition of *De bono*, *ad loc*: "Appetitus autem tantum movet et ipsa haec intelligentia movet, quoniam principium ipsius appetitivum est, phantasia vero, cum moveat, absque appetitu non movet."

115. Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III 9,432b5, and, *De homine*, q. 65, prol.; B., XXXV, 547; q. 68, a. 1, ad ult.; B., XXXV, 560.

116. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, p. 230,86 ff.

117. "In aliis enim scientiis non est acceptio ad operandum vel appetendum, sed ad sciendum tantum, hic autem fit ad operandum et appetendum. Et ista scientia est consequenter ad voluntatem ordinata et in volito sive objecto voluntatis; aliae autem sunt quoad actum studendi vel considerandi posterius voluntate, scilicet cum objectum non est voluntatis objectum, sed potius finis intelligentiae speculativae, ut dicit Philosophus." *De bono*, IV, i, 3, p. 231,13-21. Cf. Arist., *De anima* III 10,433a14-15.

118. See *De bono*, IV, i, 1, ad 1; IV, i, 1, ad 2; IV, i, 2, ad 24.

119. See *De bono*, IV, i, 3, obj. 6.

120. See *ibid*., ad 6.

121. *Ibid*., obj. 7.

122. *Ibid*., ad 7.

123. *Ibid*., obj. 8.

124. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, ad 8.

125. See *supra*, n. 104.

126. See *De homine*, q. 65, a. 1; B., XXXV, 548-49. See Lottin, *PEM*, I^2, 404.

127. Si vero quaeratur, quare voluntas, βούλησις, non sit de eo quod est ad finem? dicendum quod nulla potentia appetitiva tantum, id est, cuius non est apprehendere sed affici circa objectum, distinguit aliquid vel ordinat: et omnis distinctio vel ordinatio est ex praecedenti apprehensione. Cum igitur in his quae sunt ad finem propter incertitudinem ipsorum exigitur distinctio et inquisitio et ordinatio, non potest esse voluntas de his. Finis autem in omni appetente suppositus est certus: et ideo voluntas est de ipso." *De homine*, q. 65, a. 2, ad qu. 3; B., XXXV, 552.

128. *De homine*, q. 65, a. 1; B., XXXV, 548.

129. *De bono*, I, iv, 4, sol. It should be pointed out that *imperans* and *rectificans* are not terms usually associated with the vocabulary of will.

130. Cf. *De bono*, I, iv, 1, ad 2, p. 45,33; I, vi, 3, sol., p. 80,65 ff.

131. See *supra*, Chapter One, n. 41 for text.

132. *De bono*, IV, i, 2, ad 24.

133. *Ibid*.

NOTES

CHAPTER THREE

1. De bono, IV, i, 2, ad 4, p. 224,83.

2. Ibid., p. 224,37.

3. See De bono, IV, i, 2, ad 4, p. 224,80.90.

4. The article deals with three main points: (1) The matter of prudence as such (objections 1-5); (2) The meaning of the expression: "Prudentia sit in ratione, secundum quod consequenter se habet ad voluntatem (objections 6-8); (3) Whether prudence has some matter per se (objections 9-14). We have already dealt with the second point.

5. See De bono, IV, i, 4, p. 233,13.

6. De bono, I, iv, 1, p. 43.

7. Cf. "And since 'nature' means two things, the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of 'that for the sake of which'." Arist., Physics II 8, 199a30-32.

8. What Albert seems to have in mind here is the Aristotelian doctrine of the continuance of species or duration or the perpetuity of generation. For texts in this regard, cf. De anima II 4,415b1; GC II 10,336a31-337a17; GA II 1,731b31-35; De caelo I 9,279a17-30.

9. De bono, I, iv, 1, sol., p. 45,3 ff.

10. See De bono, I, iv, 1, sol., p. 45,11 ff; Aristotle, EN III 1,1109b30; EV, p. XI,1-2.

11. See De bono, I, ii, 4, sol.

12. Albert distinguishes between matter ex qua, in qua, and circa quam. He continues: "Ex qua autem et in qua non sunt principium cognoscendi rem, cuius sunt materia. Sed materia circa quam frequenter est principium cognoscendi rem, praecipue in actibus animae, in quibus materia non tantum est materia, sed etiam finis." Ibid.

13. *Ibid*.

14. *De bono*, I, v, 2, ad 3.

15. See *De bono*, II, ii, 3, ad 3.

16. *De bono*, III, ii, 2, ad 1. Cf. "Ad aliud dicendum, quod materia, quae tantum est materia, non distinguit virtutes vel vitia, sed materia, quae est finis potentiae motivae, sicut est appetitus vel pars appetitus; finis enim in moralibus potissima forma est, ut dicit Socrates."
    De bono, III, iv, 3, ad 3.

17. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, sol.

18. See *De bono*, IV, i, 3, obj. 1; Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 5, 16-17.

19. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, obj. 1.

20. *Ibid*., ad 1.

21. *Ibid*.

22. See *supra*, Chapter Two, n. 86.

23. See Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 6, 19.

24. See *De bono*, IV, i, 2, obj. 12.

25. See *De bono*, IV, i, 3, ad 2. *Supra*, notes 1, 2, 3.

26. See *De bono*, IV, i, 3, obj. 3; Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 43, 152.

27. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, ad 3.

28. See Arist., *De anima*, III 3,427b24-26.

29. See *supra*, Chapter Two, p. 57.

30. See *De bono*, IV, i, 3, obj. 4.

31. See *supra*, Chapter Two, p. 57.

32. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, obj. 5, p. 228,72-229,28.

33. *Ibid*., ad 5.

34. Arist., *De anima* III 10,433a14-15.

35. See *De bono*, IV, i, 3, p. 229,22 ff.

36. *Ibid*., p. 228,72 ff.

37. *Ibid*., p. 228,76 ff.

38. Arist., *Metaph*., II 1,993b21. See *Metaph*. *vetus*, ed. R. Steele, p. 282,25.

39. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, ad 5.

40. See *supra*, Chapter Two, p. 58 ff.

41. *Supra*, p. 88.

42. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, obj. 5, p. 229,7-12. Cf. Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 43, 153.

43. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, obj. 5, p. 229,17-21; cf. Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 45, 160.

44. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, p. 229,51 ff.

45. Albert has used various expressions to describe the matter of prudence. He speaks of proper matter, principal matter, secondary matter, *per se* matter and determined matter. Proper matter and principal matter are the same. To have such matter simply means that there is some identifiable object with which prudence is concerned primarily. Secondary matter refers to objects with which prudence might be concerned but these do not enter into the essential structure of prudence. However, proper matter must not be confused with *per se* or determined matter. These last two are roughly the same although Albert is not always entirely consistent in using the terms. Prudence has determined matter but not in the sense that the other cardinal virtues have determined matter. Looked at from a material point of view prudence does not have *per se* matter although formally it can be said to have *per se* matter. There is a formal difference between the matter of prudence and the matter of the other virtues.

46. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, p. 231,44 ff.

47. See *De homine*, q. 61, a. 1: "Utrum virtutes animae rationalis sint corporeae?" B., XXXV, 518 ff.

48. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, p. 231,51 ff.

49. See *De bono*, IV, i, 3, p. 231,58 ff.

50. *Ibid*., p. 231,62-64.

51. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, p. 231,64 ff. Thirdly, matter is said to be determined not through the notion of the private good, but the common good in so far as it pertains to the conservation of the community. When matter is taken in the third way it refers to the determined matter of justice.

52. See *De bono*, I, iv, 1, obj. 2.

53. "Ad aliud dicendum, quod sicut se habet potentia ad potentiam, ita se habet habitus potentiae ad habitum potentiae. Unde cum potentia motiva, quae est ratio, se habeat ad irascibilem et concupiscibilem ut regens et ordinans et sit quodammodo universalis ad eas, etiam suus habitus per hunc modum se habebit ad habitus illarum potentiarum. In ratione autem sunt iustitia et prudentia. Unde illi habitus se habebunt ad habitus castitatis et fortitudinis ut universaliter regentes et ordinantes, et ita oportet, quod sint circa idem. Unde non habent materiam extra materiam illarum, sed rationem ponunt circa eandem materiam. Et cum prudentia regat in opere, ipsa accipiet in materia castitatis et fortitudinis eligibile ad opus. Et cum iustitia regat ad alterum secundum debitum iuris, ipsa accipiet illud debitum in materia castitatis et fortitudinis. Et hoc est quod dicitur a multis, quod opera fortitudinis et castitatis materialia sunt ad opera prudentiae et iustitiae." *De bono*, I, iv, 1, ad 2.

54. *Ibid*.

55. See *De bono*, IV, i, 3, p. 231,58-64.

56. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, ad 9, p. 231,88 ff.

57. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, ad 9, p. 231,95 ff. See also, *ibid*., ad 11: "Ad aliud dicendum, quod prudentia non tantum ponit discretionem in operibus aliarum virtutum, sed ponit rationem sui regiminis in omnibus operibus pertinentibus ad vitam civilem vel monasticam, ut obiectum est."

58. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, obj. 10.

59. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, ad 10.

60. See *De bono*, IV, i, 3, obj. 14.

61. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, ad 14.

62. "Iuxta hoc etiam quaeritur, si prudentia in actu quaerit medium determinatum sibi sicut alia virtus" *De bono*, IV, i, 4, p. 233,13.

63. *De bono*, I, v, 1, ad 30.

64. "Praeterea, hoc videtur per rationem. Dicit enim Philosophus generaliter diffiniens virtutem, quod 'virtus est habitus voluntarius in medietate consistens determinata ratione.' Ergo si aliquis habitus non erit in medietate consistens, ille non erit virtus. Si ergo prudentia non consistit in medietate, non erit virtus, quod falsum est; ergo est in medietate consistens." *De bono*, IV, i, 4, obj. 10. See Arist., *EN* II 6,1106b36-1107a2; *EV*, p. VI,26-28.

65. *De bono*, IV, i, 4, ad 10, p. 235.

66. *Ibid*. For logical virtues, see *supra*, Chapter One, n. 7.

67. See *supra*, n. 61.

68. *De bono*, I, iv, 1, ad 2.

69. *De bono*, IV, i, 4, obj. 11. Cf. *De bono*, I, v, 1, ad 31.

70. "Ad aliud dicendum, quod substantia virtutis dicitur esse medium, eo quod virtutis diffinitio et esse est in medio, licet non eodem modo respiciat illud. Et ideo prudentiae scientia determinatur in his scibilibus quae habent medium, licet scientia secundum se medio careat. Et ideo prudentiae substantiale est medium non per se, sed secundum suum scibile, scibile autem non propter scitum, ut dicit Philosophus, sed propter opus." *De bono*, IV, i, 4, ad 11.

71. "Ad id quod iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum prudentia in actu suo attendat medium, sine praeiudicio dico, quod non habet medium. Causa autem huius est, quia ipsa est virtus logica, non determinans sibi materiam nisi logice, hoc est secundum rationem, ut prius dictum est. Unde cum omne medium sit secundum materiam dicti vel facti vel passionis illatae vel innatae, non determinabit sibi prudentia aliquod istorum mediorum . . . " *De bono*, IV, i, 4, p. 235,1-9.

72. *Supra*, n. 17.

73. De bono, IV, 1, 4, p. 232.

74. See De bono, IV, 1, 4, sol.

75. De bono, IV, 1, 4, sol., p. 234,23-24.

76. Ibid., line 29.

77. De bono, IV, 1, 3, ad 5, p. 230,57.

78. See supra, notes 42 and 43.

79. De bono, IV, 1, 4, sol., p. 234,20-1. St. Thomas does not make this distinction within the act of prudence and consequently can say the command of prudence is the principal act of prudence; see, ST II-II, 47, 8c.

80. Lottin, "Les débuts . . . " PEM, III, 266.

NOTES

CHAPTER FOUR

1. *De bono*, IV, i, 6, p. 242. See *supra*, Chapter One, p. 18. Article five of this question deals with the various senses that have been traditionally given to the term 'prudence'. We shall deal with this article after our treatment of the parts of prudence.

2. Bernard, *Sermones in cantica*, 49; PL 183, 1018D.

3. We are making no pretense here to give a history of the term *auriga*. We simply want to show that it was used in a metaphorical sense by certain Latin Fathers who were read widely in later centuries. We want to show a precedent for Bernard's use of the term. See *supra*, Introduction, n. 13.

4. Ambrose, *De viduis liber*; PL 16, 272B.

5. Augustine, *Sermo II in sabbato sancto*, 4; PL 46, 825.

6. Augustine, *De symbolo*, 2; PL 40, 638. See II Kings for account of the assumption of Elijah to heaven. Cf. II Kings 2, 11-12 where God is referred to as the *auriga Israel*.

7. "Sed si te pompa illa, figura ea equorum, compositio curruum, ornatus et aurigae superstantis, equos regentis, vincere cupientis . . . " Augustine, *De symbolo* 2; PL 40, 638.

8. "Vae homini cuius auriga superbia est, necesse est enim ut praeceps eat." *In epistolam Joannis*, VIII, 9; PL 35, 2040.

9. See Augustine, *De moribus ecclesiae*, I, 4, 6; PL 32, 1313.

10. *Ibid*., I, 5, 8; PL 32, 1314.

11. *Ibid*., chp. 6; PL 32, 1314.

12. Jerome, *Epist*., 52, 13; PL 22, 538. Cf. *Epist*., 64, 22; PL 22, 621.

13. *Epist*., 100, 16; PL 22, 827. Cf. *Comm*. *in* *Ezech*., I, 1; PL 25, 22C.

14. See Dingjan, *Discretio*. *Les origines patristiques et monastiques de la doctrine sur la prudence chez saint Thomas d'Aquin*, pp. 14-86 for discussion of doctrine of Cassian. We have referred to *discretio* here as a virtue. We have also pointed out above that the tradition never called it a virtue, *supra*, Chapter one, p. 31. However, its being a virtue was never explicitly denied. When we refer to *discretio* as a virtue we are speaking in a general way, understanding by the term 'virtue' a quality perfecting the mind in reference to moral judgment. We do not intend to imply any opinion regarding the historical question whether the earlier writers of the Middle Ages actually viewed *discretio* as a virtue. We shall not translate the term *discretio* in our discussion since the texts will show its function clearly enough and the English counter-part hardly renders the richness of the Latin term as it came to be used.

15. Cassian, *Johnannis Cassiani Conlationes* XXIIII, ed. M. Petschenig, *CSEL* 13 (1886) I, 23, p. 35. The numbers in the Cassian references will be to this edition.

16. " . . . quae si in homine nequam fuerit, id est non vero iudicio et scientia communita seu quolibet errore ac praesumptione decepta, totum corpus nostrum faciet tenebrosum, hoc est omnem aciem mentis actusque nostros reddat obscuros, caecitate scilicet vitiorum et perturbationum tenebris involutos." *Coll*., II, 2, p. 42. Cf. Matth., 6, 23.

17. Cassian, *op*. *cit*., II, 9, p. 47.

18. *Coll*., II, 4, p. 44.

19. PL 73, 813 ff. Regarding authorship of Book IV: "Quis autem ea concinnaverit, non habeo certo dicere." PL 73, 39.

20. *De Vitis Patrum*, IV, 42; PL 73, 840-1. St Thomas used this text, see, *In III Sent*., D. 33, q. 2, a. 5.

21. See *supra*, n. 2; Dingjan, *op*. *cit*., p. 136, and *supra*, Chapter One, n. 53.

22. Bernard, *De consideratione*, I, 8; PL 182, 737.

23. *Ibid.*; PL 182, 738-9.

24. Abelard, *Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum*; PL 178, 1652B. See *supra*, Introduction, n. 14. Cf. Cicero, *De inventione*, II, 53, 160.

25. Abelard, *Dialogus inter* . . . ; PL 178, 1652-53.

26. Richard of Saint Victor, *Adnotatio in Psalmum CXLIII*; PL 196, 381-2. Dingjan, *op. cit.*, p. 162 ff., brings together the various discussions of *discretio* found in the works of Richard. He says: "Mais si on rassemble les passages sur la *discretio* et qu'on y mette un peu d'ordre, on obtient un ensemble fort impressionnant et cohérent qui ne le cède presque en rien au traité de la prudence de l'école aristotélicienne." p. 162-3.

27. *Adnotatio* . . . ; PL 196, 382A.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Dingjan, *op. cit.*, p. 182, author's emphasis.

30. See William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, 92ra, 155vb.

31. Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, text in Lottin, *PEM*, III, 265, lines 45-47.

32. We could with justice apply to Albert what Deman says about Aquinas: "Il est vrai que la discrétion n'est pas nommée dans notre traité; mais elle l'est ailleurs. Et du rapide examen des textes il doit résulter que saint Thomas charge désormais la prudence de perpétuer l'enseignement constant et venerable que la discrétion avait porté jusqu'à lui." *La Prudence*, 21ème édition (Editions de la Revue des Jeunes, 1949) p. 407-8. Cf. Dingjan, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

33. *De bono*, IV, i, 6, p. 243,6.

34. *De bono*, IV, i, 6, sol. Reference to Bernard seems to be incorrect in the edition, see rather, *Sermones in cantica*, 49; PL 183, 1018D. Cf. Aristotle *EN* I 13, 1102b30-1103a4.

35. "Omne quod est operabile, prius est eligibile secundum rationem rectam; sed ratio recte eligens dirigit in opere; ergo virtus, cuius est per rectam rationem eligere, dirigit in omni opere virtutis. Sed hoc est prudentiae; ergo prudentia est auriga in omni opere

virtutis; ergo non tam est virtus quam auriga virtutum." De bono, IV, i, 6, sed contra (1).

36. "Item, sicut se habet potentia ad potentiam, sic se habet habitus ad habitum. Sed potentia, quae est ratio, dirigit ut auriga concupiscibilem et irascibilem; ergo habitus eius diriget etiam habitus istarum. Sed rationis dirigentis habitus est prudentia, aliarum autem fortitudo et temperantia; ergo prudentia dirigit fortitudinem et temperantiam." Ibid., sed contra (3).

37. "Praeterea, si indigent virtutes auriga, hoc videtur maxime illis convenire quae sunt in parte rationali animae. Sed secundum hoc non debet esse auriga iustitiae, quia iustitia est in ratione sicut et prudentia." De bono, IV, i, 6, obj. 6. This objection only seems to make sense if virtues "in parte rationali animae" are different from virtues "in ratione". The former would be virtues in the parts of the soul subject to reason; virtues of the latter kind would be the virtues of reason itself.

38. Ibid., ad 6. It seems that this reply, although apparently satisfactory for Albert, leaves something to be desired. As long as justice is located in reason these conflicts will arise. They will only be removed when justice is located in the will as subject, cf. Aquinas, ST II-II, 58, 4.

39. "Item, cuiuscumque habitus partes sunt ad omnem circumstantiam operis discernendam, ille habitus est dirigens et regens in omni opere; prudentiae partes, scilicet memoria, intelligentia et providentia, sunt ad omnem circumstantiam operis discernendam; ergo dirigunt in omni opere; ergo prudentia non tam est virtus quam auriga virtutum." De bono, IV, i, 6, sed contra (2).

40. De bono, IV, i, 6, obj. 1. Cf. Arist., EN II 5, 1106b14; EV p. VI,10.

41. "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus quaelibet habet certitudinem sui actus et medii; sed quae faciant ad actum expediendum vel qualiter ordinetur ad finem, non considerat virtus aliqua nisi prudentia sola, et ideo ipsa sola est dirigens." De bono, IV, i, 6, ad 1.

42. Ibid., obj. 2. Albert is thinking here of Cicero's definition of virtue, De inventione, II, 53, 159.

43. De bono, I, v, 1, ad 17.

44. "Ad aliud dicendum, quod hoc verum est, quod virtus operatur ut natura et ideo non determinat finem et expedientia ad actum sicut nec natura, et ideo, ut sit perfecta, secundum quod est hominis bonum, oportet cuilibet adesse prudentiam." *De bono*, IV, 1, 6, ad 2.

45. *Ibid*., obj. 3.

46. *Ibid*., ad 3.

47. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 6, obj. 5. Cf. Bernard "Unde mihi videtur non omnino absurde definire temperantiam, qui hanc nec praecidere necessitatem, nec excedere dicat, iuxta illud philosophi: ne quid nimis." *De consideratione* I, 8; PL 182, 737D; and "Denique et ipsi iustitiae, ut iusta sit, temperantia modum imponit." *Ibid*.; PL 182, 738A; and "Quid tam rursum temperantiae, quae non aliunde profecto temperantiam est, nisi quod nil immoderatum admittit?" *Ibid*.; PL 182, 738C. Dingjan, *op*. *cit*., p. 138, says that for Bernard temperance is the moral application of the knowledge which is prudence. He continues: "Et cela se comprend facilement si l'on songe que la fixation du juste milieu des vertus est, il est vrai, un acte de la raison, mais qu'elle s'appelle tempérance et s'exerce par la tempérance." *Ibid*., p. 138-9.

48. See Bernard, *De consideratione* I, 8; PL 182, 737C.

49. See *ibid*.; PL 182, 738D-739A. See *supra*, n. 23.

50. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 4, obj. 9 and ad 9.

51. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 6, ad 5.

52. *De bono*, IV, 1, 6, ad 5, p. 243,87-91. The phrase "habita una habeantur omnes" seems to come from Cicero, *De officiis*, II, 10, 35.

53. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 4, sol., p. 234,29. Albert continues by giving his reply to the objection. He says that even if it were granted that if we have one virtue we have all of them, this does not mean that the 'difficult' element in temperance would be the difficulty of fortitude. The *difficile* of fortitude is to be found in the proper matter pertaining to fortitude. The same applies to the other virtues except prudence. This is so since in its proper act prudence involves itself (*immiscet se*) in all of the

virtues as ruler and guide. Consequently, it is called *auriga*.

54. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 6, ad 5, p. 244.

55. See *De bono*, II, 1, 2, p. 87,65.

56. *Ibid*., p. 87,33. Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, 4, 6; PL 42, 927.

57. See Albert, *In III Sent*., D. 36, a. 1; B., XXVIII, 665-667. For treatment of the subject, see Lottin, "La connexion des vertus chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs," *PEM*, III, 197-252. The general observation of Lottin with regard to the theologians at the period prior to the knowledge of the complete *Ethics* of Aristotle is this: "Ainsi donc, dès le moment où, avec Godefroid de Poitiers, on avait distingué entre vertus infuses et vertus acquises, les théologiens unanimement soutinrent la connexion des vertus infuses, mais, et non moins unanimement, nièrent la connexion des vertus acquises." *Ibid*., p. 231.

58. See *supra*, n. 31.

59. *De bono*, IV, 1, 6, ad 7, p. 244,22.

60. *Ibid*., p. 244,38-41.

NOTES

CHAPTER FIVE

1. *De bono*, IV, ii, 1-6.

2. The first article deals with memory in itself; the second, with the *ars memorandi*; the third, with *intelligentia*; the fourth, with *providentia*.

3. Cicero, *De inventione* II, 53, 160. We shall translate *memoria*, *intelligentia*, *providentia* respectively as 'memory', 'understanding', 'foresight'.

4. Translations will be those of J. I. Beare in, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. R. McKeon (Random House: New York, 1941).

5. *De mem. et rem.*, 1,451a15-19. The term 'state' translates the term for *habitus* or habit. The term 'presentation' translates *φάντασμα* which is what the *φαντασία* (imagination) receives or what is presented to the imagination.

6. 450a10-14. Cf. *De anima* III 1,425a14-20.

7. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (University Paperbacks, n. 65, 1965, of 5th ed., 1953) p. 144.

8. "Accordingly, therefore, when one wishes to recollect, this is what he will do: he will try to obtain a beginning of movement whose sequel shall be the movement which he desires to reawaken." 451b30.

9. *De bono*, IV, ii, 1, obj. 1. See *supra*, n. 3.

10. "Dicimus, quod memoria est pars prudentiae, secundum quod memoria cadit in rationem reminiscentiae." *De bono*, IV, ii, 1, sol., p. 245,61-63; see also, *ibid*., line 68-69.

11. "Tamen in tribus differentia est memoriae et reminiscentiae. Quorum unum est, quod reminiscentia habet coniunctum sibi actum rationis et syllogisimi, propter quod inest solis hominibus: memoria autem non, et propter hoc est in brutis. Secundum, quod

reminiscentia est a principiis determinatis: memoria vero non: non enim utitur phantasmate ut imagine deveniendo in rem, ut supra dictum est. Tertium est, quod reminiscentia vadit etiam per intentiones propinquas, licet non sunt conjunctae ordine naturali, ut patet in supra dictis exemplis: et in talibus trahit vim a consuetudine . . . Memoria vero non procedit hoc modo, sed a propriis intentionibus et imaginibus rei procedit in rem prius acceptam a sensu." De homine, q. 41, a. 1, De tertia diffinitione; B., XXXV, 353.

12. De bono, IV, i, 2, p. 221,54; Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae, I, 15, 25; PL 32, 1322.

13. " . . . oportet ipsam procedere inquirendo et sic necesse est eam progredi a principio determinato et per media probabilia devenire in propositum operabile." De bono, IV, ii, 1, sol.

14. Ibid.

15. De bono, IV, ii, 1, sed contra (1).

16. De bono, IV, ii, 1, obj. 4.

17. Ibid., ad 4.

18. Ibid.

19. Arist., EN II 1,1103a16-17; EV, p. I,1-4.

20. Arist., Metaph., I 1,980b29 (Oxford trans.). Latin text in Albert at De bono, IV, ii, 1, sed contra (3): "Fit autem memoria experimentum hominibus; multae enim memoriae eiusdem rei experimenti potentiam perficiunt." For Latin text used, see Kübel, art. cit., p. 255. Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 19,100a4 (and whole of Chapter 19).

21. See De bono, IV, ii, 1, obj. 1.

22. "Dicendum ergo, quod repetere ea quae fuerunt, dupliciter contingit, scilicet ex potentia, et haec repetitio est in potentia tantum et imperfecta, eo quod non habeat habitum, unde procedere debet. Et est repetitio ex habitu, qua repetitur praeteritum, quando vult repetens. Et haec potest esse in habitu cognitivo, et tunc est theoretica et potest esse in habitu morali, et tunc est practica et est virtus pertinens ad prudentiam." De bono, IV, ii, 1, ad 1.

23. See *ibid*., ad 2.

24. *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, obj. 6.

25. *Ibid*., ad 6.

26. *Incerti auctoris de ratione dicendi ad C. Herennium Libri IV*, ed. F. Marx (Leipzig: Teubner, 1964). Albert's use of this work is described by F. A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London, 1966) Chapter III.

27. *De bono*, IV, ii, 2, sol.

28. See *Ad Herennium* III, 16, 28.

29. *Ibid*.

30. *Ibid*.

31. *De bono*, IV, ii, 2, sol.

32. *De inventione* II, 53, 159.

33. See *De bono*, IV, i, 1, obj. 2. See *supra*, Chapter Four, notes 42-44.

34. *De bono*, IV, i, 1, ad 2, p. 219.

35. Cicero, *De inventione* II, 53, 160. See *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, obj. 1. There is a textual problem here. The definition of Cicero reads *perspicit*. *Perspicio* means to look at or perceive. However, there is a variant in the MSS of Cicero with the reading *prospicit*. This is the reading which Albert had and which will occasion an objection because of the connotation of the future which the latter verb carries.

36. *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, sol.

37. "Unde patet, qualiter complet secundum aliquem modum potestatem prudentiae et ita est pars ipsius." *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, sol.

38. "Ad id ergo quod primo obicitur, dicendum, quod intelligentia, prout a Tullio accipitur, non est habitus speculativae partis animae. Contrahitur enim per hoc, quod in diffinitione ponitur animus. Animus enim proprie sonat partem practicam, quae movet et operatur, et ideo intelligentia sic dicta est pars practicae. Aliter etiam prospicit speculativa ea quae sunt, et aliter intelligentia practica.

Speculativa enim accipit ea quae sunt, idest ea quae vera sunt, non sub ratione praesenti vel alicuius differentiae temporis, sed practica accipit ea quae sunt, idest ea quae in praesenti sunt, idest quae negotium praesens circumstant, et ideo aequivocatio est in his 'quae sunt' hic et ibi." *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, ad 1.

39. "Ad aliud dicendum, quod intelligentia, secundum quod est pars prudentiae, regit in opere ex consideratione praesentium in negotio. Ergo est ante opus et electionem, et ita suum est prospicere, licet non adeo longe sicut providentiae. Et hoc notat Tullius ex proprietate loquendi in verbo prospiciendi." *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, ad 4.

40. See *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, ad 5.

41. *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, p. 252,60.76.

42. *Ibid*., line 93.

43. *Ibid*., p. 253,4.

44. *De bono*, I, ii, *prologus*.

45. *De bono*, I, ii, 4.

46. "Bonum autem in genere non dicit simpliciter primum in moribus, sed ordinatum magis ad unum contrariorum, scil. ad bonum virtutis, sicut nec malum in genere simpliciter dicit primum in moribus, sed inclinatum magis ad vitium." *De bono*, I, ii, 4, sol.

47. *Ibid*., ad 2. Cunningham says: "*Bonum in genere*, therefore, designates the first movement of goodness in the order of morality, and it is subject to further increments of moral perfection." *The Significance of Albert the Great's De Bono* . . . , p. 77.

48. *De bono*, I, iii, 1-3.

49. See editor's note at *De bono*, I, ii, 2, p. 39,3.

50. *De Bono*, I, iii, 1, obj. 1. Note the text of Boethius in Migne omits *rhetoricae*, cf. *De differentiis topicis* IV; PL 64, 1212C.

51. Boethius, *De diff. top*., IV; PL 64, 1212C.

52. *De bono*, I, iii, 1, sol.

53. See *ibid*., obj. 1.

54. "Dicimus ergo ad primum, quod ista talia non dant esse actui, inquantum actus est, sed dant esse ei, inquantum honestus vel vituperabilis est, et propter hoc, licet sint extrinseca actui, non tamen sunt extrinseca honesto vel vituperabili. Esse autem honesti potius accipitur ex modo quam ex ipso actu ita, ut modus appellentur omnes circumstantiae." *De bono*, I, iii, 1, ad 1.

55. "Actus enim semper singularium est et singularis. Nec persona circumstantia est, sed haec persona et illa, et similiter locus et tempus et sic de aliis." *De bono*, I, iii, 1, ad 4.

56. *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, sol.

57. *De bono*, IV, ii, 4, obj. 1. See Cicero, *De inventione* II, 53, 160; *supra*, n. 3.

58. *De bono*, IV, ii, 4, sol.

59. See *De bono*, IV, ii, 4, obj. 1.

60. " . . . potius ponit aliquid factum vel faciendum et coniciendo de futuro casu sequente per effectum vel ius, illud factum aestimat, utrum hoc sit bonum fieri vel non. Et ideo ipsa providentia non procedit in futurum, ut est dependens a libero arbitrio, sed potius ut est effectus vel sequela facti, quod supposuit providentia, ut postea ex sequentibus casibus cognoscat, utrum fuerit consultum hoc fieri vel non." *De bono*, IV, ii, 4, ad 1.

61. "Vel si intelligatur de providentia proprie dicta, non erit certa, eo quod non sit necessaria, sed probabilis ex parte futuri, sed tamen certa secundum ordinem, quem habet ad futurum, quod supponitur ut causa vel antecedens talis casus futuri." *De bono*, IV, ii, 4, ad 2.

62. "Praeterea, quaeritur iuxta hoc, si providentia est de futuris, per quid considerat ea. Oportet enim ipsam habere aliqua principia. Et videtur, quod nulla, quia sicut dictum est, futura sub libero arbitrio existentia contingentia sunt. Ergo cum sint etiam particularia, non habent causam vel ad minus non habent causam determinatam et stantem ut principium. Ergo cum providentia sit de talibus, non habebit principium, ex quo procedat in illa, et cum iterum

futura in se nondum sint, videtur, quod providentia non sit de futuris in suis principiis nec etiam in seipsis, et ita nullo modo est de futuris." *De bono*, IV, ii, 4, obj. 3.

63. *De bono*, IV, ii, 4, ad 3. We have changed the punctuation of the edition. Where the edition has a comma after *sequatur* we have placed a period.

64. *De bono*, IV, ii, 4, ad 3.

65. *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, sol., p. 255,64-66.

66. "Dicendum quod divisio boni, quae assignatur a sanctis, est divisio totius potestativi sive virtualis, cuius partes sic se habent ad divisum, quod divisum non salvatur secundum sui perfectionem nisi in ultima. In his autem quae sunt ante ultimam, salvatur quidem et praedicatur de ipsis, sed secundum diminutam perfectionem suae potestatis. Et hoc, qualiter sit, diffuse ostensum est in tractatu *De hierarchis angelorum*. . . . In toto etiam potestativo aliud est, scilicet quod sequens pars semper praecedentem in se claudit, ut dicit Boethius, quia quidquid potest potestas inferior, potest et superior, sed non convertitur." *De bono*, I, ii, 1, sol., p. 23.

67. "Dicendum, quod secundum Boethium quoddam est totum potestativum, et illud quodammodo est medium inter totum universale, et totum integrale. Totum enim universale est in qualibet parte sua, et praedicatur de illa; sicut enim probat Philosophus in *VII Metaphysicae*, quod est per essentiam est idem universali et particulari. Totum vero integrale non est in aliqua suarum partium, nec praedicatur de illis. Sed totum potestativum est in qualibet partium, licet non aequipotenter, sed in prima secundum minus, et in secunda ut potentius, et in ultima secundum totum posse." *De IV coaeqaevis*, IV, 36, 2, part. 1, sol.; B., XXXIV, 540. Cf. ibid., IV, 35, 3, sol.; B., XXXIV, 532. See B. Muller-Thym, *The Establishment of the University of Being in the Doctrine of Meister Eckhart of Hochheim* (New York, 1939) Chapter 2, in which the author shows how the notion of *totum potestativum* is used by Albert in his doctrine of the powers of the soul.

68. *De bono*, II, ii, 10, sol., p. 112. Albert also speaks of the division of the good into *delectabile*, *utile* and *honestum* as a *totum potestativum*: "Unde partes totius potestativi secundum ordinem constituunt ipsum

totum, et prima constituit secundum quid, secunda autem secundum plus, et ultima perfecte, sicut dicimus etiam de divisione boni in delectabile et utile et honestum. Delectabile est bonum secundum quid; et utile est bonum plus, honestum autem est bonum simpliciter. Item, honestas ponit utile et delectabile, sed non convertitur." *De IV coaequaevis*, IV, 35, 3, sol.; B., XXXIV, 532.

69. *De bono*, II, ii, 2, sol., p. 101.

70. See *De bono*, III, iv, 5, ad 1, p. 194.

71. *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, sol.

72. *Ibid*.

73. *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, sol.

74. *De bono*, IV, ii, 2, sol.

75. *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, sol.

76. See *De bono*, IV, ii, 1, sol., (memory); IV, ii, 3, sol., (understanding); IV, ii, 4, sol., (foresight).

77. *De bono*, IV, ii, 3, sol.

NOTES

CHAPTER SIX

1. In this chapter we shall discuss the parts of prudence enumerated by Macrobius, those found in Proverbs I, 2-5, Aristotle's division of intellectual virtue, and the fifth article of the first question on prudence concerning the senses of the term *prudentia*. This rather disjointed chapter is necessary in order to complete our analysis of Albert's treatment of prudence in the *De bono*.

2. " . . . prudentiae insunt ratio, intellectus, circumspectio, providentia, docilitas, cautio." *Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobii Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1963) I, 8, 7. The English terms used are those found in W. Stahl, tr., *Macrobius: Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* (Columbia University Press: New York, 1952). We shall also render *docilitas* as '*docility*'.

3. *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, sol. In this text Albert says that Macrobius and the others "non tantum ponunt" the parts but also conditions of the act and effects. The "non tantum" appears to imply that these further aspects are also parts of prudence and more. However, the subsequent discussion does not give this impression. From this later treatment the term 'parts' seems to be reserved for the parts as enumerated by Cicero. The *modus* of the act mentioned here is the circumstances: " . . . ut modus appellentur omnes circumstantiae." *De bono*, I, iii, 1, ad 1.

4. "Raciocinacio est faciens currere causam in causato." Isaac Israeli, *Liber de Definicionibus*, ed. J. Muckle, *AHDL* 11 (1937-38) 321. See *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, obj. 1. Cf. *Paraphrasis*, Tr. 1, chp. 3; B., VII, 399, for a later use of the same text: " . . . et intelligitur de causa consequentiae et non de causa consequentis."

5. See *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, obj. 2.

6. *Ibid*., ad 1.2.

7. Albert says in this place that Cicero does not take *ratio* for a power of the soul. This is strange since

it is the *ratio* of Macrobius' enumeration that is under discussion.

8. *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, ad 1.2.

9. "Et sic ratio procedit potius disponendo et sententiando, ut aliquid fiat, quam syllogizando, nisi forte vocetur argumentatio syllogismus rhetoricus, qui est enthymema. Et ex talibus apud nos actualiter et habitualiter eligentes procedimus." *Ibid*.

10. *Ibid*., obj. 3.

11. *Ibid*., ad 3.

12. *Ibid*., obj. 4.

13. *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, ad 4.

14. *Ibid*., obj. 5.

15. "Ad hoc autem quod obicitur de cautione sive cautela, dicendum, quod illa specialiter docet vitare pericula. Eo enim quod in talibus casibus magis difficile est dirigere et periculosum errare, ideo in tali materia specialem exigit conditionem." *Ibid*., ad 5.

16. "Et si quis vult redigere ad divisionem ea quae addit Macrobius super Tullium, dicet, quod conditio actus prudentiae potest iuvari aut ex parte inquisitionis aut ex parte sententiae sive determinationis huius vel illius aut ex parte vitationis periculi sequentis. Et si primo modo, tunc iuvat et complet potestatem circumspectio; si secundo modo, tunc iuvat docilitas; si tertio modo, tunc iuvat cautela sive cautio." *Ibid*.

17. Proverbs I, 2-5.

18. See *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, ad 8, p. 256,73 (for scientia); *ibid*., ad 9, p. 257,2 (for *disciplina*) *ibid*., ad 10, p. 257,16 (for guidance).

19. See *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, ad 6, p. 256,47 (for instruction); *ibid*., ad 7, p. 256,57 (for *astutia*).

20. *Ibid*., ad 6, p. 256,45.

21. *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, ad 7.

22. *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, sol. Text *supra*, n. 3.

23. *Ibid*., obj. 9.

24. "Et sic dicit correctionem morum per experimentum verberum, et sic procedit Glossa, quae est ad Hebraeos. Et in hoc sensu non dicit aliquam determinatam partem prudentiae vel conditionem, sed generaliter correctionem stultitiae cuiuscumque per verbera." *Ibid*., ad 9, p. 257.

25. *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, obj. 11. In connection with this word there is a verb (*calleo*), a noun (*calliditas*) and an adjective (*callidus*). Albert does not give the source or his reason for bringing up the concept. From what he says it would seem that he found it somewhere linked with prudence.

26. See *De bono*, IV, ii, 5, ad 11. It would seem that the basic meaning underlying *calliditas* is the state of having some knowledge or shrewdness. In classical Latin the meaning went in both the direction of connoting a good quality and an evil quality. Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, say, however, that in classical usage it appears more frequently in a bad sense, cf. Cicero, *De officiis* III, 32, 113, where it is linked with prudence: "Fuit igitur stulta calliditas perverse imitata prudentiam." In the Vulgate the adjective is used in both senses but apparently more frequently in a bad sense, cf. GN 3,1; Prov. 12, 16; 22, 3; Esther 16, 6; Job 36, 13.

27. *De bono*, IV, ii, 6, p. 257,25.

28. *Ethica nova*, p. XL,17-20; *EN* I 13,1103a3-7. In the translation of Grosseteste *fronesim* will be rendered as *prudentiam* which will avoid certain ambiguities. It is the opinion of Gauthier, *op. cit*., Vol. II, 100, that the division given by Aristotle here is simply a reproduction of the old division of intellectual virtue descending from the Academy: "Aristote se contente ici de reproduire cette doctrine académicienne . . ."

29. See *De bono*, IV, ii, 6, sol., p. 257,86.

30. *Ibid*., ad 2.

31. "Phronesis autem secundum acceptionem strictam, qua accipitur ab Aristotele, vocatur habitus moralium cum scientia iuris naturalis et positivi et determinatione recti vel non recti, et ideo dicit maiorem cognitionem moralium, quam exigatur ad prudentiam, cui sufficit

cognoscere 'quia', cum phronesis et sapientia determinent 'propter quid', sapientia quidem ex fine, phronesis autem ex debito et obligatione iuris." *De bono*, IV, ii, 6, sol. In the *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle distinguishes between *ὅτι* knowledge and *διότι* knowledge, *PA* I 13,78a22. These two terms came to be translated in the Latin version of the *Posterior Analytics* as *scientia quia* and *scientia propter quid* respectively, see *PL 64*, 725: "Sed quia differt, et propter quid scire, primum in eodem scientia, et in hac dupliciter." In the Oxford translation they are translated respectively as "knowledge of the fact" and "knowledge of the reasoned fact". See J. Owens for remarks regarding the retention of the Latin terms, "Our Knowledge of Nature," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 1955, p. 68, n. 23.

32. "Praeterea, quaeritur, quare Aristoteles non facit mentionem de prudentia, quae tamen praecipua est virtus intellectualis, cum ipse in libro *De anima* distinguat eam ab aliis acceptionibus, ubi dicit, quod acceptionis tres sunt species: prudentia et opinio et scientia." *De bono*, IV, ii, 6, obj. 3. See Arist., *De anima* III 3,427b24-26.

33. *De officiis* I, 43, 153.

34. Cf. *De bono*, IV, i, 3, obj. 5, p. 228,82; and IV, i, 5, obj. 19.

35. *De bono*, IV, i, 5.

36. It is true that after mentioning the theological uses Albert says, "A philosophis etiam invenitur prudentia diversimode accepta." *De bono*, IV, i, 5, p. 236,48. However, he does not deal with these uses by the philosophers but refers back to his treatment of the definitions and the matter of prudence. See *De bono*, IV, i, 5, p. 242,46.

37. See *De bono*, IV, i, 5, p. 235,93-236,23; St. Basil, *Hom. V Rufini interpretatio*; PG 31, 1767D-1768B.

38. "Praeterea, multi alii modi determinantur a glossis sanctorum hinc inde, qui summatim colligi possunt hoc modo . . . " *De bono*, IV, i, 5, p. 236,24.

39. It will be recalled that Philip the Chancellor when dealing with the species of prudence proposes to treat of *prudentia spiritus*, see *supra*, Introduction,

n. 35. Philip has a long treatment of this subject, see Padua, Antonianum _Ms_. 156, fols. 142va-145va. The discussion of Philip clearly lies behind Albert's treatment.

40. _De bono_, IV, 1, 5, sol. Although drawn from several sources, this is an original definition provided by Albert himself.

41. _Ibid_.

42. There is one interesting remark which Albert makes in connection with _prudentia spiritus_. It is objected that the difference between spiritual prudence and the virtue of prudence is that the former has the added perfection of grace. (_De bono_, IV, 1, 5, obj. 11) In reply Albert emphasises the natural basis of the cardinal virtue of prudence. Prudence as prudence is not changed because it is infused by grace: "Ad aliud dicendum quod etiam si prudentia, quae est una de quattuor cardinalibus, accipiatur informata per gratiam, adhuc non erit ipsa prudentia spiritus, quia gratia non addit ei, nisi quod sit grata et opus eius gratum, sed modum accipiendi operabilia non mutat ei gratia; adhuc enim accipit rationes liciti, expedientis et honesti. Prudentia autem spiritus haec omnia quasi supponendo ut non satis perfecta accipit ex experimento divinorum notitiam spiritualium." _De bono_, IV, 1, 5, ad 11.

43. In these first four articles Albert deals with prudence as a virtue, its definition, the matter of prudence and the act of prudence. From these considerations there emerges a full, well-rounded view of the essential nature of the cardinal virtue of prudence.

NOTES

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. A Pelzer, "Le Cours inédit d'Albert le Grand sur la Morale à Nicomaque recueilli et rédigé par s. Thomas d'Aquin," in, *Etudes d'Histoire Littéraire sur la Scolastique Médiévale*, ed. A. Pattin, E. Van de Vyver (Louvain, 1964) pp. 272-335. References to Pelzer will be to this article unless otherwise noted. It originally appeared in *RNP* 24 (1922) 333-361; 479-520. This discovery of Pelzer confirms several earlier statements to the effect that Albert had commented on the *Ethics* in a way different from the edited *Paraphrasis* (see Pelzer, p. 272-3). This commentary is in the form of a literal commentary with questions added. It would seem to be the one William of Tocco is speaking of when he says: "Posthac autem praedictus Magister Albertus cum librum *Ethicorum* cum quaestionibus legeret, frater Thomas Magistri lecturam studiose collegit et redegit in scriptis . . . " Pelzer, p. 272.

2. A. Pelzer, "Les versions latines des ouvrages de Morale conservés sous le nom d'Aristote en usage au XIIIe siècle," *op. cit.*, ed. A. Pattin, E. Van de Vyver, p. 173, places the Grosseteste translation at 1240-43. However, Callus has come to a later solution which seems more acceptable. Note his distinction between translation and circulation. He says, "In the light of the evidence in our possession, we may safely say that the complete work was not circulated before 1245-46, and even more probably 1246-47." D. Callus, "The Date of Grosseteste's Translations and Commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius and the *Nicomachean Ethics*," *RTAM* 14 (1947) 207.

3. See J. Weisheipl. *NCE* I, 255.

4. This agrees with Pelzer's conclusion, "Le Cours inédit . . . " p. 295. We have not found this conclusion seriously challenged. There is one problem connected with this unedited commentary which today is insoluble, viz., the original contribution of Thomas to the work. We can only say with Pelzer: "D'autre part, S. Thomas ne s'est pas contenté de mettre par écrit, séance tenante, les leçons qu'il entendait chez Albert: il les a ensuite, je crois,

remaniées et complétées ça et là sans recourir toutefois, lui-même, à la version de Robert Grosseteste avec son triple contenu. Néanmoins il serait difficile, sinon impossible, de faire exactement la part du maître et de l'élève dans le texte conservé du Cours . . . " p. 294. The triple content mentioned in this quotation is, (1) the translation of the *Ethics*; (2) the translation of the Greek commentaries to the *Ethics*; (3) notes, largely lexographical, of Grosseteste to the translations.

5. See Appendix, pp. 1*-2*.

6. *In VIII Physicorum*, L. I, Tr. 1, chp. 1; B., III, 1. See *De somno et vigilia*, L. III, Tr. 1, chp. 12; B., IX, 195, where Albert refers to his theological writings as the sources for his own opinions.

7. "Dicet autem fortasse aliquis nos Aristotelem non intellixisse, et ideo non consentire verbis eius, vel quod forte ex certa scientia contradicamus ei quantum ad hominem et non quantum ad rei veritatem. Et ad illum dicimus quod qui credit Aristotelem fuisse deum, ille debet credere quod numquam erravit. Si autem credit ipsum esse hominem, tunc procul dubio errare potuit sicut et nos." *In VIII Phys.*, L. VIII, Tr. 1, chp. 14; B., III, 553.

8. Grabmann, "Die Stuttgarter Handschrift des ungedruckten Ethikkommentars Alberts des Grossen," in, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, II, 322. On the subject of the *Paraphrasis* Meersseman says: "Deficiunt enim disgressiones quae in logicalibus et naturalibus abundant. Unde hic unice intendit aperire mentem Aristotelis et hic facit paraphrasando et glossas interiiciendo saepesaepius ex commentariis graecis et arabicis excerptas. *Nullibi videri potest quid ipse sentiat Albertus*." *Introductio in Opera Omnia B. Alberti Magni* (Bruges, 1931) p. 72. (Emphasis mine.) On the subject of the *Unedited Course* and Albert's own opinions therein Meersseman says: "Paraphrasando enim Aristotelem latinis voluit facere intelligibilem non vero ex proprio docere. In scriptis autem, textum aristotelicum expositione litterali . . . et deinde, --quod maximi momenti est,--quaestionibus disputatis illustravit, quibus suam propriam mentem tradere intendit occasione variarum sententiarum aristotelicarum." "Le droit naturel chez S. Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs," *Angelicum* 9 (1932) 64.

9. In saying this we are not saying that a priori the

translation of Grosseteste was inferior to our own English translations for example. Nor do we agree with Heylbut: "De latinis commentariorum versionibus innumeris fere libris servatis agere inutile duximus, quippe quae omnes a medii aevi viris doctis additamentis auctae sint, quae non tam ad Aristotelis verba explicanda quam ad Christianae doctrinae consensum demonstrandum conquisita sint . . . " *Eustratii et Michaelis et anonyma In Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria*, G. Heylbut (Berlin, 1892) p. IX. We are simply saying Albert was at a disadvantage in the same way that a person would be today who approached the text of Aristotle solely through an English translation.

10. H. Rackham, *Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934 in 1962 printing).

11. The outline which follows is a brief summary of the main divisions of chapter five according to Albert's view of the division. See Appendix, pp. 21*-27*.

12. Consequently, there are eleven questions in this section. The questions are structured like other medieval *quaestiones*: objections, solution, replies to objections. We have numbered the questions and the objections in each question. References will be made in this way: Qu. 1, ad 1, p. 6* = the first question, the reply to the first objection, page 6* in Appendix.

13. Qu. 1, obj. 1, p. 5*. The Greek word λόγος is rendered by *ratio* in the Latin translation of the *Ethics*. There is discussion with regard to the proper translation of λόγος, and this problem is simply moved to the Latin text when the word is rendered *ratio*. We shall simply translate *ratio* as reason and provide no further elucidation except where Albert does himself. In this way we shall be able to skirt the interpretation problem with regard to Aristotle and still explain Albert's use of the term.

14. The second question asks whether prudence is a *habitus activus*.

15. The notion of "cum ratione vera" at 1140b21 is not read in most modern editions of Aristotle. The *verus* is associated with *habitus*. For a discussion of the textual problem see, Gauthier, *op. cit*., p. 461-2. Since it is certain that Grosseteste translated *EN* 1140b4 as "habitum verum cum ratione", Gauthier

explains Albert's usage in this way: " . . . il faut simplement voir là un exemple de le tendance harmonisante des commentateurs." p. 461.

16. Qu. 1, ad 4, p. 7*.

17. Qu. 1, ad 1, p. 6*

18. Qu. 1, ad 2, p. 6*-7*.

19. Qu. 1, ad 3, p. 7*.

20. Qu. 2, sol., p. 8*.

21. Aristotle, *De anima* III 10.433a13-20; Averroes, *Aristotelis opera cum commentariis Averrois*. (Venice, 1550) Vol. VI, text com. 49.

22. Qu. 2, ad 1, p. 9*.

23. *Ibid*. There is a textual difficulty here whose solution is not clear. It seems the reading we have chosen brings out the sense of the text.

24. See *supra*, Chapter Four.

25. Qu. 2, ad 2, p. 9*.

26. Qu. 2, obj. 6, p. 8*. See Augustine, *De moribus eccl*., II, 15, 25; PL 32, 1322.

27. Qu. 2, ad 6, p. 10*.

28. "Solutio. Dicendum quod aliqua virtus potest dici intellectualis a tribus, scilicet a subiecto quia est perfectio mentis sive rationalis per essentiam, et a generatione quia scilicet generatur experimento et tempore, et ab obiecto sicut sapientia quae scilicet est de causis altissimis. Prudentia et ars quantum ad duo prima sunt intellectuales, sed quantum ad obiecta non, sed conveniunt cum moralibus quia prudentia est ratio eligibilium ad opus et ars ratio factibilium et secundum hoc mediae dicuntur inter intellectuales et morales non per essentiam quia sic sunt intellectuales secundum quod perficiunt potentias ad opus, sed inquantum in aliquo conveniunt cum moralibus et in aliquo cum intellectualibus . . . " V fol. 101rb.

29. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 2, p. 228,20; and *supra*, Chapter One, n. 49.

30. See *supra* , Chapter Six, n. 40.

31. Aristotle is insistent that prudence is not *scientia* in this fifth chapter of Book VI. This insistence is probably the reason why Albert does not even raise the question in this context.

32. See *supra*, n. 20.

33. Qu. 5, obj. 1, p. 12* . Cf. Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 5, 15-16; I, 6, 18-19; *supra*, Chapter One, pp. 22-23.

34. See Qu. 5, ad 4, p. 14* .

35. *Factio* and *actio* are representative terms from two different vocabulary families. In the first we have such terms as *factio*, *facere*, *factibilia*; in the second we have such terms as *actio*, *agere*, *agibilia*, *actibilia*. The terms of the first family are translated into English by words connoting production or making. The terms of the second family are translated by words connoting human moral activity. See *Paraphrasis*, L. VI, Tr. 1, chp. 2; B., VIII, 395, where Albert distinguishes *actio*, *factio* and *operatio*. The latter term is a common term (" . . . commune est ad utrumque.")

36. See *Topics* VI 6,145a15-18; *Metaph*., VI 1,1025b20-25; XI 7,1064a10-14.

37. The sentence beginning *relinquitur* (1140b4) in some modern editions of Aristotle follows the paragraph beginning *factionis* (1140b6). This means that 1140b6-7 is seen as an elucidation of the phrase: "Ars autem, quoniam aliud genus actionis et factionis." (1140b3-4). See Gauthier, *op*. *cit*., p. 473, comment on 1140b6-7.

38. Qu. 6, ad 1, p. 14* .

39. *EN* III 1,1111a22-24; Thomas Aquinas, Bk. III, lect. 4.

40. *Metaph*., VI 1,1025b24-25.

41. See *Metaph*., VI 1,1025b24: "For in the case of things made the principle is in the maker--it is reason or

art or some faculty." Cf. *Metaph*., XI 7, 1064a11.

42. *EN* VI 5,1140b6-7.

43. Appendix, p. 24*.

44. Appendix, p. 24*.

45. The example of military leadership comes from Eustratius, see Heylbut, *op*. *cit*., p. 307, lines 14-23.

46. See Qu. 6, ad 2, p. 15*. It seems that Albert's analysis of *eupraxia* in the literal commentary differs from his analysis in the sixth question. In the literal commentary *eupraxia* is explained: " . . . id est bona actio virtutis est sibi ipsi finis." (Appendix, p. 24*.) In the reply to the second objection of question six Albert mentions some arts which are *circa humana bona* but whose end is not the activity itself. Of these Albert says: "Sed tales artes dicuntur eupraxiae in greco quasi bonae actiones." These two interpretations seem to be opposed. According to the interpretation of the literal commentary the action of *eupraxia* is an end to itself. According to the interpretation of Qu. 6, ad 2, the end of the action of *eupraxia* is something extrinsic to the action itself.

47. Qu. 2, ad 4, p. 9*. The distinction is found elsewhere in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, I 1,1094a4-6; VI 2,1139b1-4.

48. *EN* VI 5,1140b11; cf. Plato, *Cratylus* 411E.

49. Appendix, p. 25*-26*.

50. *Existimatio* means 'judgment' or 'opinion'. According to Lewis and Short *dictamen* is a late Latin word for *dictum*, *praescriptum*, *praecaptum*. In Albert the *dictamen* carries the connotation of a command in the major and in the conclusion.

51. Qu. 8, sol., p. 19*.

52. *Ibid*.

53. "Primo utrum prudentia sit magis particularium quam universalium." V fol. 121rb.

54. *An*. *Pr*. II 2166b20-67b13.

55. *An. Pr.* II 21,67b4-6; cf. V fol. 121rb.

56. V fol. 121rb; S fol. 107va. In the *Recensio Carnutensis* of the *Prior Analytics* the third sense of *agere* is translated *ut agere*: "Nam scire dicitur tripliciter, aut ut universali aut ut propria aut ut agere . . . " *Aristoteles Latinus* III, 1-4. *Analytica Priora*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Paris, 1962) p. 183, lines 25-26.

57. V fol. 121rb; S fol. 107vb.

58. V fol. 121rb-va.

59. V fol. 121rb-121va; S. fol. 107vb.

60. See Qu. 10, obj. 1, p. 27*.

61. Qu. 10, ad 1, p. 28.*

62. *EN* VI 5,1140b28-30; cf. 1100b12-17.

63. Appendix, p. 27*.

64. Qu. 11, obj. 1, p. 29*.

65. Qu. 11, sol., p. 30*.

66. *Ibid*.

67. Qu. 11, sol., p. 30*.

68. See *De bono*, IV, 1, 6, p. 244,38-41; *supra*, Chapter Four, n. 60.

69. A consideration of Questions 3, 4, 7, 9, has been omitted. We shall mention the third question in the following chapter. The other questions do not directly concern the notion of prudence as such.

NOTES

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. See *supra*, Chapter Five and Chapter Six.

2. Qu. 5, ad 1, p. 13*. In a characteristic return to former notions Albert calls *providentia* a *pars prudentiae* in, *Summa Theologica* I, Tr. XVII, q. 67, m. 2; B., XXXI, 680.

3. See *supra*, Chapter Six, n. 3.

4. Various translations are offered for these terms in the different English versions. We shall follow the translations of Rackham. These virtues are treated by Aristotle in chapters 9, 10, 11, respectively in *EN* VI. In the medieval translation of the *Ethics* the Greek terms were simply transcribed, viz., *eubulia*, *synesis* and *gnome*.

5. See, V fol. 124vb-125ra.

6. See Gauthier's discussion of the purpose of Aristotle in this regard, *op*. *cit*., pp. 507-509.

7. "Primo, utrum sit necessarium quod prudentia habeat huiusmodi partes." V fol. 123rb.

8. Text for immediately preceding can be found in Lottin, *Autour d'Aristote*, Text VI, p. 357-8. See also V fol. 126vb.

9. "Si autem fiunt per rationem operis propriam quando communis ratio non est sibi applicabilis erit gnome." V fol. 126vb.

10. The texts concerning the act of prudence as described by Albert can be found in the article of Lottin, "Les débuts . . . " *PEM*, III, 271-273. Here and in his article in *Autour d'Aristote* Lottin uses the Stuttgart *Ms*. (S).

11. V fol. 125ra; *PEM*, III, 271, n. 2.

12. See Chapter Two.

13. See Chapter Three, p. 104 ff.

14. "Tertio videtur quod synesis praecedat prudentiam." V fol. 127ra. *Autour d'Aristote*, Text VII, p. 358.

15. *PEM*, III, 273.

16. See Lottin, "La connexion des vertus chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs," *PEM*, III, 197-252, partic. 231 for Albert; and "Aristote et la connexion des vertus morales," *Autour d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1955) p. 343-364, partic. p. 351-360 for Albert where Lottin gives many texts from the *Unedited Course*.

17. See Chapter Four, p. 121 ff.

18. *Ibid*., n. 54.

19. *Ibid*., n. 57.

20. See *In III Sent*., D. XXXVI, 1.

21. For a brief treatment of the sources for the doctrine of the connection of the virtues, see F. M. Utz, *De connexione virtutum moralium inter se secundum doctrinam s. Thomae Aquinatis* (Oldenburg, 1937) pp. 21-46.

22. *In III Sent*., D. XXXVI, 1, sol.; B., XXVIII, 666. See *EN* II 1,1103a14-17; *EV*, p. I,1-4.

23. *EN* X 8,1178a16-19 (Ross tr.). Coming as it does at the end of the *Ethics* this statement sounds very much like a summary of the final remarks of Book VI. However, Gauthier suggests that perhaps it is rather a preliminary sketch of the same matter of Book VI. Whichever it is, the statement as it stands is a comprehensive synthesis of the teaching of Aristotle on this matter.

24. "For vice tends to be destructive of the principle." *EN* VI 5,1140b20.

25. See *EN* VI 12,1144a6, a20-21.

26. See *EN* I 1,1103b32; VI 1,1138b21-25.

27. *EN* VI 13,1144b30-32. Again he says, "For if a man have the one virtue of prudence he will have all the moral virtues with it." *EN* VI 13,1145a1-2; cf. *EN* VII 2,1146a8; VII 10,1152a7.

28. *EN* VI 13,1145a5-6. This partition of ends and means

over moral virtue and prudence respectively is made several times by Aristotle. The conclusion has been drawn that moral virtue is concerned with the end and prudence with the means. Gauthier has been at great pains to show that this is not a true representation of the doctrine of Aristotle. At 1139a21-26 in his commentary Gauthier begins his effort to show that such an interpretation is a misrepresentation of the thought of Aristotle: "C'est là un des passages dont l'interpretation divise ceux qui veulent restreindre le champ de la sagesse (prudence) aux moyens et ceux qui veulent l'étendre à la fin." *op. cit.*, p. 446. See the comments of Gauthier to 1139a21-26; 1139a30-31; 1144b16-17. The point which Gauthier wants to make is that both ends and means are relative to one another, coupled with the notion that the moral life is an effective moral life. In order to be effective the intellectual judgment on the best means must be made in view of an end and the desire of the end must be the desire of an end which is attainable by these means. As Gauthier says, it is a question here of obtaining "la-fin-par-ce-moyen" or of using "ce-moyen-pour-la-fin". (p. 447) As we have remarked already, the partition is made since it is through moral virtue that prudence can keep its eye fixed on the right end and through prudence that moral virtue is the determined mean. But this does not signify that prudence has no knowledge of the end or that moral virtue does not desire these means to this end.

29. Qu. 3, ad 1, p. 11*.

30. Qu. 3, ad 2, p. 11*.

31. Qu. 3, obj. 3, p. 10*.

32. V fol. 130ra. This is one of the questions meant to clarify *Ethics* VI 13. In particular it is meant to clarify the texts of Aristotle relating moral virtue to the correctness of the end (1144a8; 1144a20).

33. *EN* II 6,1106b27-28: "Medietas quaedam ergo est virtutis coniectatrix existens medii." Aquinas, Book II, lect. 6.

34. We have seen that prudence prescribes the end.

35. V fol. 132ra. This is the first question of several in the section, *EN* VI 13,1144b17-30 which Albert says, "confirmat dictum suum, scil. quod moralis virtus non potest esse sine prudentia per sententias aliorum

de virtutibus omnibus." V fol. 132ra; see Aquinas, Book VI, lect. 11.

36. The text just analysed can be found in Lottin, Autour d'Aristote, p. 353.

37. V fol. 131vb. Autour d'Aristote, p. 352-3.

38. Ibid. At p. 352, line 11 we read virtutis with V for virtutes. V fol. 131vb.

39. Perhaps Albert had in mind here the Boethian dictum: "Omne namque esse ex forma est." De Trinitate II; Boethius, The Theological Tractates, ed. E. K. Rand, (Cambridge, Mass., 1962 printing), p. 8.

40. See EN II 6,1106b36-1107a1.

41. V fol. 131vb; Autour d'Aristote, Text I, p. 353.

42. Autour d'Aristote, p. 353, lines 25-27.

43. V fol. 132va; Autour d'Aristote, p. 353, Text III.

44. Albert simply says: "Electio enim est, ut dicit Damascenus, duobus propositis etc." Autour d'Aristote, p. 354,60. The allusion is to De fide orthodoxa II, 22; PG 94, 945B. See Lottin, PEM, I, 398.

45. Supra, n. 32.

46. See Autour d'Aristote, p. 354, Text IV: "Tertio videtur quod non sit necessarium omnes virtutes morales simul haberi." Meersseman edits a short question from Albert's commentary on Book VII, see RNP 40 (1937) 389: "Quarto videtur quod prudentia possit trahi a passionibus."

47. See Autour d'Aristote, p. 355.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., p. 356. It should be remarked here that we certainly have not read the whole manuscript of the Unedited Course. However, we feel that from what we have read the conclusion of Lottin is legitimate. We shall have to await the edition of the whole text before we can make a final judgment.

NOTES

CONCLUSION

1. *De bono*, IV, 1, 4, sol. See *supra*, Chapter Two, n. 32.

2. Lottin, *PEM*, III, 550, says that in a commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* synderesis and conscience could hardly be expected to emerge. This is only partially true. The concept of *universalia iuris* could hardly be expected to be found in a commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* either, but it is there. Perhaps Albert simply found no reason to introduce these admittedly foreign notions since their substance was already present in other garb.

3. *PEM*, III, 551 ff.

4. We are not suggesting any views or opinions on the 'Christian philosophy' problem discussed in some circles. Here it is not primarily a question of theology *versus* philosophy but perhaps the supernatural (grace) *versus* the natural. Does the natural provide a basis for an autonomous ethic? The theologian can answer this question. The theologians prior to Albert imply a negative response.

5. From an historical point of view much remains to be done apropos Albert's doctrine of prudence. A close confrontation of Albert's texts with Philip the Chancellor and Eustratius remains to be accomplished in order to clarify the proximate sources of Albert. However, this must await critical editions of both these men. We shall soon be in possession of a critical text of Aquinas' *Commentary on the Ethics*. Albert's influence or lack of it on Aquinas in this regard must be studied. The doctrine of Albert on prudence could be fruitfully compared with Aquinas' teaching in the *secunda pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*. While we would find a decisive advance made over the master, we would also find that Albert's most fundamental direction towards a natural ground for morals is taken up and developed.

6. Letter of March 31, 1775 to Jean François de la Harpe. See *Voltaire's Correspondence*, ed. T. Besterman (Geneva, 1964) Vol XC, letter 18280, p. 138.

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I. *Abbreviations used in this work:*

AHDL	*Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge*.
B	Borgnet edition of works of Albert.
EN	*Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle).
EV	*Ethica vetus*
Heylbut	*Eustratii et Michaelis et anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea Commentarii*.
PEM	*Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles* (Lottin).
PG	*Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca*.
PL	*Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina*.
RNP	*Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie*.
RTAM	*Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale*.

II. *Manuscripts:*

C	Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library, *Ms*. 510(388) fols. 1-156.
P	Paris, B. N. lat. *Ms*. 16582, fols. 168-172.
	Padua, Antonianum, *Ms*. 156, fols. 133 ff.
S	Stuttgart, Landesbibliothek, H. B. X. Philos. 15, fols. 1-180.
V	Vat. lat. 722, fols. 1-205.

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APPENDIX

INTRODUCTION

In this Appendix will be found an edition of the nine questions which preface Albert's literal commentary to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 5. These nine questions are followed by an edition of the literal commentary itself and two final questions which close the discussion of the fifth chapter.

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V--Vat. lat., 722, fols. 1r-205r. Perhaps of thirteenth century. Complete.[1]

C--Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library, *Ms*. 510(388) fols. 1-156+1. Perhaps thirteenth century. Complete.[2]

W--Vienna, Dominican convent, *Ms*. 129, fols. 1-256. Perhaps of the thirteenth or fourteenth century. Complete.[3]

Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, Ms. 1236, fols. 211r-231v. Thirteenth century. Contains questions of Books I, II, and part of III.[4]

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S--Stuttgart, Landesbibliothek, H.B.X. Philos. 15, fols. 1r-180v. Thirteenth century. Complete.[5]

Cracow, Jagellone Library, Cod. 643 (DD XIV 7), fols. 5r-192v. Second half of fifteenth century. Complete.[6]

Naples, National Library, *Ms*. VIII G 8, fols. 1-71. First half of fourteenth century. Contains almost exclusively the literal commentary.[7]

Naples, Archivo Grande, Cod. Museo 26, fols. 74-158. Thirteenth century. Books VIII-X and other parts of Albert and Thomas.[8]

Edition:

Although the Albertus Magnus Institute is at present preparing an edition of the Unedited Course, we felt that it was necessary to prepare a working edition of the matter with which we are concerned.[9] In the preparation of our text we have followed the guidance of Meersseman. His first general conclusion is that a text can be based on MSS V, C, S.[10] In C Meersseman distinguishes between C^1 and C^2. C^1 is the text as copied; C^2 corresponds to the later corrections. C^1 belongs to the same family as S and W and is more often better than S. C^2 corrects according to a good manuscript of another family. Sometimes the corrections of C^2 are made not according to another manuscript but according to the sense the corrector thought the text should have. Consequently, C^2 must be used prudently.[11] V can be used as the basic text corrected by means of C and S.[12] The text we shall present will use V as the basic text and it will be corrected according to CS.

There are a few points to which we would like to call attention:

1. Pointed brackets < > indicate emendations not

completely authorised by the manuscripts, or additions we have made.

2. The titles inserted in pointed brackets have no manuscript authorisation and are added for the sake of clarity.

3. Most of the references made by Albert have been found and identified. References to the Commentator are of two kinds. They either refer to Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle or the Greek commentators which were translated by Grosseteste at the time he translated the Ethics.

4. References to Eustratius are given both to the Greek edition done by Heylbut and to a manuscript containing the Latin translation of the Ethics with the translation of the Greek commentaries. This manuscript is abbreviated to P (Paris, B. N. Ms. 16582).

5. Numbering of questions, paragraphing, numbering of paragraphs are not to be found in the manuscripts. However, underlining in the literal commentary of the words of Aristotle is to be found in the manuscripts.

6. Albert's Unedited Course has not gone completely unnoticed. Sections of it have been edited in various places. The major sources are:

a. Prologue, introduction, commentary on EN I,1.[13]

b. Question headings of Book I.[14]

c. Incipits and explicits of Books I-X.[15]

d. Sections of the commentary to Book VI,5.[16]

e. Sections of the commentary to Book VI (later chapters on the connection of the virtues).[17]

7. The Latin text for Aristotle is that to be found in, _In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio_, ed. A. M. Pirotta (Turin, 1934). This text is in substantial agreement with the lemmata with the text of Aristotle in manuscript P.

8. The material edited is to be found in the following places in the three manuscripts we used:

V--fols. 112vb-114vb.
C--fols. 89va-91ra.
S--fols. 101ra-103ra.

Folio references will be given to V in our edition since it is the basic text.

9. Finally, we should like to explain the numeration system in the text of the edition. Roman capitals to the left of the page refer to the number of the question. Arabic numbers at the left of the page refer to the numbers of the objections. Raised Arabic numbers refer to the variant readings in the notes. Arabic numbers in round brackets refer to the citations adduced by Albert. There are three series of _Notes_ to the Appendix: the first is the notes to the Introduction to the Appendix; the second is to the variant readings; the third is to the citations.

<ALBERTI MAGNI COMMENTARIUM CUM QUAESTIONIBUS IN CAPITULO QUINTO LIBRI SEXTI *ETHICORUM* ARISTOTELIS>

(112vb) De prudentia. In parte ista determinat de prudentia inter quinque[1] intellectuales virtutes.[2] Et ratio ordinis assignata est supra. Ad evidentiam[3] eorum quae in littera dicuntur dubitantur[4] IX.

<QUAESTIONES I-IX>

I. Primo, quid sit prudentia quantum ad hanc partem diffinitionis quod dicit eam esse[5] cum ratione vera. Et videtur quod non sit cum ratione vera.[6]

1. Ubicumque enim convenit[7] esse plurimas deceptiones ibi non est certa ratio nec determinata veritas; (1) sed contingentium quorum est prudentia, ut ipse dicit, (2) sunt plurimae deceptiones; ergo ipsorum non est aliqua vera ratio.

2. *Praeterea*, prudentia est circa particulares sermones in moribus[8] quia tales magis sunt necessarii ad opus; sed in particularibus et moralibus sunt plurimi errores, sicut ipse dicit, propter quod non est possibile de eis universalem tractatum facere. Unde etiam propter[9] hoc[10] peccatum est in lege. Ergo et cetera.

3. *Praeterea*, eorum quae non habent veritatem nec in se nec in sua causa non potest esse vera ratio; sed contingentia

de futura, ut dicit Philosophus in primo Perihermenias, (3) sunt huiusmodi. Cum igitur de talibus sit prudentia quia non consiliamur nisi de his quae sunt in nobis, et talia sunt maxime variabilia; ergo non est cum ratione vera.

4. Praeterea, ratio hic aut dicitur diffinitio aut potentia animae; sed ratio quae est diffinitio est medium demonstrationis; ergo sic esse cum ratione vera magis pertinet ad scientiam et non ad[11] prudentiam quae est contingentium. Si autem intelligatur de ratione quae est potentia tunc[12] aequaliter convenit omni virtuti quod sit cum ratione vera.[13]

5. Praeterea, ratio non est tantum se habens ad verum sed etiam[14] ad falsum; ergo videtur omnibus modis male dicere quod sit cum ratione vera.

Solutio. Dicendum quod optime positum est[15] in diffinitione prudentiae esse[16] cum ratione vera quia hoc est regitivum in ipsius opere. Omne enim opus aliquo regente indiget.

Ad primum ergo[17] dicendum quod contingentia in quantum sunt contingentia non habent aliquam determinationem, sed[18] secundum quod sunt praeordinata a ratione sic magis se habent ad unum quam ad alterum et sic est ipsorum aliqualiter determinata veritas, non sicut necessariorum sed sicut est ratio contingentis nati, sive quod est ut[19] in pluribus et sic ipsorum est prudentia.

Ad secundum dicendum quod particularia secundum quod huiusmodi quantum ad conditiones individuantes sunt sine determinata[20] veritate; sed secundum quod exeunt ab universalibus habent aliquam[21] determinationem et sic ipsorum habet veram rationem prudentia.

Ad tertium dicendum quod illa de quibus est prudentia per[22] se considerata non habent veritatem nec in se nec in suis causis; sed[23] secundum quod stant in[24] ordine rationis et conceptione finis sic habent veritatem in causis suis ratione ordinante et voluntate determinante ad finem unum ordinata.

Ad quartum dicendum quod ratio pluribus modis dicitur quam illis duobus, et hic ratio sumitur pro fine. Dicimus enim qua ratione fecisti hoc et respondetur[25] ut hoc contingeret. Unde etiam in littera[26] (4) dicit quod prudentes sunt qui ad finem studiosum bene ratiocinantur quia[27] ratione finis dirigitur aliquis in his quae ad finem sunt.

II. Secundo, videtur quod non sit activus habitus cum ratione vera.

1. Sicut enim dicit Commentator in tertio De anima, intellectus practicus movet per suam scientiam;(5) sed scientia illa est ratio vera; ergo cum haec propositio[28] notet diversitatem non debuit dicere quod est habitus activus cum ratione sed simpliciter vera ratio.

2. Praeterea, si prudentia est habitus activus/ 113ra / aut est sufficiens aut insufficiens habitus. Si sufficiens ergo complet et perficit animam ad omnia agibilia et sic non oportet habere alios habitus ab illo et hoc est falsum

quia ad illam ordinantur omnes morales virtutes. Si autem est insufficiens ergo insufficienter perficit animam et hoc est contra suam intentionem. Vult enim quod qui habet simpliciter prudentiam quod habeat omnes[29] virtutes; ergo nullo modo videtur activus habitus.

3. *Praeterea*, tota vita comprehendit actionem et[30] contemplationem; sed prudentia dirigit per consilium ad totum vivere ut dicitur in littera;(6) ergo dirigit etiam in contemplativis[31] virtutibus et sic non oportet magis dici activus habitus quam contemplativus.

4. *Praeterea*, prudentia, sicut ipse dicit[32] in littera,(7) non est ars sed quaedam ars est activus habitus ut dicit Commentator,(8) scilicet[33] ducatus aliquis quo quis bene ducere exercitum novit, et constat[34] quod est[35] cum ratione vera; ergo haec diffinitio prudentiae non est convertibilis.

5. *Praeterea*, habitus virtutum potissime speciem a fine recipiunt. Cum igitur in diffinitione prudentiae non faciat mentionem de fine videtur insufficiens.

6. *Praeterea*, Augustinus ponit actum prudentiae eligere.(9) Ergo debuit dicere electivus habitus et non activus.

Solutio. Dicendum quod Aristoteles in diffinitione quam ponit de prudentia comprehendit et[36] materiam ipsius per hoc quod dicit quod est *circa humana bona*, et iterum actum eius per hoc quod dicit *activus*, et genus ipsius per hoc quod dicit *habitus*, et regitivum actus per hoc quod dicit[37] *cum ratione vera*.

Ad primum ergo[38] dicendum quod habitus activus et ratio vera sunt idem secundum substantiam eo quod prudentia quae utrumque complectitur quidam habitus est, sed diversa[39] secundum rationem. Est enim prudentia habitus in[40] ratione existens quo eligit vel refutat ad opus ea quae pertinent ad humanam vitam. Unde ex[41] parte illa qua attingit rationem, est in ipsa ratio vera, et est sicut regitivum quod in omni opere exigitur. Ex parte autem alia qua ordinatur ad opus habet actum et <ut haec distinctio notetur posuit propositionem mediam.> [42]

Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut dicit hic prudentia est auriga virtutum. Sicut enim ratio regit alias potentias sic prudentia alias virtutes. Unde sicut dux[43] quamvis sit[44] sufficiens in regiminis opere quod est suum opus, tamen oportet ad alia opera exsequenda ordinari milites,[45] ita etiam prudentia sufficiens est habitus ad eligendum actualia ad opus, nihilominus oportet esse alias virtutes exsequentes et subservientes illi.[46]

Ad tertium dicendum quod est triplex vita ut in primo dictum est, scilicet voluptuosa,[47] civilis et contemplativa.(10) Prudentia autem non dirigit nisi tantum ad agere vel vivere civilis vitae.

Ad quartum dicendum quod quamvis ars ducis habeat actum eo quod circa agibilia operatur non tamen habet finem actus in se quia operatio est propter aliud, scilicet propter victoriam. Sed prudentia habet actum et finem in suo actu quia non prudenter agit nisi propter prudenter agere. Unde etiam dicit Commentator quod si quaerat laudem ex hoc quasi finem non erit prudens.(11) Unde per hoc patet solutio[48] ad quintum quia in actu includitur finis.

Ad sextum dicendum quod[49] Augustinus assignavit actum prudentiae secundum quod attingit rationem, sed Philosophus considerat hic prudentiam secundum quod operatur in materia moralium virtutum. Est enim media quodammodo inter intellectuales et morales, et[50] ideo diffinit per activum.

III. Tertio, videtur quod non sit distincta ab aliis virtutibus.

1. Illud enim quod est regitivum alterius in suo opere non distinguitur/ 113rb /ab illo; sed prudentia est regitiva omnium virtutum; ergo et cetera.

2. Praeterea, omnis virtus distincta ab aliis virtutibus habet etiam materiam distinctam a materia aliarum; sed hoc non convenit prudentiae quia eligit ad opus in omnibus virtutibus; ergo et cetera.

3. Praeterea, compositum ex duobus non est distinctum ab eis; sed Commentator dicit quod[51] componitur ex moralibus virtutibus et intellectualibus;(12) ergo et cetera.

4. Praeterea, sicut se habet potentia ad potentiam ita habitus ad habitum; sed ratio cuius habitus est prudentia immiscet se aliis potentiis in quantum participatur ab eis; ergo et prudentia aliis virtutibus quibus inferiores partes perficiuntur.

Solutio. Dicendum[52] quod prudentia dupliciter potest considerari, aut secundum suam substantiam aut secundum id quod sequitur[53] ipsam. Quantum ad suam substantiam est virtus per se distincta ab aliis virtutibus, habens proprium actum qui dictus est. Sed consequitur ipsam in quantum est regitiva aliarum quod sit immixta operationibus[54] aliarum virtutum secundum quod intentio primi regulantis oportet quod sit in omnibus regulatis et secundum hoc non est distincta.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod regitivum est distinctum ab aliis quantum ad actum regiminis qui sibi singulariter convenit; sed quantum ad exsecutionem operis non habet actum distinctum in quantum huiusmodi.

Ad secundum dicendum similiter quod secundum quod in se consideratur habet materiam[55] propriam, scilicet humana bona prout sunt eligibilia ad opus. Sed in quantum movet alias virtutes ad opus habet materiam in aliis virtutibus sicut actio primi motoris est in actione secundi.

Ad tertium dicendum quod compositio illa[56] non est essentialis cum prudentia sit simplex habitus, sed[57] exigitiva quia ad hoc quod sit perfecta prudentia oportet quod sint virtutes morales exsequentes sub[58] ipsa et quod sit ratio recta dirigens. Unde est[59] intellectualis virtus essentialiter, sed quantum ad materiam moralis.

Ad quartum dicendum quod etiam simile est de ratione quod quantum ad substantiam suam distincta est ab aliis potentiis, sed in quantum movet et ordinat eas immiscet[60] se eis per suum regimen.

IV. Quarto, videtur quod prudentia non sit divina virtus.
1. Dicitur enim virtus divina qua utuntur dii. Sed sicut dicit[61] Philosophus[62] in decimo huius, dii non utuntur operibus prudentiae;(13) ergo et cetera. Contra est quod dicit Commentator quod qui sapientes sunt attribuunt divinis prudentiam[63] in ordinatione omnium et civilium et[64] naturalium.(14)

Solutio. Dicendum quod aliqua virtus[65] dicitur divina dupliciter: aut quae essentialiter est in deo et sic prudentia non est divina quia actus moralium virtutum quorum actus prudentiae ordinativus est non conveniunt[66] deo. Dicitur alio modo divina exemplariter et sic prudentia est divina virtus quia prudentis regimen exemplatur[67] a regimine divino quo omnia civilia ordinate dispensat et regit. Unde etiam Commentator dicit quod prudentis est eligere ad opus circa humana bona in ordinatione[68] ad deum, id est secundum conformitatem ad suum regimen.(15)

V. Quinto, videtur quod prudentia non sit tantum circa humanum bonum. Tullius enim in libro De officiis ponit prudentiam esse circa omne scibile.(16) Cum igitur non omne scibile sit in humanis bonis videtur quod nec[69] circa talia tantum sit prudentia.

2. **Praeterea**, per cardinales[70] virtutes et morales

perficitur anima ad omnia moralia quia aliae virtutes eis adjunctae sunt; sed prudentia est cardinalis[71] virtus intellectualis; ergo extendit se ad omnia intellectualis, et sit[72] idem quod prius.

3. __Praeterea__, in libro Sapientiae dicitur de sapientia quod sobrietatem et prudentiam docet.(17) Cum igitur nullam mentionem faciat ibi de aliis intellectualibus nisi de prudentia videtur quod nec comprehendat[74] in se omnes alias et sic non tantum est circa humana bona.[75]

4. __Praeterea__, prudentis opus est consilium; sed consilium non tantum est de humanis bonis quae sunt agibilia sed etiam de factibilibus quia etiam[76] artifices consiliantur de suis operibus; ergo videtur quod circa illa etiam sit prudentia.

__Solutio__. Dicendum quod prudentia est tantum circa humana bona et dicuntur humana bona operationes virtutum moralium quae sunt circa humanam vitam.

__Ad primum__ ergo dicendum quod Tullius large sumit prudentiam secundum quod includit in se omnes intellectuales virtutes. Unde etiam dividit ipsam in providentiam, memoriam et intellectum.(18) Sed Aristoteles hic proprie loquitur de prudentia secundum quod est distincta ab aliis intellectualibus virtutibus.

__Ad secundum__ dicendum quod virtutes dicuntur cardinales a principalitate operis. Unde prudentia est principalis[77] intellectualis virtus non quia sit principalior aliis virtutibus[78] intellectualibus et concludens in se eas, sed quia est sola inter ipsas principalior ad opus.

Ad tertium dicendum quod ibi non intendit tangere Philosophus nisi virtutes morales. Prudentia enim quodammodo moralis est quantum ad materiam ut dictum est.

Ad quartum dicendum quod ad prudentiam pertinet consilium simplex quod[79] scilicet est de his de[80] quibus consiliatur; sed consilium quod est de operibus artium pertinet ad quosdam tantum scilicet artifices, et ideo circa illud non est consilium prudentiae.

VI. Sexto, videtur quod factio contineatur sub actione.

1. Actio enim quoddam praedicamentum est;(19) sed factio non potest reduci[81] ad aliud praedicamentum; ergo continetur sub actione.

2. Praeterea, per[82] illud quod convenit alicui artium non sufficienter distinguitur prudentia[83] ab arte; sed actio convenit cuidam arti, scilicet ducendi exercitum;[84] ergo insufficienter distinguit ab arte prudentiam[85] per actionem.

3. Praeterea, musica quaedam ars est; sed operatio ipsius est finis ut dictum est in primo;(20) ergo non est verum quod factionis semper sit alterum finis.(21)

Solutio. Dicendum ad primum[86] quod actio non sumitur hic secundum quod est praedicamentum sed pro operatione cuius principium est in ipso concipiente singularia.(22) Sed materia artificialium est mota a quodam principio extrinseco[87] et ideo per[88] operationem artis non notat[89] actionem sed factionem quia est ad aliquid faciendum ut operatum quoddam.

Ad secundum dicendum quod sunt quaedam artes quae operantur circa humana bona quae sunt regitivae in talibus operibus[90] quae activae omnes dicuntur sicut ars politica, oeconomica et ducatus et talibus convenit actio secundum quod conveniunt cum operibus prudentiae quae sunt materia[91] ipsorum. Differunt autem ab operatione prudentiae quia operatio prudentiae est finis, sed operatio ducis operatur ad quoddam alterum, scilicet ad victoriam et sic de aliis. Sed tales artes dicuntur *eupraxiae* in graeco quasi bonae actiones.[92] Aliae artes sunt quae operantur non circa humana bona sed circa ea quae sunt ordinata ad illa[93] sicut fabrilis et huiusmodi quae mechanicae dicuntur, et his nulla[94] convenit actio.[95] Hos autem Graeci *tigne* vocant et ab illis intendit distinguere per rationem actionis. Apud nos autem non sunt nomina[96] distincta[97] quibus haec diversitas significari[98] possit et ideo oportuit communi nomine uti.

Ad tertium dicendum quod musicae actio non est propter alium finem qui sit operatum quoddam[1] sed tamen aliquid habet intentum[2] extra se[3] quod est delectatio aurium.

VII. Septimo, videtur quod prudentes non sint dispensativi et politici.

1. Ethicum enim negotium habet alia principia ab oeconomico; sed dispensativus justus non fuit justus simpliciter;[4] ergo nec dispensativus prudens est simpliciter prudens.

2. Praeterea, personalis virtus[5] pertinet[6] ad unum tantum; sed prudentia est huiusmodi; ergo pertinet ad regimen unius[7] et non ad regimen domus ut possit prudens dispensativus dici nec ad regimen civitatis[8] ut possit dici politicus.

Solutio. Dicendum quod aliquis potest esse prudens dupliciter: aut secundum quid et imperfecte et sic potest esse aliquis qui se ipsum tantum scit regere et non alia et sic non est dispensativus neque politicus; aut simpliciter et[9] perfecte et sic potest se refere ex habitu in omnibus quae pertinent ad humanam vitam civilem sive sint singulares operationes sive sint ad domus regimen pertinentia vel etiam ad regimen civitatis.

Ad primum[10] dicendum quod secundum propriam rationem justitiae ipse dicit quod dispensativus non sit simpliciter justus quia justus[11] vult esse circa commune sed omnia quae sunt in domo sunt propria patrifamilias[12] qui dispensativus est et ideo ad ipsum non potest esse justitia et non ex hoc quod est ethica virtus.

Ad secundum dicendum quod personalia sunt principium civilium secundum quod bonum personae redundat in bonum domus et ulterius in bonum gentis et regni.

VIII. Octavo, videtur quod inconvenienter dicat temperantiam salvare prudentiam.

1. Prudentia enim eligit secundum rectam[13] rationem eligibilia ad opus in omnibus virtutibus; sed quod se habet ad plura non conservatur[14] per unum tantum; ergo non debuit

tantum dicere de temperantia.

2. Si dicas sicut[15] Commentator quod tres virtutes cardinales regulatae a ratione sunt sorores (23) et ideo quod dicitur de una intelligitur de alia, contra est quod ratio non esset quare tunc magis diceret de una quam de alia quia de quacumque dixisset intelligeretur de alia.

3. Si dicas quod omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones quia etiam justitiae operationem de qua minus videtur consequitur delectatio vel tristitia, temperantiae autem est temperare in passionibus unde sumitur hic temperantia pro[16] moderamine quod est in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, contra est quia refrenare ab omnibus passionibus est etiam continentiae. Ergo si hoc intellexit potius debuit dicere continentia.

4. Si dicas iterum sicut idem dicit(24) quod quaelibet virtutum moralium dicitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie et communiter ad omnes alias sicut fortitudo proprie est circa difficile in periculo[17] belli sed communiter dicta est respectu cuiuslibet difficilis in qualibet virtute, similiter justitia proprie dicta est in distributionibus et communicationibus sed communiter dicta in rectitudine secundum omnes potentias animae, temperantia etiam[18] proprie sumpta est tantum[19] circa delectationes tactus sed communiter dicitur secundum quod temperat ab omnibus passionibus et sic sumitur hic prout est generalis ad omnes alias; contra est quia[20] haec communitas[21] est tantum secundum rationem

nominis. Cum igitur Aristoteles non intendat[22] in littera hoc quod dictum est tantum ex ratione nominis[23] sed etiam ex parte rei, videtur quod intelligitur de temperantia proprie dicta.(25)

5. Praeterea, in secundo dixit quod multi sunt scientes sed econtrario[24] operantes.(26) Ergo videtur quod delectatio intemperantiae non corrumpat estimationem[25] prudentiae.

6. Praeterea, estimatio[26] prudentiae est contemplatio operabilium. Per delectationem intemperantiae non corrumpitur estimatio[27] scibilium quia nihilominus manet habens geometriam scientiam intemperatus; ergo non corrumpit estimationem[28] prudentiae per eandem rationem.

7. Si dicas quod in opere carnis anima efficitur sub carne tota, unde et[29] dicit Gregorius quod in illo actu spiritus sanctus[30] non tangebat corda prophetarum et ideo corrumpitur estimatio[31] prudentiae, contra, contemplatio/ 114ra /sapientiae et intellectus magis <est>[32] elevata supra carnem quam existimatio prudentiae, et magis impeditur per carnales cogitationes sed illa non corrumpitur;[33] ergo nec existematio prudentiae.

8. Praeterea, multotiens videt aliquis finem propter quem operandum esset et tamen[34] propter[35] intemperantiam contrarium operatur; ergo videtur quod delectatio talis non corrumpit finem ut dicit.(27)

9. Praeterea, si corrumperet existimatio prudentiae, semper peccaret intemperatus per ignorantiam; sed ipse hoc

supra removit quia dixit peccatum ex passione aliud a peccato per ignorantiam in quarto; ergo falsum est quod dicit.

Solutio. Dicendum quod existimatio prudentiae non est ipsa prudentia sed dictamen ipsius ad operandum. Dictamen autem[36] est tripliciter, scilicet in maiori propositione quae est scire in universali ut non esse fornicandum, et dictamen in minori propositione quod[37] est scire in particulari ut huic[38] commisceri est fornicari, et dictamen conclusionis quod[39] est scire in agere quando iam sententiatur, scilicet de faciendo vel non faciendo. Delectatio igitur intemperantiae non corrumpit habitum prudentiae sed dictamen ipsius, et non in maiori propositione quia scit in universali hoc non esse faciendum, sed in minori propositione partim corrumpit, quia proponit sibi particulare simpliciter non secundum quod stat sub universali. Proponit enim quod mulier est[40] pulchra et ideo ex toto corrumpitur in conclusione et caecatur[41] ratio quia universalis virtus non venit in conclusionem unde sententiat[42] in contrarium.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod solum secundum tactum sunt delectationes simpliciter circa quas est temperantia[43] ut dictum est in tertio(28) et ideo delectationes tales maxime corrumpunt existimationem prudentiae absorbendo rationem. Et propter hoc etiam temperantia magis est salvativa ipsius quam aliae virtutes. Tria alia concedimus quia non videntur rationes[44] illae[45] secundum intentionem Aristotelis.

Ad quintum dicendum quod Aristoteles ibi[46] intellexit quod sunt scientes in universali.

Ad sextum[47] dicendum quod contemplatio operabilium non corrumpitur in universali sed in particulari sicut[48] dictum est et magis quam contemplatio simpliciter contemplativarum virtutum quamvis etiam illae impediantur a suo actu quia dictamen prudentiae est in eodem genere et talia nata sunt corrumpere[49] se invicem trahendo unum ad[50] alterum;[51] sed speculationes rerum contemplabilium sunt alterius generis. Unde[52] patet ratio[53] ad septimum.

Ad octavum dicendum quod finis in quantum est bonum quoddam non corrumpitur sed in quantum est terminus huius operis. Videt enim hoc[54] simpliciter esse appetendum ut finem sed non applicat ad hanc operationem delectatione praeventus.

Ad nonum dicendum quod non corrumpit habitum cognitionis singularium in quibus est actus et ideo non est peccatum per ignorantiam.

IX. Nono, videtur quod ars sit virtus.

1. Omnis enim intellectualis virtus est virtus; sed ars est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera.

2. *Praeterea*, si ipsius sit virtus hoc non est nisi quia circa artificiosum convenit[56] esse virtutem; sed similiter etiam est virtus circa agibile cuius est prudentia; ergo et prudentiae est virtus.

3. *Praeterea*, qui peccat volens peccat ex malitia; sed qui sic[57] peccat est exprobabilior ut supra dixit in quarto;

ergo videtur falsum dicere quod peccans in arte scienter eligibilior est.

Solutio. Dicendum quod intentio sua est dicere quod ars non est moralis virtus sed ipsius est moralis virtus quia circa artificiatum convenit[58] esse moralem[59] virtutem sicut patet de justitia quae est circa artificialium communicationes; sed prudentia quodammodo est moralis virtus/ 114rb / quia est circa agibile et finis eius est in ipso actu ipsius et ideo ipsius non potest esse virtus quia moralis virtutis non est moralis virtus[59a] quia sic esset abire[60] in infinitum.(29) Et per hoc patet solutio ad duo prima.

Ad tertium dicendum quod peccans in arte ex scientia eligibilior est quantum ad scientiam artis in qua per hoc non ostenderetur[61] deficiens; sed quantum ad mores est vituperabilior.

<COMMENTARIUM AD LITTERAM>

Dividitur etiam[62] haec pars secundum Commentatorem in duas.(30) Primo determinat de prudentia secundum suam substantiam. In secunda inquirit circa quam partem animae sit, ibi: duabus autem[63] (1140b25). Prima dividitur in duas, primo ostendit circa quid sit prudentia. In secunda[64] ostendit differentiam prudentiae ad duos determinatos habitus ut concludat diffinitionem prudentiae, ibi: consiliatur[65] autem (1140a31). Circa primum tria facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio et ordinem tractandi,[66] et dicit quod hoc modo sumenda est[67] nobis prudentiae consideratio ut speculemur primo quos dicamus esse prudentes et assignat Commentator rationem huius quia recta via est[68] ut procedatur ab his quae sunt notiora secundum nos.(31) Prudens autem est notius quo[69] ad nos quam prudentia quae est simplex habitus et ideo per cognitionem prudentis oportet venire in cognitionem prudentiae. Secundo, ibi: *videtur autem* (1140a35) ostendit circa quid sit operatio prudentis quia circa talia est etiam prudentia, et dicit quod prudentis est posse ex habitu *consiliari bene* (1140a26) quantum ad modum virtutis, *circa bona ipsi*[70] (1140a26) quantum ad ea quae sunt finis operationis licet non sit ulterius finis simpliciter. Et dicit *ipsi*[71] quia de his quae agunt scire non considerantur Lacedemones ut in tertio dicit[72]. (31a) *Et circa conferentia* (1140a37) id est utilia ordinata ad finem et hoc *non secundum partem* (1140a27), id est non secundum unam particularem virtutem aut operationem vitae sicut ad sanitatem vel fortitudinem *sed ad totum bene vivere* (1140a28) secundum civilem vitam. Tertio, ibi: *signum autem* (1140a28) probat per signum quod haec probatio familiaris est huic scientiae et dicit quod signum huius quod dictum est, est hoc quod nos dicimus aliquem esse prudentem circa aliquid determinate quando bene ratiocinatur de his quae conferunt ad finem studiosum de quibus non est ars quia alias diceremus eum esse artificiosum. Et ita patet quod prudens est simpliciter *consiliativus totaliter* (1140a30) id est de his quae ad totam vitam pertinent.

Deinde cum dicit *consiliatur* (1140a31) ostendit differentiam prudentiae ad scientiam et artem. Et primo ad scientiam principaliter. Secundo ad artem, ibi: *factionis* (1140b6). Circa primum tria facit. Primo ponit rationem qua ostenditur[73] differentia[74] quae talis est: omnis scientia est de his quae non possunt aliter se habere; sed prudentia nulla est de talibus; ergo prudentia non est scientia. Primam[75] sic probat: omnis scientia est ex demonstratione; sed demonstratio non est nisi ex[77] necessariis; ergo et cetera. Secundam sic probat: prudentia[78] non est nisi eorum quorum est consilium; sed consilium est de contingentibus aliter se habere, neque de his quae non[79] contingunt ipsi consilianti agere et si sint in se contingentia; ergo et cetera. Et inducitur sub forma antecedentis totum ab illo loco: *quare scientia* usque ibi: *non utique* (1140a33-b2) et est ibi consequens sive conclusio quia conclusio est amplior quam ratio quia ratio non concludit nisi[80] de scientia et ipse de arte addit in conclusione. Et[81] ideo secundo, ibi: *scientia quidem* (1140b2). De uno probat conclusionem sigillatim et primo resumit probationem de scientia quia scientia est necessariorum; sed actibile cuius est prudentia est contingens aliter se habere; ergo et cetera. Et/ 114va /deinde gratia conclusionis inductae probat per accidens de arte et est ratio talis: ars est factibilium sed prudentia agibilium; sed alterum est genus actionis et factionis; ergo prudentia non est ars. Tertio, ibi: *relinquitur ergo*[82] (1140b4), concludit diffinitionem prudentiae per differentiam ad scientiam et patet per se ex disputatione. (32)

Deinde cum dicit *factionis* (1140b6) ostendit principaliter differentiam artis et prudentiae. Et primo secundum quod ars est virtus. Secundo secundum quod non est virtus, ibi: *sed tamen artis* (1140b22). Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit differentiam. Secundo concludit iterum diffinitionem per comparationem ad artem, ibi: *quare necesse* (1140b20). Differentiam autem ostendit tripliciter. Primo ex parte materiae tali ratione: omnis factio est ad alium finem extra se; sed actionis non semper est alius finis quia *eupraxia* (1140b7), id est bona actio virtutis est sibi ipsi finis; ergo actio et factio differunt et sic prudentia et ars. Et hoc est quasi confirmatio prius positae differentiae. Et dicit *non semper* (1140b7) ut[83] removeat artes quae sunt circa actibilia sicut ducatus cuius finis est extra. Secunda probatio est per signum, ibi: *propter hoc*[84] *Periclem* (1140b7-8) qui fuit valde peritus in consiliis civilibus et tales qui ipsum imitantur dicimus prudentes in quantum sciunt speculari ad opera[85] quae sunt[86] bona sibi ipsis[87] et aliis. Et tales sunt qui sibi et aliis providere student, *dispensativi* (1140b10-11) id est oeconomici et politici habentes regere civitatem. Sed tales non dicimus artificiosos et sic patet quod ars non est prudentia quia non dicuntur de eisdem. Tertia probatio est per comparationem temperantiae ad prudentiam quia prudentia <m>[88] salvat temperantia[89] et non artem, ibi: *hinc et temperantiam* (1140b11). Circa[90] hoc tria facit. Primo, probat quod salvat prudentiam ex nomine quia in graeco dicitur temperantia sophrones. Phronesis[91] enim est prudentia. Unde dicitur temperantia sophrones quasi salvans prudentiam quia salvat existimationem ipsius,[92] id est dictamen de faciendo in conclusione.[93] Sed latinum nomen temperantiae hoc non exprimit. Secundo, ibi: *non enim omnem* (1140b13) probat per rationem quae talis est: cuiuscumque contrarium corruptivum est alterius, ipsum est salvativum ipsius; sed delectatio intemperantiae non corrumpit omnem existimationem artis vel scientiae, ut quod triangulus *habet angulos aequales* <*duobus*>[94] *rectis*, (1140b16), (et dicit duos quantum ad quantitatem sed tres sunt quantum ad formam), sed existimationem[95] quae est circa operabilia quae est existimatio prudentiae; ergo temperantia non salvat artem vel scientiam sed prudentiam. Tertio, ibi: *principia quidem enim* (1140b16) ostendit quomodo corrumpit[96] quantum ad principium sui quia principium operabilium est id cuius gratia fit operatio. Sed propter delectationem vel tristitiam non statim in promptu apparet hoc principium in quantum est terminus operis, neque apparet quod gratia huius oporteat operari et eligere omnia propter hoc scilicet finem illum delectatione velante oculos rationis in minori propositione et conclusione[97] quia malitia, id est inordinata delectatio large pro quolibet vitio est corrumptiva principii quod est finis in quantum est terminus operis huius.

Deinde cum dicit *quare*[98] *necesse* (1140b20), concludit iterum diffinitionem prudentiae per differentiam ad artem et iterum patet./ 114vb /

Deinde cum dicit *sed tamen artis* (1140b21022) ostendit differentiam artem in quantum non est virtus per duas rationes quarum prima talis est: ars non est virtus moralis sed eius[1] est virtus[2] ut dictum est. Prudentia autem est virtus et eius non est virtus, ergo et cetera. Secundam ponit ibi: *et in arte* (1140b22-23) quae talis est: qui peccat in arte voluntarie est eligibilior ad artem quam qui peccat invitus; sed econverso[3] est de prudentia sicut est de omnibus aliis virtutibus moralibus; ergo prudentia differt ab arte.

Deinde ibi: *duabus autem* (1140b25) ostendit in qua parte animae sit prudentia. Ibi duo facit. Primo ostendit quod sit in opinitiva parte per quod[4] seiungitur a scientia. Secundo quod non habet tantum quod est rationis per quod seiungitur ab arte, ibi: *sed tamen neque* (1140b28). Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit et dicit quod cum duae sint partes animae rationem habentes communiter accipiendo rationem, scilicet scientificum et ratiocinativum vel opinativum, alterius horum erit prudentia scilicet virtutis opinativae. Secundo, ibi: *opinio enim* (114ob27) probat tali ratione: omnis habitus qui est circa contingens[5] aliter se habere illius est potentia[6] quae est circa idem obiectum propter proportionem quam oportet esse inter potentiam et habitum perficientem; sed prudentia est circa huiusmodi; ergo est in opinativa.[7]

Deinde cum dicit *sed tamen neque* (1140b28) ostendit quod non habet tantum id quod est rationis. Et primo proponit et dicit quod non est habitus[8] cum ratione solum sed etiam principia innata. Secundo, ibi: *signum autem* (1140b28-29) probat hoc modo: cuiuslibet habitus qui est cum ratione solum est oblivio; sed prudentiae non est; ergo et cetera. Et circa hanc ultimam partem quaeruntur duo.

<QUAESTIONES X-XI>

X. Primo, utrum prudentia[9] sit in opinativa virtute.

Videtur quod non.

1. Habitus enim verum dicens et non fallens non est in parte fallibili. Cum igitur talis habitus sit prudentia ut in littera dicit, non erit in opinativa quae est fallibilis.

2. *Praeterea*, supra ubi[10] enumeravit[11] virtutes intellectuales exclusit[12] opinionem ab illis.(33) Cum igitur prudentia sit quaedam intellectualis virtus videtur quod non sit in opinativa.

3. *Praeterea*, ratio et opinio differunt; sed supra dictum est prudentiam esse in ratiocinativo; ergo et cetera.

4. *Praeterea*, Commentator dicit quod prudentia magis simulatur sapientiae quam scientiae; sed scientia est in scientifico in quo etiam[13] est sapientia; ergo multo magis debet in illo[14] esse prudentia.

5. *Praeterea*, Philosophus in secundo dixit quod virtutes sunt voluntates quaedam.(34) Cum igitur prudentia sit virtus, videtur quod sit in voluntate.

Solutio. Dicendum quod perfectio[15] debet esse proportionata perfectibili. Prudentia autem est habitus accipiens et procedens per probabile medium. Unde oportet sit habitus perficiens illam partem animae quae nata est accipere probabilia et contingentia et haec est opinativa quam superius dixit[16] ratiocinativam secundum partem.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia numquam fallit in maiori propositione ubi est tota virtus ipsius sed in minori et in[17] conclusione fallit ut[18] dictum est. Et hoc non est prudentiae secundum quod huiusmodi sed convenit ex defectu materiae immixtione passionum.

Ad secundum dicendum quod superius exclusit[19] opinionem quae est vulgaris causata a sensu. Sed hic accipit opinativum ab opinione quae est sapientium ex ratione imperfecti medii. Et hoc est idem quod supra dixit ratiocinativum. Unde patet solutio ad tertium.

Ad quartum dicendum quod magis dicitur convenire cum sapientia non[20] quantum ad essentialia cum sit ex probabilibus, sed in quantum attingit divina quorum est sapientia secundum quod regulatur iure divino ut supra dictum est.

Ad quintum dicendum quod sunt voluntates quaedam omnes virtutes et non simpliciter secundum quod voluntas est motor aliarum virium, et non quidem ut dirigens quia[21] hoc est rationis quae per suam essentiam recta est a qua etiam voluntas regitur. Et ideo non oportet quod sit in voluntate ut in subjecto sed magis in ratione cum ipsa sit regitiva omnium virtutum moralium.

XI. Secundo, videtur quod prudentiae possit esse oblivio.

1. Oblivio enim est deletio habitus; sed prudentia est habitus delibilis et ex parte medii quia non procedit per causam necessariam, et ex parte subiecti quia est habitus acquisitus; ergo eius potest esse oblivio.

2. Si dicas sicut dicit Commentator quod[22] ideo non potest ipsius esse oblivio quia est humanorum in quibus hoc semper exercitatur,(35) contra, contingit quod aliquis abstrahatur ab humanis ut si efficiatur[23] heremita. Talis autem non exercitabitur in operibus humanis quorum est prudentia; ergo poterit oblivisci.

3. Praeterea, eius cuius non potest esse oblivio non debet tradi ars memorativa; sed Tullius in Rhetorica dat artem memorandi circa humana;(36) ergo et cetera.

4. Praeterea, in secundo dixit quod virtutum intellectualium

est generatio per experimentum et tempus;(37) sed prudentia est huiusmodi virtus; ergo per experimentum et tempus generatur, quibus etiam subtractis erit oblivio ipsius.

5. **Praeterea**, idem dixit quod innati sumus suscipere eas sed perficere ex assuetudine;(38) sed omne id quod non habetur ex principio naturali est delibile[24] manente natura; ergo et cętera.

Solutio. Dicendum quod prudentiae simpliciter et secundum totum non potest esse oblivio. Sed[25] potest esse quod aliquis efficiatur[26] minus habilis ad applicandum ad opus et huius ratio est quia universalia iuris sunt in nostra natura in quibus substantialiter[27] est prudentia. Et ista[28] semper permanent.[29] Sed secundum applicationem ad opus particulare oportet quod perficiamur per experimentum et per alia iura scripta quia ius illud universale est. Unde non potest applicari eodem modo ad omnia, sed oportet quod habeatur aliquid simile regulae Lesbiae aedificationis(39) sicut ipse[30] dixit de epiichia et quantum ad hoc generatur per experimentum et tempus. Et ad hoc etiam datur ars memorandi in Rhetorica quia argumenta[31] rhetorica trahuntur a partibus circumstantis negotii; sed quantum ad principia est semper manens quia haec virtus maxime humana est. Et per hoc patet solutio ad omnia quae obiecta sunt.

NOTES

APPENDIX: INTRODUCTION

1. Pelzer, "Le Cours inédit . . ." *ed*. *cit*., p. 276.

2. *Ibid*., p. 278. See also M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and Caius College* (Cambridge, 1908) Vol. II, n. 510.

3. Pelzer, "Le Cours inédit . . ." *ed*. *cit*., p. 279.

4. *Ibid*., pp. 279-80.

5. M. Grabmann, "Die Stuttgarter Handschrift des ungedruckten Ethikkommentars Alberts des Grossen," in, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, II, 313-323. Because of the presence of *peciae* (see, p. 318) Grabmann considers the value of the manuscript to be great: "Für die so überaus wünschenswerte Edition dieses grossen ungedruckten Ethikkommentars Alberts des Grossen wird die Stuttgarter Handschrift die erste Stelle beanspruchen können." p. 321.

6. G. Meersseman, "Les manuscrits du cours inédit d'Albert le Grand sur la Morale à Nicomaque recueilli et rédigé par Saint Thomas d'Aquin," *RNP* 38 (1935) 64-65.

7. *Ibid*., pp. 68, 70-77.

8. G. Meersseman, "L'original de l'abrégé napolitain du cours inédit d'Albert le Grand sur l'Ethique à Nicomaque," *RNP* 40 (1937) 385-395.

9. On Feb. 10, 1965 I received word from the Institute saying that the first three books had been sent to the printers. They were promised not before the autumn of 1966 and have not yet appeared.

10. See Meersseman, *RNP* 38 (1935) 79.

11. *Ibid*., p. 66-67.

12. "L'éditeur du cours inédit d'Albert le Grand sur l'Ethique pourra donc continuer a se baser sur le manuscit V, commes nous l'avons déjà dit, quitte à

en corriger les fautes au moyen des manuscrits CS." Meersseman, RNP 40 (1937) 397. On pages 396 and 397 of this article the author presents a stemma for all the MSS in question.

13. Pelzer, "Le Cours inédit . . . " *ed. cit.*, pp. 298-329.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 329-333. Using V.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 333-335. Using V.

16. Lottin, "Les débuts du traité . . . " PEM, III, 271-277 *passim*. Using S.

17. Lottin, *ibid.*; and Lottin, "Aristote et la connexion des vertus morales," *Autour d'Aristote*, pp. 352-354; 356-358. This later article repeats several texts from the commentary on Book VI, chp. 5. Using S.

NOTES

APPENDIX: VARIANT READINGS

1. *Om*. CS.
2. in parte ista tertio inter intellectuales virtutes determinat de prudentia S; in hac parte tertio inter intellectuales virtutes determinat de prudentia C.
3. *Add*. autem C.
4. *Add*. hic C.
5. *Om*. S.
6. *Add*. *in marg*. cum ratione vera C.
7. contingit S.
8. *Om*. in moribus S.
9. *Del*. C.
10. *Om*. C.
11. *Om*. S.
12. *Add*. hoc C.
13. *Om*. C.
14. *Om*. VS.
15. *Add*. est C.
16. *Om*. V.
17. autem CS.
18. *Om*. S.
19. *Om*. V.
20. determinate S.
21. aliam S.

22. secundum CS.

23. *Om*. S.

24. *sub* C.

25. rendetur C.

26. *Om*. in littera V.

27. *Add*. ex CS.

28. *Add*. cum CS. The *cum* here perhaps refers to the whole phrase, "cum ratione vera". Both the sense of this objection and the reply are uncertain to us.

29. omne C.

30. scilicet S.

31. contemplatis S.

32. probat CS.

33. sed V; si S.

34. continuat S.

35. *Add*. quod S.

36. etiam S.

37. *Om*. habitus, et regitivum actus per hoc quod dicit V.

38. vero V.

39. diversus V.

40. cum S.

41. a S.

42. This reading is uncertain. V reads, et ut haec diffinitio notetur posuit cum propositionem mediam; S reads, et ut haec distinctio notetur posuit compositionem mediam; C reads, et ut haec distinctio (*corr*. *from* diffinitio) notetur posuit cum propositionem mediam .

43. dixit S.

44. sic C.

45. Add. ad alia officia exercitus CS.
46. sibi CS.
47. Add. et C.
48. ratio V.
49. Om. dicendum quod C.
50. Om. S.
51. Om. V.
52. Add. dicendum S.
53. consequitur C.
54. operibus V.
55. naturam V.
56. Om. C.
57. sit S.
58. Om. V.
59. utile sit V; utile est S.
60. immiscit C.
61. Om. C.
62. Add. probat C.
63. sapientiam V.
64. Add. etiam CS.
65. prudentia S.
66. Add. de CS.
67. Add. in marg. et sic prudentia est . . . exemplatur C.
68. ordine CS.
69. non C.
70. carnales V.

71. carnalis V.

72. sic S.

73. *Add*. divina CS.

74. comprehendit C.

75. *Om*. V.

76. *Om*. V.

77. *Om*. V.

78. *Om*. C.

79. quia S.

80. *Om*. S.

81. duci V.

82. *Om*. V.

83. prudentiam V.

84. exercitus S.

85. *Homoeoteleuton* sed actio . . . prudentiam C, *corrected in mar*. *but* distinguit ab arte om. *Om*. prudentiam S.

86. *Om*. ad primum C.

87. intrinseco S.

88. *Om*. C.

89. vocat CS.

90. virtutibus S.

91. materiae S.

92. operationes V.

93. ea V.

94. nullo modo C.

95. factio S.

96. notitia S.

97. *Add*. a S.

98. figurari S.

1. quiddam V.

2. *Om*. V.

3. sensum VS.

4. *Add*. civiliter CS.

5. *Add*. non S.

6. *Add*. nisi S.

7. illius V.

8. civilitatis V.

9. aut C.

10. *Add*. ergo C.

11. iustitia VS.

12. patris familias CS.

13. *Om*. S.

14. conversatur S.

15. *Add*. dicit S.

16. per VC

17. periculis S.

18. autem S.

19. *Om*. VS.

20. quod V.

21. *Add*. non S.

22. ostendat C.

23. Om. cum igitur . . . nominis *homoeoteleuton* C.

24. contrario V.

25. existimationem C.
26. existimatio C.
27. existimatio CS.
28. existimationem CS.
29. etiam CS.
30. scilicet V.
31. existimatio CS.
32. sunt VCS.
33. corrumpuntur VS.
34. non V.
35. per C.
36. *Add*. hoc C.
37. quae S.
38. hoc C.
39. quae S.
40. *Om*. C.
41. excecatur V.
42. sentiat S.
43. intemperantia VS.
44. solutiones CS.
45. *Add*. procedere CS.
46. *Om*. V.
47. septimum S.
48. ut CS.
49. *Om*. V.
50. *Om*. CS.

51. Add. ad se CS.

52. Add. etiam CS.

53. solutiones CS.

54. Om. S.

55. Om. et cetera V.

56. contingit S.

57. Om. S.

58. contingit S.

59. Om. esse moralem V.

59a. et ideo non potest esse ipsius virtus esse V; et ideo ipsius non potest esse virtus quia moralis virtus non est moralis S.

60. esset abire: abiretur C.

61. ostendetur CS.

62. autem CS.

63. quae V.

64. secundo C.

65. consiliatus S.

66. determinandi CS.

67. Om. C.

68. etiam V.

69. Om. V.

70. ipsa C.

71. ipsa CS.

72. dixit CS.

73. ostendit C.

74. differentiam C.

75. prima V.

76. sicut V.

77. de S.

78. scientia V.

79. *Om*. CS.

80. *Add*. ibi CS.

81. *Om*. CS.

82. *Add*. et cetera CS.

83. *Add*. primo S.

84. *Om*. V.

85. opus C.

86. sint CS.

87. ipsius V.

88. prudentia VCS.

89. temperantiam VCS.

90. et circa CS.

91. sophronesis S.

92. *Om*. C.

93. conclusionem S.

94. habet duos angulos aequales rectis VCS. There is doubt about the proper reading of this text in the Greek of Aristotle, cf. Bywater. The Greek of Eustratius supports the reading, *duos*. The Latin of Eustratius reads, *duos*, Paris, B. N. *Ms*. 16582 fol. 170ra. *Duos* obviously caused Albert some trouble and he inserted a parenthetical explanation. We have emended the text according to the reading in the Aquinas commentary, Book VI, lect. IV.

95. existimatio S.

96. *Add*. et dicit quod corrumpit CS.

97. conclusionem VC.
98. quia S.
1. *Om*. S.
2. *Om*. C.
3. econtrario CS.
4. *Om*. V.
5. contingentes S.
6. potentiae CS.
7. *Add*. quae est circa huiusmodi CS.
8. *Om*. S.
9. *Om*. VC.
10. *Om*. CS.
11. ennaravit CS.
12. excludit CS.
13. *Om*. S.
14. illa CS.
15. *Add*. semper C.
16. *Om*. S.
17. *Om*. CS.
18. *Add*. supra CS.
19. excludit C.
20. *Om*. S.
21. et V.
22. quia CS.
23. efficitur S.
24. debile CS.

25. *Add*. bene CS.

26. efficitur CS.

27. aliter V.

28. ita V.

29. manent CS.

30. *Om*. C.

31. (?) S; *add*. in V.

NOTES

APPENDIX: CITATIONS IN EDITION

1. Cf. Arist., *EN* 1 3,1094b14 ff; II 2,1104a1 ff.
2. *EN* VI 5,1140b2-3.
3. Cf. *De interpretatione* 9,18a34 ff.
4. *EN* VI 5,1140a28-30.
5. Cf. *De anima* III 10,433a14-20; Averroes, text com. 49.
6. *EN* VI 5,1140a28.
7. *EN* VI 5,1140b2.
8. P fol. 169va-vb; Heylbut, p. 307,14-23.
9. Augustine, *De moribus ecclesiae* I, 15, 25; PL 32, 1322.
10. *EN* I 5,1095b17.
11. P fol. 169vb; Heylbut, p. 307,25-26.
12. P fol. 168rb; Heylbut, p. 303,6 ff. (?).
13. *EN* X 8,1178b7-25. This text is also referred to in Albert's commentary on the first book. See edition in Pelzer, "Le Cours inédit . . ." *ed*. *cit*., p. 309.
14. P fol. 170ra; Heylbut, p. 308,20.
15. *Ibid*.
16. Cicero, *De officiis* I, 5, 15-16; I, 6, 18-19.
17. Wis. 8, 7.
18. Cf. Cicero, *De inventione* II, 53, 160.
19. *Categories* 4,1b25; 9,11b1 ff.
20. Cf. *EN* I 7,1097b25-26.
21. Cf. *EN* VI 5,1140b6-7.

22. Cf. EN III 1,1111a23.

23. P fol. 170va; Heylbut, p. 309,36 ff.

24. P fol. 170va-b; Heylbut, p. 310.

25. Cf. P. fol. 170vb-171ra; Heylbut, p. 310-311.

26. EN II 4,1105b12.

27. Cf. EN VI 5,1140b17.

28. EN III 10,1118a30.

29. Cf. P fol. 171vb; Heylbut, p. 313,4.

30. Cf. P fol. 172ra; Heylbut, p. 314,4 ff.

31. P fol. 172ra; Heylbut, p. 303,29.

31a. EN III 3,1112a24.

32. This is a reference to the preceding questions of Albert.

33. EN VI 3,1139b17.

34. EN II 5,1106a3. Albert is following the translation of the Ethica vetus here (p. V,11).

35. P fol. 172rb-va; Heylbut, p. 315,19.

36. (Pseudo-) Cicero, Ad Herennium III, 16, 28.

37. EN II 1,1103a16-17.

38. EN II 1,1103a24-26.

39. EN V 10,1137b30-31.